Mechanical safety analysis for high burn-up spent fuel assemblies under accident transport conditions

Abstract

Transport packages for spent fuel have to meet the requirements concerning containment, shielding and criticality as specified in the International Atomic Energy Agency regulations for different transport conditions. Physical state of spent fuel and fuel rod cladding as well as geometric configuration of fuel assemblies are, among others, important inputs for the evaluation of correspondent package capabilities under these conditions. The kind, accuracy and completeness of such information depend upon purpose of the specific problem. In this paper, the mechanical behaviour of spent fuel assemblies under accident conditions of transport will be analysed with regard to assumptions to be used in the criticality safety analysis. In particular the potential rearrangement of the fissile content within the package cavity, including the amount of the fuel released from broken rods has to be properly considered in these assumptions. In view of the complexity of interactions between the fuel rods of each fuel assembly among themselves as well as between fuel assemblies, basket, and cask body or cask lid, the exact mechanical analysis of such phenomena under drop test conditions is nearly impossible. The application of sophisticated numerical models requires extensive experimental data for model verification, which are in general not available. The gaps in information concerning the material properties of cladding and pellets, especially for the high burn-up fuel, make the analysis more complicated additionally. In this context a simplified analytical methodology for conservative estimation of fuel rod failures and spent fuel release is described. This methodology is based on experiences of BAM acting as the responsible German authority within safety assessment of packages for transport of spent fuel.     

Thermal analysis of proposed transport cask for three advanced burner reactor used fuel assemblies

Abstract

Preliminary studies of used fuel generated in the US Department of Energy's Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative have indicated that current used fuel transport casks may be insufficient for the transportation of said fuel. This work considers transport of three 5-year-cooled oxide advanced burner reactor used fuel assemblies with a burn-up of 160 MWD kg^–1. A transport cask designed to carry these assemblies is proposed. This design employs a 7-cm-thick lead gamma shield and a 20-cm-thick NS-4-FR composite neutron shield. The temperature profile within the cask, from its centre to its exterior surface, is determined by two-dimensional computational fluid dynamics simulations of conduction, convection and radiation within the cask. Simulations are performed for a cask with a smooth external surface and various neutron shield thicknesses. Separate simulations are performed for a cask with a corrugated external surface and a neutron shield thickness that satisfies shielding constraints. Resulting temperature profiles indicate that a three-assembly cask with a smooth external surface will meet fuel cladding temperature requirements but will cause outer surface temperatures to exceed the regulatory limit. A cask with a corrugated external surface will not exceed the limits for both the fuel cladding and outer surface temperatures.     

Implementation of burn-up credit approach for transport and storage cask

Abstract

TN International currently uses burn-up credit methodology for the design of casks dedicated to the transport of pressurised water reactor uranium oxide spent fuel assemblies. As long as the fuel enrichment of the pressurised water reactor fuel assemblies was sufficiently low, a burn-up credit methodology based on the sole consideration of actinides and the use of a partial burn-up was satisfactory to cover the needs without necessity to design new casks. Nevertheless, the continuous increase in the fuel enrichment during the last decade has led TN International to continue the investigations on the burn-up credit methodology to limit both the increase in the neutron poison content in the new basket designs and the burn-up constraints attached to the acceptability of the fuel assemblies for transport. The strategy of TN International was then to take benefit of the large negative reactivity reserves, which might be gained by the consideration of the fission products coming from the fuel irradiation. A big step forward has recently been reached by TN International on this field with the definition of an advanced burn-up credit methodology based on the consideration of relevant fission products recommended by OECD. In the meantime, TN International has taken the opportunity to use such burn-up credit approach in the design of the TN 24 E transport and storage cask developed for the German nuclear power plants. The relevant task has been carried out according to the German standard DIN 25712 for burn-up credit application. The present paper will describe the basic principles of the burn-up credit methodology implemented by TN International such as:

(i) the current state of the art concerning the burn-up credit application in the criticality assessment

(ii) the basic approach used for the implementation of the advanced burn-up credit methodology (bounding axial burn-up profiles, fuel irradiation parameters, fission products, etc.)

(iii) the area of validity of the TN International burn-up credit approach with fission products

(iv) example of application of the burn-up credit methodology for the design of the TN 24 E transport and storage cask under licensing in Germany

(v) the perspectives of development of the burn-up credit methodology.     

