双渠道模式下定向优惠券投放策略研究

针对优惠券促销对供应链中产品定价及渠道成员收益的影响,考虑从消费者效用理论角度,构建单一渠道和双渠道投放优惠券的博弈模型,探讨优惠券促销投入和消费者偏好扰动下的渠道竞争效应,寻求供应链系统的组合优化策略,最后通过双重协调机制改善供应链运作效率。结果表明:1)存在优惠券投放、产品批发价格及零售价格的最优化组合实现供应链优化;2)零售商利润与优惠券面值呈正相关关系,制造商利润与优惠券面值呈凹函数关系;3)制造商投放定向优惠券造成两个渠道抢占细分市场,加剧了渠道冲突,影响了制造商和零售商的利润。为此设计双重协调机制,通过成本共担契约实现供应链的协调和成员利润的帕累托改进。     

商业信用-广告合作的供应链两部定价契约协调

在一个制造商和一个零售商构成的供应链中,考虑制造商以提供商业信用、零售商以广告形式进行的合作对制造商制定批发价格的影响,通过纵向整合分析、Nash均衡分析与Stackelberg均衡分析,阐明两部定价契约在供应链协调及收益分配方面的作用,确定了实现供应链协调的契约参数与条件。最后通过数值算例说明了所得结论。     

促销努力竞争情形下双渠道供应链协调策略

研究需求依赖于促销努力水平下的供应链优化协调问题。分别建立了集中式供应链和分散式供应链两种模型,在分散式模型中,发现批发价格契约不能协调该双渠道供应链,而改进的批发价格契约可以协调该双渠道供应链。然后分别研究了制造商促销努力系数、零售商促销努力系数,以及顾客对直销渠道的接受度对供应链绩效的影响,并且进行了相关的算例分析,给出相应的管理意义。     

公平偏好下考虑双边保鲜努力的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

针对供应商主导的生鲜农产品供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型;在考虑供应商、零售商双边保鲜努力水平影响生鲜农产品新鲜度和市场需求的情况下,分析零售商公平偏好对生鲜农产品供应链双边保鲜努力水平和供应链协调性的影响;采用委托代理模型对“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约协调机制进行研究,旨在增加供应链整体利益及其稳定性,更好地协调成员之间的利益。研究表明,无论是否考虑零售商公平偏好,批发价格契约均无法实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,且零售商公平偏好会进一步降低双边保鲜努力水平、使供应链偏离最优。最后基于“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约不仅能使双边保鲜努力水平达到集中决策下最优,实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,还能实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进。     

考虑促销行为和消费者偏好的医药供应链协调研究

探究了由医药制造商和医药零售商组成的两级双渠道医药供应链,其中医药零售商负责传统销售渠道,医药制造商通过网络平台负责网络销售渠道,医药制造商既是医药零售商的上游供货商又是其竞争者。结合医药产品的特性,构建了市场需求受医药制造商提供的促销努力和消费者渠道偏好影响的双渠道模型,分析促销努力和消费者渠道偏好对医药供应链利润的影响。算例分析发现,当促销努力满足约束条件时,采取双渠道对医药制造商是有利的。当消费者渠道偏好程度较低时,采用"收益共享+回购+促销成本分担"组合契约对医药制造商和医药零售商都是有利的,同时组合契约可以调动医药制造商提高促销努力水平的积极性,有效地消除存在的双重边际效应问题。     

考虑竞争和信息不对称的低碳供应链协调策略研究

在制造商进行生产减排的低碳供应链中,零售商之间存在促销竞争以及促销成本系数为零售商私有信息的情况。分别构建了考虑零售商竞争的低碳供应链集中决策模型和信息不对称决策模型,对制造商减排率以及零售商促销水平进行求解,并通过引入由批发价和成本共担组成的联合契约对供应链进行协调。研究发现:联合契约的引入可以激励零售商在保证自身利益的前提下选择与制造商共享私有信息,不对称信息造成的利润损失得以挽回;随着零售商之间竞争程度的增加,集中决策和信息不对称情形下的供应链利润差减小,用以揭示私有信息的联合契约越有效;制造商减排成本系数的提高降低了供应链成员的利润;零售商促销成本系数越高,制造商在揭示私有信息过程中付出的信息租金越少,对制造商越有利。     

信息非对称下考虑零售商促销努力竞争的供应链协调研究北大核心CSSCI

在考虑零售商促销努力竞争的基础上,研究促销努力成本信息对称和非对称两种情形下的供应链决策问题,并对如何在转移支付契约下促使零售商传递真实的促销努力成本信息进行分析。研究表明,零售商促销努力成本的信息价值会随着产品批发价格、制造商减排成本以及零售商竞争程度的增加呈下降趋势,随销售价格的增加呈上升趋势;且转移支付契约的引入可以促使零售商传递真实的促销努力成本信息,提高制造商以及供应链的利润。最后通过算例验证了转移支付契约的有效性,并对促销努力成本系数进行了灵敏度分析。     

