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长期合约电力市场的竞价模型研究
引用本文:张士军 连加裕 权先璋. 长期合约电力市场的竞价模型研究[J]. 电力自动化设备, 2004, 24(5): 35-37
作者姓名:张士军 连加裕 权先璋
作者单位:华中科技大学,电子与信息工程系,湖北,武汉,430074;华中科技大学,水电与数字化工程学院,湖北,武汉,430074
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(70271069)
摘    要:论述了电力市场的合同交易机制,应用博弈论套用Stackelberg策略对合同市场建模求解。给出了电网、电力公司及独立发电厂制定合同电价和分配负荷模型,并举例验证了模型的可行性,给电力市场提供了参照,最后提出了模型的局限性和改进之处。

关 键 词:博弈论  合约电价  合约电量  Stackelberg策略
文章编号:1006-6047(2004)05-0035-03

Research of bidding model for long-term contract trade power market
ZHANG Shi-jun,LIAN Jia-yu,QUAN Xian-zhang. Research of bidding model for long-term contract trade power market[J]. Electric Power Automation Equipment, 2004, 24(5): 35-37
Authors:ZHANG Shi-jun  LIAN Jia-yu  QUAN Xian-zhang
Abstract:The contract bargaining mechanism of power market is discussed and a solution of contract market modeling based on Stackelberg strategy of game theory is presented. The models for setting the contract price and distributing the load by power net,power company and independent power plant are introduced. The feasibility of the models is tested by several examples,which could be used as references to power market operation,and their limits and improvements are also given. This project is sponsored by National Nature Science Foundation of China(70271069).
Keywords:game theory  contract price  contract capacity  Stackelberg strategy
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