Operational experience of on-site transport of spent nuclear fuel in Korea

Abstract

With the rapid development of the nuclear power programme in Korea, the amount of accumulated spent nuclear fuel has inevitably increased year by year. The spent nuclear fuel is being stored in on-site storage pools at the nuclear power plants. As the current storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel is insufficient, at-reactor storage is being expanded at each site with regard to optimisation of technical and economic factors. On-site transport between neighbouring reactors has been necessary to secure sufficient storage capacity for pressurised water reactor spent nuclear fuel assemblies. A complete on-site transport system has been developed, and so far more than 800 spent nuclear fuel assemblies have been transported using two kinds of transport cask.     

Description of the German Concept of Final Storage Cask

Abstract

The German storage concept for the direct final storage of spent fuel assemblies from LWR reactors is described. The final storage concept is designed in such a way that it encompasses the whole spectrum of fuel elements to be stored from German reactors, Le. U fuel assemblies and MOX fuel assemblies with a mean bumup of 55 GW.d.t^?1 heavy metal were considered. The further design requirements are defined in such a way that the cask concept satisfies the conditions for type B(U) transport, interim storage and fmal storage. The safe long-term containment of the activity is guaranteed by an inner cask welded leak-tight; the sufficient shielding and the transport packaging are ensured by a shielding cask.     

Thermal analysis of a storage cask for 24 spent PWR fuel assemblies

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to perform a thermal analysis of a spent fuel storage cask in order to predict the maximum concrete and fuel cladding temperatures. Thermal analyses have been carried out for a storage cask under normal, off-normal and accident conditions. The environmental temperature is assumed to be 27°C under the normal condition. The off-normal condition has an environmental temperature of 40°C. An additional off-normal condition is considered as a partial blockage of the air inlet ducts. Four of the eight inlet ducts are assumed to be completely blocked. The accident condition is defined as a 100% blockage of air inlet ducts. The storage cask is designed to store 24 PWR spent fuel assemblies with a burn-up of 55,000 MWD/MTU and a cooling time of 7 years. The decay heat load from the 24 PWR assemblies is 25.2 kW. Thermal analyses of the ventilation system have been carried out for the determination of the optimum duct size and shape. The finite-volume computational fluid dynamics code FLUENT was used for the thermal analysis. From the results of the analysis, the maximum temperatures of the fuel rod and concrete overpack were lower than the allowable values under the normal, off-normal and accident conditions.     

Spent fuel transport using cask loaded outside pool

Abstract

During the last year, Sogin (the Italian company in charge for decommissioning of Italian nuclear power plants) had to implement an accelerated decommissioning plan of a EUREX spent fuel pool due to finding a water leakage into the environment from the pool. EUREX is no longer operating a pilot reprocessing plant, which some years ago became the responsibility of Sogin. There were 52 spent fuel assemblies from the Trino Vercellese PWR nuclear power plant, 48 irradiated pins from a Garigliano BWR fuel assembly, and 10 plates from an irradiated MTR fuel assembly stored in the EUREX pool, so the first step of the accelerated decommissioning plan consisted in the evacuation of this spent fuel. Considering the necessity to start the evacuation as soon as possible, Sogin decided to use an already existing cask (AGN-1) used in the past for the transport of Trino and Garigliano fuel assemblies. This cask was requalified in order to obtain a transport licence for the fuel assemblies stored in the EUREX pool according to ADR 2005 regulation. The transport license for the AGN-1 cask loaded with EUREX fuel assemblies was released by APAT (the Italian Safety Authority) in the spring of 2007. Owing to the limited capacity of the EUREX pool crane (27 t for nuclear loads) and limited dimensions of pool operational area, it was not possible to transfer the AGN-1 cask (50 t) into the pool for fuel assemblies charging. The solution implemented to overcome this problem was the loading of the cask outside the pool. A special shielding shuttle was developed and used to allow safe spent fuel transfer between the pool and the cask. This procedure avoided also the problem of excessive contamination of cask surfaces that could have occurred due to very high level of contamination of EUREX pool water if the cask had been immersed in the pool. Additional shielding devices were developed and used to reduce dose rate during cask loading operations. Although the evacuation of spent fuel assemblies from the EUREX pool was a very challenging activity due to the short time available, unfavourable space conditions inside the pool building and handling tool limitations; all loading and transport operations were performed successfully and without particular problems. Ten transports were carried out to evacuate all of the spent fuel stored in the EUREX pool. Spent fuel was transferred to the Avogadro Deposit pool. The first loading sequence started on 2 May 2007 and the first transport was performed on 6 May 2007. The tenth and last transport was performed on 21 July 2007. A dose less than 50 μSv (neutron + gamma) was measured for the most exposed operator during a complete cask loading sequence.     