制造商服务努力下竞争与合作的双渠道供应链微分博弈分析

在电子商务环境下,研究了由两个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链中制造商服务努力与广告费用分担,零售商进行广告促销的微分博弈模型,分别在制造商竞争与合作两种情况下得到并比较了各方最优均衡策略与利润。研究发现制造商服务努力和广告费用分担随着竞争的加剧而提高,但当零售商的边际利润较大时,将不会进行费用分担。分析了服务竞争、广告竞争和传统渠道需求所占份额对各方利润的影响,另外发现在合作模型下制造商利润之和增大,当服务效率差异程度在一定范围时,制造商会同时有合作意愿,并使得服务水平、广告投入及零售商利润降低。     

信息非对称下考虑零售商促销努力竞争的供应链协调研究

在考虑零售商促销努力竞争的基础上,研究促销努力成本信息对称和非对称两种情形下的供应链决策问题,并对如何在转移支付契约下促使零售商传递真实的促销努力成本信息进行分析。研究表明,零售商促销努力成本的信息价值会随着产品批发价格、制造商减排成本以及零售商竞争程度的增加呈下降趋势,随销售价格的增加呈上升趋势;且转移支付契约的引入可以促使零售商传递真实的促销努力成本信息,提高制造商以及供应链的利润。最后通过算例验证了转移支付契约的有效性,并对促销努力成本系数进行了灵敏度分析。     

搭便车行为下双渠道绿色供应链协调机制研究

考虑由一个制造商和线上线下两个零售商组成的绿色供应链系统,在两个零售商都面临市场需求不确定且与产品绿色度和推广努力水平相关的市场环境下,假设线下零售商进行推广努力,而线上零售商存在搭便车行为。由此,建立了制造商和两个零售商之间的博弈模型,探讨了分散决策、集中决策、收益共享与成本共担契约下的最优订货量、绿色度和推广努力水平,并对三种情形下的最优决策进行了比较和分析。研究结果表明:在分散决策情况下无法实现系统协调,通过引入收益共享与成本共担契约,当契约参数满足一定条件时,该契约模型不仅可以实现系统协调而且可以使系统成员达到帕累托改进。最后通过算例分析,探讨了相关系数对制造商和两零售商收益的影响。     

单生产商和多零售商间的协调机制

通过2个阶段分析了制造商和零售商之间的博弈关系,建立了一个制造商和多个零售商组成的协调机制。给出非合作博弈和合作博弈两种情形下供应链各个成员的利润、零售商的订购量和制造商的批发价等指标的变化情况,并通过一个分配方案对因协调带来的利润进行了合理分配。用一个数值算例,进一步说明此协调机制使供应链的总体期望利润比不协调时增加,而且利润分配方案的实施使供应链成员的利润都得到改善。     

Pricing and ordering decisions of two competing supply chains with different composite policies: a Stackelberg game-theoretic approach

In today’s global highly competitive markets, competition happens among supply chains instead of companies, as the members of supply chains. So, the partners of the chains seek to apply efficient coordinating strategies like discount, return, refund, buyback, or the other coordinating policies to abate the operation costs of the chains and subsequently increase market shares. Hence, because of the importance and application of these strategies in the current non-exclusive markets, in this study, we introduce different composite coordinating strategies to enhance the coordination of the supply chains. Here, we consider two competing supply chains where both chains launch the same product under different brands to the market by applying different composite coordinating strategies. Each supply chain comprises one manufacturer and a group of non-competing retailers where the manufacturer receives raw materials from an outside supplier and transforms them into a finished product; then, the products are sold to the retailers to satisfy the demands of market. In the first chain, a composite (QFF) policy, which is the combination of quantity and freight discount, as well as free shipping quantity policies, are considered between upstream and downstream members while in the second one, different composite polices are considered between upstream and downstream members such that the supplier offers a composite policy, as the first chain, to the manufacturer and the manufacturer proposes a composite (QPR) policy, which is the combination of quantity discount and partial-refund customer return policies, to the retailers. The main objective of the paper is to determine the optimal selling prices and the order quantities of the manufacturer and the retailers in each chain in presence of different composite coordinating strategies. A Stackelberg game-theoretic approach is employed between the members of each chain where the manufacturer is a follower and the retailers are leaders. The concavity of profit functions is proved. Finally, the applicability of the models is justified by presented numerical examples. Moreover, the effects of these strategies on the decisions of the chains’ partners are examined.     

The value of buyback contract under price competition

We investigate the value of buyback contract by analysing a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Three scenarios, depending on whether buyback contracts are offered to neither, one, or both of the retailers, are considered. We first study the case when the manufacturer can only determine his buyback price. We show how the demand uncertainty, the competition level and the handling cost of buyback contract influence the profits of the manufacturer, the two retailers and the whole supply chain. Interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the buyback contract may intensify competition between the retailers, we show that offering the buyback contract to two competing retailers can benefit every channel member even if the competition level is high. Next, we study the return contract, a special type of buyback contract, and show the effect of competition level and industry outlook on supply chain parties' choices on return contract. We extend Padmanabhan and Png [1997. “Manufacturer's Returns Policies And Retail Competition.” Marketing Science 16 (1): 81–94] to the case with an asymmetric contract structure, i.e. one return contract and one whole-sale contract. We show that an asymmetric contract structure may better off both the retailers and the whole supply chain.     

