第三方再制造外包模式选择与协调研究

研究第三方再制造外包选择与协调问题,将制造商外包和零售商外包两种模式进行对比分析.研究结果表明:制造商外包模式下新产品的数量、原始设备制造商的利润以及系统总利润更高,新产品的价格更低;零售商外包模式下再制品的数量、外包价格以及再制造商的利润更高.制造商外包模式具有较高的消费者剩余和较差的环境绩效.当再制造优势明显时,零售商外包模式的社会福利水平高于制造商外包模式.采用合作博弈方法对零售商外包模式下多主体闭环供应链进行协调,可为供应链管理决策提供理论依据与决策方法.     

基于制造商促销的供应链战略库存协调模型

考虑由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两周期供应链系统,在第一周期结束后零售商储存战略库存控制第二周期制造商批发价格的活动条件下,分别建立了集中式决策、分散式决策以及制造商促销的契约决策的供应链模型,并对三种情况下的决策变量进行了比较分析。研究结果表明：在零售商主导的情境下,零售商没有必要储存战略库存;在制造商主导的情境下,制造商通过简单的批发价格契约无法促进渠道的协调,而在制造商进行促销决策条件下,零售商的战略库存量减少,且制造商和零售商的最优利润均大于分散式决策时的最优利润。最后通过算例验证该模型的有效性。     

Analytical model of adoption of item level RFID in a two-echelon supply chain with shelf-space and price-dependent demand

We investigate whether it is possible for the manufacturer as well as the retailer to derive economic benefits from item-level RFID. We consider two supply chain contracts. In the first instance the manufacturer sets the wholesale price for his product and in response the retailer sets the retail price and allocates the shelf-space. We find that in this setting item-level RFID is adopted in a decentralized supply chain at the same levels of RFID costs as in an integrated supply chain with a single decision maker. The second case that we consider involves a powerful retailer setting product shelf-space prices. In this setting the manufacturer essentially rents shelf-space from the retailer. We find that in this setting, the retailer may force the adoption of RFID even if it does not maximize the chain's total profit.     

Theory and methodology on the global optimal solution to a General Reverse Logistics Inventory Model for deteriorating items and time-varying rates

In this paper, we present a unified general inventory model for integrated production of new items and remanufacturing of returned items for an infinite planning horizon. Our model considers a production environment that consists of three shops. The first shop is for remanufacturing returned items, the second shop is for manufacturing new items, while the third shop is for collecting returned items to be remanufactured in the first shop. The system is subject to joint production and remanufacturing options, the first one is to produce new items while the second one is to reproduce/recycle the returned items “as-good-as new”. Items deteriorate while they are in storage, and production, remanufacturing, demand, return, and deterioration rates are arbitrary functions of time. A closed form for the total relevant costs as well as a rigorous mathematical proof, which shows the global optimality of the solution to the underlying inventory system are introduced. Illustrative examples, which explain the application of the theoretical results as well as their numerical verifications, are also given.     

相对公平关切下考虑产品设计的再制造合作模式与供应链协调

将相对公平关切和产品可再制造性设计同时纳入由一个制造商和一个再制造商构成的供应链中,构建外包和授权两种再制造合作模式下供应链的决策模型,研究制造商的再制造合作模式选择问题,分析最优再制造合作模式下再制造商相对公平关切和产品可再制造性设计对供应链生产定价决策及利润的影响,并设计相应的协调策略.研究结果表明:外包再制造是制造商的最优再制造合作模式;在外包再制造供应链中,再制造商的相对公平关切虽会降低制造商利润,但能提高供应链系统利润;产品可再制造性设计对再制造商总是有利的;外包价格契约能够实现外包再制造供应链的协调.     

Supply chain model with price- and trade credit-sensitive demand under two-level permissible delay in payments

This article develops a single-manufacturer and single-retailer supply chain model under two-level permissible delay in payments when the manufacturer follows a lot-for-lot policy in response to the retailer's demand. The manufacturer offers a trade credit period to the retailer with the contract that the retailer must share a fraction of the profit earned during the trade credit period. On the other hand, the retailer provides his customer a partial trade credit which is less than that of the manufacturer. The demand at the retailer is assumed to be dependent on the selling price and the trade credit period offered to the customers. The average net profit of the supply chain is derived and an algorithm for finding the optimal solution is developed. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the coordination policy of the supply chain and examine the sensitivity of key model-parameters.     

A multi-echelon production–inventory system with supply disruption

The article investigates an integrated multi-layer supply chain model consisting of supplier, manufacturer and retailer while supply disruption, machine breakdown, safety stock, maintenance breakdown occur simultaneously. At beginning of the production, manufacturer keeps some raw materials in stock received from second supplier at high price, as safety stock due to supply disruption of first supplier. Corrective maintenance is done immediately to restore its normal stage when machine breakdown occurs. Stock out situations at manufacturer and retailer are considered due to disruption of production for machine breakdown. The integrated expected costs of the chain in centralized (collaborating) and decentralized (Stakelberg approach) system are compared. A numerical example and its sensitivity analysis are provided to test feasibility of the model.     