Multiple water barriers: alternative to assessment of fuel assemblies during accident conditions of transport

Abstract

Packages for the transport of radioactive material have to comply with national and/or international regulations. These regulations are widely based on the requirements set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 'Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material'. In this framework, packages to transport fuel assemblies (including spent fuel assemblies) have to meet the requirements for packages containing fissile material. In accident conditions of transport, the applicant for the package design approval has to show that the package remains subcritical taking due account of the status of the contents in these conditions. In most cases, considering water ingress in the package, it is not possible to assume that the fissile material included in the fuel assemblies is dispersed in the package with the most severe conceivable distribution regarding criticality. In order to alleviate this difficulty, during the last years, we have provided a significant better knowledge of the conditions of the fuel assemblies to be transported. This was part of the Fuel Integrity Project, whose progress was regularly reported during PATRAM 2001 and PATRAM 2004 Symposia. However, for packages which encounter a large g-load during accident conditions of transport and/or which contain spent fuel assemblies with very high burn-up, it can be difficult to demonstrate that the fuel assemblies are not significantly damaged. Then, to make the criticality assessment considering water inleakage into the flask and a large release of fissile material within its cavity will not allow meeting the subcriticality criteria. For that reason, for our package designs, which use a gas and not water as an internal coolant and which fall into that category, the author has decided to take credit of the possibilities provided by the subparagraph 677 (b) of the Regulations. This paragraph allows not taking into account water in the package, provided that the package exhibits 'multiple high standard water barriers'. The paper describes the author's experience with the implementation of this paragraph. Two different cases are considered: either a double vessel, or a double lid. It will be explained when each of these solutions is implemented, and give examples of package designs with such features, as well as the approvals which were granted for these designs in various countries.     

Development of new transportable storage casks for interim dry storage

Abstract

We have started a programme to design a new type of transportable storage cask (Hitz casks) for both boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurised water reactor (PWR) fuels for use in the new interim dry spent fuel storage project in Japan. The basic policy of this development is to use proven technology to realize a safe and cost-effective design with a high transport and storage capacity and a low fabrication cost. Since it is not permissible to change the lid gaskets at the storage facility, the double-lid system is designed to be able to use double metallic gaskets as the containment boundary for transport after the storage period; this is one of the new design features used in the casks. With the basket design we tried to achieve a capacity of 69 fuel assemblies for BWR fuel and 26 fuel assemblies for PWR fuel. Further details about these and other topics are discussed.     

Moving the Largest Capacity PWR Dual-Purpose Cask in the World from Gösgen NPP to the Zwilag Interim Storage Site

Abstract

The Swiss Gösgen nuclear power plant (NPP) has decided to use two different methods for the disposal of its spent fuel. (1) To reprocess some of its spent fuel in dedicated facilities. Some of the vitrified waste from the reprocessing plant will be shipped back to Switzerland using the new COGEMA Logistics, TN81 cask. (2) To ship the other part of its spent fuel to the central interim storage facility at Zwilag (Switzerland) using a COGEMA Logistics dual-purpose TN24G cask. The TN24G is the heaviest and largest dual-purpose cask manufactured so far by COGEMA Logistics in Europe. It is intended for the transport and storage of 37 pressurised water-reactor (PWR) spent fuel assemblies. Four casks were delivered by COGEMA Logistics to Gösgen NPP. Three transports of loaded TN24G casks between Gösgen and Zwilag were successfully pelformed at the beginning of 2002 using the new COGEMA Logistics Q76 wagon specifically designed to transport heavy casks. This article describes the procedure of operations and shipments for the first TN24G casks up to storage at Zwilag. The fourth shipment of loaded TN24G was due to take place in October 2002. The TN24G cask, as part of the TN24 cask family, proved to be a very efficient solution for Kemkraftwerk Gösgen spent fuel management.     