风险规避与信用担保比例对供应链融资选择的影响

研究资金充足制造商和资金约束零售商构成的供应链的融资选择问题。运用CVaR方法,构建风险规避的制造商和零售商在贸易信用融资和核心企业部分信用担保融资下的风险收益模型,分析制造商和零售商的风险规避程度和制造商提供的信用担保比例对双方收益以及供应链融资选择的影响。结果表明,制造商与零售商的风险规避程度对收益起反向影响,且双方的收益对制造商的风险规避程度更敏感;制造商提供的担保比例或者银行利率越高,零售商收益越高,但是制造商收益越低;制造商风险规避度和提供的担保比例满足一定条件情况下,零售商和制造商都会选择内部融资方式。     

双边竞争型闭环供应链回收渠道的决策分析

为了提高回收渠道决策的效率,主要采用非合作博弈的方法,以2个竞争的制造商和2个竞争的零售商组成的双边竞争型闭环供应链为对象,研究了回收渠道的决策过程。经过分析论证得出制造商之间和零售商之间的竞争程度共同影响回收渠道的决策结果,但制造商之间的竞争程度对决策结果的影响作用更大。     

Coordinating a supply chain under demand and cost disruptions

In this paper, we investigate the coordination of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and n Bertrand competing retailers under disruptions of market demand and production cost. We present a coordination model of a supply chain under normal scenarios. Our findings demonstrate that the coordination scheme designed for the initial production plan should be revised when disruptions of market demand and production cost occur. To resolve this issue, we consider the possible deviation costs caused by disruptions and propose optimal decision models for different disruptions under centralised decision-making. We present an improved revenue-sharing contract model to coordinate the decentralised supply chain under disruptions. The proposed models are then further analysed through numerical examples.     

政府干涉下闭环供应链的回收渠道选择策略

了提高回收效率,在政府对制造商的回收行为进行干涉下建立了制造商回收、零售商回收和混合回收决策模型,分别从消费者、政府、制造商、零售商和供应链整体五个角度研究了回收渠道的选择策略。结果表明,零售商总是希望参与回收;从其他四个角度来看,回收渠道选择主要受回收渠道竞争强度的影响,政府干涉对渠道选择影响不大。     

考虑横向公平的双渠道销售闭环供应链定价策略与协调研究

考虑双渠道零售商和制造商组成的闭环供应链,分别构建了制造商直接回收、委托第三方回收模式下的动态博弈模型,以公平中性时的均衡策略为参照,对比分析了线下零售商的横向公平偏好对双渠道闭环供应链中各决策主体定价策略及利润的影响。研究表明,无论零售商是否存在横向公平关切行为,制造商直接回收模式都优于委托第三方回收。在直接回收模式下,线下零售商的横向公平偏好使得在正向供应链中的两零售商为提高市场占有率会竞相降低零售价格,制造商为鼓励竞争会降低批发价,并且价格均与横向公平关切系数负相关。在逆向供应链中,制造商会提高废旧产品的回收率;相比公平中性的情况,此定价策略使制造商和整个供应链系统效用增加,而两零售商收益递减。制造商作为渠道管理者为鼓励零售商之间竞相降价,可通过一个三方收益共享的契约实现协调,达到帕累托最优。     

Supply chain coordination under trade credit and retailer effort

In this paper, we study the role of trade credit in coordinating a Capital Constrained Supply Chain in the presence of retailer Effort (CCSCE), essentially because of the impact of its related default risks on the relationship between the chain’s members. We consider a CCSCE consisting of a supplier and a retailer where the retailer may exert costly promotional efforts to increase the market demand but has limited capital and no access to bank financing due to low credit rating. Conversely, the supplier has adequate funds to offer trade credit to the retailer without borrowing from external channels. We then examine whether the existing coordination contracts can still coordinate the CCSCE under trade credit. Our result shows that these contracts can achieve coordination of the supply chain when the interest rate of trade credit is competitively priced. Nevertheless, this position cannot always be reached. That’s why we propose a generalised contract based on risk compensation to coordinate the CCSCE. Using our proposed coordinating contract, the supplier perfectly coordinates the retailer’s decisions for the largest joint profit, and arbitrarily allocates the maximised joint profit among supply chain members. Finally, the numerical study allows to verify this finding. From managerial insights, our results provide the supply chain managers with novel insights on how to combine trade credit with the existing coordination contracts in order to improve the profitability of the entire supply chain as well as the individual member.     

多个损失厌恶零售商共存的一对多供应链 回购契约及其协调机理

为实现供应链的整体运作绩效最大,本文以一个风险中性的供应商和多个损失厌恶的零售商组成的两阶段供应链为研究对象,基于前景理论对损失厌恶的界定,采用考虑零售商损失厌恶系数的供应链回购契约模型。论证得出,多个存在竞争关系的损失厌恶零售商存在唯一的纳什均衡总订购量使其期望效用最大;在零售商的损失厌恶程度较大或者数量较少的情况下,通过供应链回购契约的协调,存在唯一的回购价格使得供应链的整体运作绩效最大,实现供应链协调。