| 代建制下公共工程主体行为博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 万乐平.代建制下公共工程主体行为博弈分析[J].山西建筑,2007,33(17):248-249. |
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| 作者姓名： | 万乐平 |
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| 作者单位： | 岳阳市公路桥梁基建总公司,湖南,岳阳,414000 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用博弈论对公共工程代建制中业主、代建单位和承建商三者之间的委托代理问题进行了分析,并在博弈均衡的基础上提出了业主应设计合理的激励机制,使代建单位和承建商的行为更接近业主的目标。
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| 关 键 词： | 代建制 委托代理 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-6825（2007）17-0248-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-02-09 |
A game analysis on the behavior of main parts in the public projects under the construction substitute |
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| WAN Le-ping.A game analysis on the behavior of main parts in the public projects under the construction substitute[J].Shanxi Architecture,2007,33(17):248-249. |
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| Authors: | WAN Le-ping |
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| Affiliation: | WAN Le-ping |
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| Abstract: | In the public projects under the construction substitute the principal-agent problems among the owner, the substitute construction company and the contractor are to be discussed in this paper. On the game balanced the owner should design a reasonable an incentive system to make the behaviors of the substitute construction company and the contractor be more close to the goal of the owner. |
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| Keywords: | the construction substitute principal-agent incentive system |
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