Adaptation of Approved Transport and Storage Cask Lines to Individual Customer Requirements

Abstract

Within the decommissioning programmes of the Italian nuclear power plants, the Italian multi-utility company ENEL decided to rely on on-site dry storage while waiting for the availability of the national interim storage site. SOGIN (Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari SpA, Rome, Italy), now in charge of all nuclear power plant (NPP) decommissioning activities was created in the ENEL group but is now owned by the Italian government. In 2000 it ordered 30 CASTOR® casks for the storage of its spent fuel not covered by existing or future reprocessing contracts. Ten CASTOR X/A17 casks will contain the Trino pressurised water reactor (PWR) fuel and the Garigliano boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel currently stored in pools at the nuclear power plant Trino and the Avogadro nuclear facility at Saluggia. Additionally 20 CASTOR X/B52 casks will contain the BWR fuel assemblies, which are stored in the pool at the Caorso nuclear power plant. GNB (Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear-Behaelter mbH, Essen, Germany) has completed detailed studies for the design of both types of cask. The tailored cask design is based on the well-established and proven design features of CASTOR reference casks and is responsive to the needs and requirements of the Italian fuel and handling conditions. The design of the CASTOR X/A17 for up to 17 Trino PWR fuel assemblies or 17 Garigliano BWR fuel assemblies and the CASTOR X/B52 cask holding up to 52 Caorso BWR fuel assemblies is suitable for the following conditions of use: loading of the casks in the fuel pools of the nuclear installations at Trino, Caorso and Avogadro; no upgrading of the Current on-site crane capacities; transport of the fuel assemblies, which are currently stored at the Saluggia facility to the nuclear power plant Trino; on-site storage in a vertical or horizontal position with the possibility of transfer to another temporary storage or a final repository, even after a number of years; the partial loading of mixed oxide (MOX) and failed fuel; loading and drying of bottled Garigliano fuel assemblies. On the basis of the CASTOR V/19 and CASTOR V/52 cask lines, the design of the CASTOR X/A17 and X/B52 casks aims at optimising safety and economics under the given boundary conditions. The long time for which fuel is kept in intermediate wet storage results in a reduced shielding and thermal-conduction requirement. This is used to meet the tight mass and geometry restrictions while allowing for the largest cask capacity possible.     

BWR spent fuel transport and storage with TN9/4 and TN24BH casks

Abstract

In 2001 the Swiss nuclear utilities started to store spent fuel in dry metallic dual purpose casks at ZWILAG, the Swiss interim storage facility. BKW FMB Energy Ltd, as the owner of the Mühleberg nuclear power plant, is involved in this process and has selected to store the spent fuel in a new high capacity dual purpose cask, the TN24BH. For the transport Cogema Logistics has developed a new medium size cask, the TN9/4, to replace the NTL9 cask, which has performed numerous shipments of BWR spent fuel in past decades. Licensed by the IAEA 1996, the TN9/4 is a 40 t transport cask, for seven BWR high burnup spent fuel assemblies. The spent fuel assemblies can be transferred to the ZWILAG hot cell in the TN24BH cask. These casks were first used in 2003. Ten TN9/4 shipments were made, and one TN24BH was loaded. After a brief presentation of the operational aspects, the paper will focus on the TN24BH high capacity dual purpose cask and the TN9/4 transport cask and describe in detail their characteristics and possibilities.     