A tri-level programming model based on Conditional Value-at-Risk for three-stage supply chain management

For the problem of supply chain management, the existing literature mainly focuses on the research of the single-stage supply chain or the two-stage supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. To our best knowledge, little attention has been paid to the study of a more extensive supply chain that consists of a material supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer, which is a more practical and interesting case. Therefore, based on the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure of risk management, this paper proposes a tri-level programming model for the three-stage supply chain management. In this model, the material supplier and the manufacturer maximize their own profit while the retailer maximize his/her CVaR of expected profit. Further, we show that the proposed tri-level programming model can be transferred into a bilevel programming model, which can be solved by the existing methods. Numerical results show that the proposed model is efficient for improving the risk management of the three-stage supply chain.     

风险规避制造商市场入侵策略

针对由风险中性的在位制造商、风险规避的外来制造商和风险中性零售商组成的二级供应链系统,基于Stackelberg博弈理论建立不同市场入侵策略下的决策模型,研究风险规避的外来制造商市场入侵策略选择问题,分析市场入侵和风险规避行为对供应链成员均衡决策的影响.研究发现:当外来制造商通过零售商销售产品时,损害在位制造商的利润,但对零售商有利;当外来制造商通过网络渠道直接向消费者销售产品时,不一定损害在位制造商的利润,存在帕累托改进区域;当外来制造商的风险规避程度较大时,价格战愈发激烈,对自身、在位制造商和零售商都是不利的;外来制造商的市场入侵策略受质量差异程度、风险规避程度、生产成本和直销成本的综合影响;外来制造商选择最优的市场入侵策略时,损害在位制造商的利润,而且供应链系统不能实现帕累托改进.     

考虑权力结构与股权合作的低碳闭环供应链生产决策及协调

低碳时代传统制造业的成本构成以及盈利模式已被彻底颠覆,考虑再制造及碳减排的闭环供应链生产决策及协调优化值得关注.在3种渠道权力结构下,构建零售商持股制造商减排投资的闭环供应链决策模型,分析权力结构与股权合作对闭环供应链生产决策及企业利润的影响,探讨股权合作与两部定价契约的协调效果.研究发现,不同权力结构的闭环供应链需选择合适的持股比例,零售商主导下更高的持股比例产生更高的回收率、碳减排量及市场需求,而Nash博弈下则相反.有主导者的权力结构中,零售商持股比例的增加能够提高主导企业的利润;无主导者的权力结构中,企业利润的增减受持股比例与消费者低碳偏好的共同影响.无论何种权力结构,股权合作仅能实现闭环供应链的部分协调,通过两部定价契约可实现完美协调.     

Coordination in a retailer‐dominated supply chain with a risk‐averse manufacturer under marketing dependency

In this paper, a combined contract composed of option and cost sharing is proposed to investigate coordination and risk‐sharing issues of the supply chain consisting of a dominant retailer and a risk‐averse manufacturer. Demand faced by the retailer is stochastic in nature and dependent on marketing effort. We adopt the conditional value‐at‐risk (CVaR) criterion to model risk aversion of the manufacturer, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the retailer acts as the leader. It is verified that the combined contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto‐improvement. Moreover, the dominant retailer can allocate the system‐wide profit arbitrarily only by option price in the premise of coordination. It is worth mentioning that coordination of the supply chain is reachable only when the manufacturer is low in risk aversion, and the manufacturer's risk aversion is a significant element for contract design and profit allocation.     

考虑制造商公平关切的强势零售商自有品牌导入策略研究

研究了制造商公平关切下强势零售商的自有品牌导入策略,在有强势零售商存在的供应链中,考虑弱势一方制造商的公平关切对供应链决策的影响。将零售商是否导入自有品牌以及制造商是否具有公平关切行为进行组合,得到了四种情景,分析了四种情景下的供应链博弈模型,得到均衡策略、利润以及相应自有品牌的导入条件;进一步对模型进行比较分析,探讨自有品牌导入以及制造商公平关切对供应链成员决策以及利润的影响。研究发现,制造商的公平关切会使其批发价格和利润提高;零售商导入自有品牌会使零售商和供应链的利润增加,当自有品牌产品替代率较大时也会有利于制造商利润水平的提高。     

基于回收产品质量水平的闭环供应链渠道选择模型

基于回收努力和回收产品质量水平的考虑,应用Stackelberg博弈模型理论,构建分别由制造商回收、零售 商回收和第三方回收的3种再制造闭环供应链决策模型,考察不同渠道下参与主体最优决策差异和基于回收产品 质量水平的回收渠道选择问题.结果表明,第三方回收为下策均衡,制造商回收或零售商回收取决 于产品再制造成本的节约水平,制造商需衡量其再制造成本,从制造商回收和零售商回收中选择最优的回收渠道.     

