考虑风险规避和谈判权力的农产品供应链绿色投资机制

研究风险规避的农户和风险中性的销售商组成的农产品供应链,在集中式决策和分散式决策下绿色投资的最优决策问题.考虑两类成本共担契约,分别为一般成本共担契约和考虑谈判权力的讨价还价的成本共担契约;同时,分析风险规避和谈判权力对相关决策变量的影响.结果表明:在分散式供应链中,风险规避与绿色投资水平负相关,而在两类契约中,两者正相关.两类契约都有利于供应链绿色投资水平和期望效用的提高.在双方谈判的成本共担契约中,成本分担比例和绿色投资水平分别与谈判权力和风险规避正相关;在满足一定条件时,供应链绿色投资水平高于集中式供应链的相应值;供应链绿色投资水平和期望效用可同时高于一般成本共担契约中的相应值.投资成本系数对供应链绿色投资水平和期望效用有负向影响.

Green investment mechanism of agricultural supply chain considering risk aversion and bargaining power

This paper studies the optimal decision of green investment in the supply chain of agricultural products composed of a risk-averse farmer and a risk-neutral retailer under centralized and decentralized decision-making. Two types of cost-sharing contracts are considered, one is the general cost-sharing contract and the other is the cost-sharing contract under the bargaining game between two parties considering the bargaining power. At the same time, the influence of risk aversion and bargaining power on relevant decision-making variables are compared. Research conclusions show that in the decentralized supply chain, risk aversion is negatively correlated with the green investment level, while in the two types cost-sharing contracts, risk aversion is positively correlated with the green investment level. Both contracts are beneficial to the improvement of the green investment level and expected utility of the supply chain. In the cost-sharing contract under the bargaining game, cost-sharing ratio and green investment level are positively correlated with bargaining power and risk aversion, respectively; the green investment level of the supply chain can be higher than that of the centralized supply chain under certain conditions; under other certain conditions, the expected utility and the green investment level of the supply chain can be higher than the corresponding value in the general cost-sharing contract. The capital cost coefficient has a negative effect on the green investment level and expected utility of the supply chain.