Spent fuel transportation risk assessment: cask impact analyses

Abstract

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently completed an updated Spent Fuel Transportation Risk Assessment, NUREG-2125. This assessment considered the response of three certified casks to a range of impact accidents in order to determine whether or not they would lose their ability to contain the spent fuel or maintain effective shielding. The casks consisted of a lead shielded rail cask that can be transported either with or without an inner welded canister, an all-steel rail cask that is transported with an inner welded canister, and a DU shielded truck cask that is transported with directly loaded fuel. Finite element analyses were performed for impacts at speeds of 48, 97, 145 and 193 kilometres per hour into a rigid target. Impacts in end-on, side-on, and CG-over-corner orientations were analysed for each cask and impact speed. Calculations were performed to equate these impacts onto rigid targets with higher speed impacts onto the yielding targets that exist in the real world. These analyses indicated that a cask with an inner welded canister or a truck cask would not release radioactive material in any impact accident and that only very high-speed impacts onto hard rock targets could result in either release of material or significant degradation of shielding for rail casks without an inner canister. Impacts other than those onto flat unyielding targets were also considered. Analyses show that an impact that bypasses the impact limiters on the ends of the casks does not result in seal failure and neither does an impact by a locomotive also between the impact limiters.     

Spent fuel transportation risk assessment: conclusions

Abstract

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently completed an updated Spent Fuel Transportation Risk Assessment, NUREG-2125. The study reached the following findings. First, the collective dose risks from routine transportation are vanishingly small. These doses are about four to five orders of magnitude less than collective background radiation doses. Second, the routes selected for this study adequately represent the routes for spent nuclear fuel transport, and there was relatively little variation in the risks per kilometre over these routes. Third, radioactive material would not be released in an accident if the fuel is contained in an inner welded canister inside the cask. Fourth, only rail casks without inner welded canisters would release radioactive material, and only then in exceptionally severe accidents. Fifth, if there were an accident during a spent fuel shipment, there is less than one in a billion chance the accident would result in a release of radioactive material. Sixth, if there were a release of radioactive material in a spent fuel shipment accident, the dose to the maximally exposed individual would be <2 Sv (200 rem) and would not cause an acute fatality. Seventh, the collective dose risks for the two types of extraregulatory accidents (accidents involving a release of radioactive material and loss of lead shielding) are negligible compared to the risk from a no release, no loss of shielding accident. Eight, the risk of loss of shielding from a fire is negligible. Ninth, none of the fire accidents investigated in this study resulted in a release of radioactive material. Based on these findings, this study reconfirms that radiological impacts from spent fuel transportation conducted in compliance with NRC regulations are low. In fact, this study’s radiological impact estimates are generally less than the already low estimates reported in earlier studies. Accordingly, with respect to spent fuel transportation, this study reconfirms the previous NRC conclusion that the regulations for transportation of radioactive material are adequate to protect the public against unreasonable risk.     

Analysis of the Castor RBMK Cask Cooling Preceding Discharge of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Abstract

An important problem of the handling of casks intended for spent nuclear fuel transport and storage is providing safety during all operations. In particular the safety requirements should be fulfilled during the cask cooling that precedes the discharge of spent nuclear fuel from the cask. An analysis has been performed for the CASTOR RBMK cask heat removal system. This provides forced cooling of the cask with the spent fuel assemblies in it, by water delivery into the cask inner cavity. As a result of analyses performed for the different flow rates of the cooling water, the maximum pressure in the cask cavity caused by water evaporation has been estimated and compared with the maximum permissible value and the time taken by the cask in cooling to the given temperature limit has been determined. On the basis of the analysis results the most preferable regime for CASTOR RBMK cask cooling is suggested.     

Spent fuel transportation risk assessment: cask fire analyses

Abstract

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently completed an updated Spent Fuel Transportation Risk Assessment, NUREG-2125. This assessment considered the response of three certified casks to a range of fire accidents in order to determine whether or not they would lose their ability to contain the spent fuel or maintain effective shielding. The casks consisted of a lead shielded rail cask that can be transported either with or without an inner welded canister, an all steel rail cask that is transported with an inner welded canister, and a DU shielded truck cask that is transported with directly loaded fuel. For the two rail casks, large pool fires that were concentric (fully engulfing), offset from the casks by 3 m, and offset from the cask by 18 m were analysed using the computational fluid dynamics CAFE-3D fire modelling code coupled with the finite element analysis PATRAN-Thermal heat transfer code. All of the fires were assumed to last for 3 h. In addition to these extraregulatory fires, the regulatory 30 min fire was analysed using both the regulatory uniform 800°C boundary condition and the more realistic CAFE-3D fire modelling code. For the truck cask, only the engulfing fire case was analysed using a 1 h fire duration. In all of the fire analyses, the seal region of the cask stayed below the failure temperature; therefore, there would be no release of radioactive material. In addition, the temperature of the fuel rods stayed below their burst rupture temperature, providing another barrier to release. For the lead shielded cask, very severe fires cause some of the lead to melt. There is no leak path for this molten lead to exit the shield region, but its expansion during the melting and subsequent contraction due to solidification during cool down results in a reduction in gamma shielding effectiveness.     