模糊环境下考虑零售商风险偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型

在模糊需求环境下绿色供应链运作系统中,研究由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级绿色供应链.首先,引入创新成本,分别建立风险中性制造商为主导者,具有中性、悲观和乐观等风险偏好的零售商为跟随者的两级绿色供应链Stackelberg博弈模型;然后,推导出最优决策的期望值和机会约束规划模型,并进行算例分析,比较产品绿色度、批发价格及零售价格与不同置信水平之间的相互影响,探讨具有不同风险偏好的零售商对模糊绿色供应链中制造商、零售商及供应链整体运作绩效的影响.研究结果表明:悲观决策模型中,伴随置信水平的增加,产品的绿色度水平、批发价格及创新成本逐步下降,零售价格、制造商、零售商及绿色供应链整体利润逐步上升;在乐观决策模型中,结论相反.     

绿色供应链背景下互补品定价策略

考虑绿色供应链背景下由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链定价策略问题,其中两个制造商生产两种互补品,且制造商1进行绿色制造投入.分别研究集中式、MS-Bertrand、MS-Stackelberg、RS-Bertrand和RS-Stackelberg五种模型.结论表明:1)绿色制造水平随着绿色投入系数的增加而减少,且绿色制造水平在集中式情形最高,分散式决策下产品1和产品2的最优零售价格高于集中决策;2)只有制造商1进行绿色制造时,绿色投入会影响其最终的收益,但是互补品的性质会使采取传统制造的制造商从中获利;3)在分散式决策情形下,产品1(产品2)的零售价格会随着产品1(产品2)的交叉价格敏感程度的增加而降低,而随着产品2(产品1)的交叉价格敏感程度的增加而升高.     

Pricing strategy in a dual-channel and remanufacturing supply chain system

This article addresses the pricing strategy problems in a supply chain system where the manufacturer sells original products and remanufactured products via indirect retailer channels and direct Internet channels. Due to the complexity of that system, agent technologies that provide a new way for analysing complex systems are used for modelling. Meanwhile, in order to reduce the computational load of searching procedure for optimal prices and profits, a learning search algorithm is designed and implemented within the multi-agent supply chain model. The simulation results show that the proposed model can find out optimal prices of original products and remanufactured products in both channels, which lead to optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. It is also found that the optimal profits are increased by introducing direct channel and remanufacturing. Furthermore, the effect of customer preference, direct channel cost and remanufactured unit cost on optimal prices and profits are examined.     

零售电商和回收政策对闭环供应链的影响研究

构建第三方回收下的双渠道闭环供应链模型,考虑了三种不同的决策情形来探讨零售电商参与和处理基金政策对供应链中决策、利润、需求和消费者剩余的影响。结果表明：零售电商参与使得传统零售商的产品价格和利润水平降低,制造商可以通过调整对零售电商的批发价格来提高其利润;第三方回收商的回收决策和最优利润不受到零售电商参与的影响,处理基金政策可以有效地提高产品回收数量,但也会使得正向供应链中企业的定价提高;零售电商会蚕食制造商原有的市场份额,但产品总需求量不发生变化。当进一步考虑处理基金政策时,市场总需求量出现下降的趋势;此外,零售电商参与和处理基金政策都会造成供应链中消费者总剩余的减少。     

再制造商公平关切下闭环供应链生产设计决策与协调

研究制造商关注和不关注再制造商公平关切的闭环供应链生产设计决策与协调. 研究表明: 制造商和闭环供应链利润均与公平关切程度负相关; 制造商关注再制造商公平关切时, 公平关切程度越高, 许可费和模块化水平越低, 再制造商利润越高, 且与不关注相比, 新产品与再制造品销量更高, 环境效益更好; 当不关注再制造商公平关切时, 再制造商利润与公平关切程度负相关. 采用再制造收益共享契约对考虑再制造商公平关切的供应链进行协调.

     

再制造率随机的闭环供应链产品差别定价策略

考虑闭环供应链的差别定价问题, 制造商回收废旧产品, 并生产新产品和再制造产品, 再制造率随机. 采用Stackelberg 博弈方法, 研究集中决策和分散决策下相应产品的最优定价, 给出供应链各成员的最优利润. 结果表明:若制造商对产品延迟定价, 则集中决策下回收价格高于分散决策, 而销售价格均低于分散决策; 当零售商的保守利润不低于一定值时, 集中决策下总利润不低于分散决策, 制造商可以采用改进的两部定价契约协调供应链.

     

Pricing and return product collection decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with dual-channel in both forward and reverse logistics

This paper deals a closed-loop supply chain with two dual channels – forward dual-channel where a manufacturer sells a product to customers through traditional retail channel and e-tail (internet) channel, and reverse dual-channel where the used items are collected for remanufacturing through the traditional third party logistics and e-tail channel. We derive analytically the pricing and return product collection decisions for the supply chain under five different scenarios viz. centralized, decentralized (Nash game), and manufacturer-led, retailer-led and third party-led decentralized scenarios. We also demonstrate the proposed model through a series of data sets. It is observed from the numerical study that the retailer-led decentralized scenario provides more profit than other decentralized scenarios.