| 不对称信息下逆向供应链契约设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 贡文伟,李虎,葛翠翠. 不对称信息下逆向供应链契约设计[J]. 工业工程与管理, 2011, 16(5): 27-32 |
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| 作者姓名： | 贡文伟 李虎 葛翠翠 |
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| 作者单位： | 江苏大学工商管理学院,江苏镇江,212013 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金青年项目(10CGL025); 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJA630043); 江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2011SJB630007); 江苏大学高级专业人才科研启动基金项目(11JDG005) |
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| 摘 要： | 制造商对废旧产品的回收积极性在很大程度上影响逆向供应链的实施和协调.运用委托代理理论和甄别博弈的显示性原理,探讨不对称信息下逆向供应链契约设计问题.分别基于政府不参与逆向供应链运作、政府对制造商实施奖励、政府对制造商实施奖惩三种前提,建立决策模型,得到不同模型下制造商提供给零售商的契约设计策略.三种契约比较分析显示:政...
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| 关 键 词： | 逆向供应链 契约设计 不对称信息 激励机制 |
The Contract Design of Reverse Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information |
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| GONG Wen-wei,LI Hu,GE Cui-cui. The Contract Design of Reverse Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information[J]. Industrial Engineering and Management, 2011, 16(5): 27-32 |
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| Authors: | GONG Wen-wei LI Hu GE Cui-cui |
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| Affiliation: | GONG Wen-wei,LI Hu,GE Cui-cui (College of Business Administration,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China) |
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| Abstract: | The enthusiasm of manufacturers recovering waste products has greatly affected the implementation and coordination of the reverse supply chain.Using the display principle of agent theory and the screening game theory,we discussed the contract design problem of the reverse supply chain under asymmetric information.We built decision-making model and obtained the manufacturer's contract design strategies which provided for the retailers in three different models of when the government did not participate in th... |
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| Keywords: | reverse supply chain contract design asymmetric information incentive mechanism |
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