Time dependent burn-up and fission products inventory calculations in the discharged fuel of the Syrian MNSR

The Syrian Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), a 30 kW, 89.8% HEU fueled (U-Al), went critical in March, 1996. By operating the reactor at nominal power for 2.5 h/day, the estimated core life is 10 years. This paper presents the results of fuel burn-up and depletion analysis of the MNSR fuel lattice using the ORIGEN 2 code. A one-group cross-section data base for the ORIGEN 2 computer code was developed for the Syrian MNSR research reactor. The ORIGEN 2 predicted burn-up dependent actinide compositions of MNSR spent fuel using the newly developed data base show a good agreement with the published results in the literature. In addition, the burn-up characteristics of MNSR spent fuel was analyzed with the new data base. Finally, to study the effect of burn-up on the reactivity, the microscopic cross-sections of the fission products calculated by the WlMS code (using the number densities of fission products generated by the ORIGEN 2 code as a function of burn-up time), were used as an input for the CITATION code calculations. The results contained in this paper could be used in performing criticality safety analysis and shielding calculations for the design of a spent fuel storage cask for the MNSR core.     

Spent Fuel Transport Associated With Other Dangerous Goods in Regular Train Units — Assessment of Hypothetical Explosion Impacts

Abstract

Continental railway transport regulations (RID) do not exclude the transport of spent fuel casks in a regular train unit that also contains wagons with other hazardous materials. In the case of a train accident the release or reactions of those dangerous goods could potentially give significant accidental impacts on to the spent fuel casks. The assessment of fires from inflammable liquids and the explosion impacts from pressurised inflammable gases (like LPG) is well known from other studies which have usually revealed sufficient safety margins to the robust spent fuel cask designs. A new problem to be assessed is the potential impact from a detonation blast wave from explosives transported in the same train unit as a spent fuel cask. BAM is assessing this problem by developing a numerical model to calculate the effect of the dynamic pressure of a external shockwave on the cask construction. The calculation results show that the integrity of a robust monolithic cask with a screwed lid closure system is preserved after the effect of a 21 tonne (equivalent weight of TNT) explosive detonation in the regular transport configuration with a distance of 25 m between the centre of the explosion and the front of the cask.     

Mobile system for the management of fuel assemblies from research reactors

Interim storage in transport and storage casks of the CASTOR type, and later the final storage of these casks are planned for the management of spent fuel assemblies from German research reactors.A mobile transfer unit is used for loading the casks with fuel assemblies on the reactor sites. Key components of the mobile transfer unit are a transfer cask, the recharging lock, and an air-cushion transport system. By means of the air-cushion transport system, the whole equipment, as well as the CASTOR casks, is transported into the reactor building. Thus, handling of the 16 t CASTOR casks is possible even on reactor sites within sufficient crane capacity. A 20 ft container accommodates the mobile transfer unit and all accessories so that the whole equipment can be transported to the reactor sites by truck.     

Letter to the Editor

Abstract

Transport of fresh MOX fuel assemblies for the prototype FBR MONJU initial core started in July 1992 and ended in March 1994. As many as 205 fresh MOX fuel assemblies (109 assemblies for an inner core, 91 assemblies for an outer core and 5 assemblies for testing) were transported in nine transport missions. The packaging for fuel assemblies, which has shielding and shock absorbing material inside, meets IAEA regulatory requirements for Type B(U) packaging including hypothetical accident conditions such as the 9 m drop test, fire test, etc. Moreover, this packaging design features such advanced technologies as high performance neutron shielding material and an automatic hold-down mechanism for the fuel assemblies. Every effort was made to carry out safe transport in conjunction with the cooperation of every competent organisation. This effort includes establishment of the transport control centre, communication training, and accompanying of the radiation monitoring expert. No transport accident occurred during the transport and all the transport missions were successfully completed on schedule.