基于产量竞争的供应链RFID技术投资均衡与协调

以单制造商和单零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,基于供应链成员是否采用无线射频识别(radio frequency identification,RFID)技术,分别构建链上成员均不采用RFID(NN)、仅制造商采用RFID(AN)、仅零售商采用RFID(NA)以及链上成员均采用RFID(AA)四种情景下的收益模型,求解出相应的最优解,并探讨链上成员采用RFID的均衡策略.研究发现:双渠道供应链采用RFID的均衡策略取决于渠道竞争强度、收益共享系数及RFID标签成本.竞争强度较小时,供应链成员均倾向于采用RFID;反之,则仅零售商倾向于采用该技术.收益共享系数较高时,AA情景不会出现;反之,若制造商采用RFID,则AA为均衡策略.RFID标签成本较低(高)时,供应链成员倾向于采用(不采用)RFID技术.     

资金约束下的非对称信息供应链协调研究

供应链金融能够有效解决无核心资产的中小企业资金约束的问题。针对制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链,考虑了零售商自有资金的不同对融资利率变化的影响,研究了在完全信息下采用融资前后联合契约供应链的收益变化,实现供应链协调的参数和各成员收益的变化,将零售商销售成本信息不对称下的情况作为对比,分析零售商私有信息对供应链的影响,通过算例进行了数值分析。结果表明,在完全信息下零售商存在资金约束时,融资服务能够增加供应链各成员的期望收益,回购契约与收益共享契约组成的联合契约能够协调采用融资后的供应链,在非对称信息下,供应链的效率有所减少,而资金充足的零售商会因私有成本信息获得更多的收益,但是在资金约束时,私有信息却失去了价值。     

零售商定价/订货决策下竞争/互补制造商采用RFID的策略研究

以一个零售商主导的两级供应链为研究对象,构建两个生产竞争性或互补性产品的制造商是否采用无线射频识别技术(radio frequency identification,RFID)时链上成员的收益模型,分析求解出各种情景下零售商定价/订货决策时制造商的最优批发价和RFID标签成本分摊系数,以及零售商的最优零售价/订货量,进...     

基于资金约束的竞争供应链融资策略研究

针对制造商存在资金约束时供应链成员的运营问题,分别研究了链与链竞争的结构中无资金约束、有资金约束且不融资、融资有利息且批发价格无折扣、融资无利息且批发价格有折扣4种不同模式下供应链成员的利润。当制造商存在资金约束时,其所在供应链上的零售商倾向于融资无利息且批发价格有折扣的模式。除了有资金约束且不融资的模式外,其他3种模式下竞争强度的增大不利于2条供应链上成员利润的提高。相同的竞争强度下,制造商可以通过调整单位生产成本投入来改变自己及竞争方的最优决策策略,进而影响供应链成员的利润。最后,仿真结果验证了所得结论。     

考虑成员企业风险态度的制造商资金约束闭环供应链定价与回收决策

针对制造商资金约束的闭环供应链,考虑制造商、零售商和回收商面对市场需求不确定性表现出不同的风险态度,研究闭环供应链如何确定其最优定价与回收决策.首先,依据均值-方差法给出制造商、零售商、回收商和闭环供应链的效用函数;然后,基于博弈论的思想分别确定集中式决策下闭环供应链的最优策略和效用,以及分散式决策下制造商、零售商和回收商的最优策略和效用;最后,分析相关参数对最优策略和效用的影响.研究结果表明,制造商、零售商和回收商的风险态度在很大程度上能够影响其最优批发价格、最优零售价格及最优回收率,进而影响其效用.贷款利率能够影响制造商、零售商、回收商和闭环供应链的效用,且对资金约束的制造商的效用影响最为显著.     

绿色供应链的投贷联动融资决策均衡

以一个零售商和一个资金约束的制造商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,构建了制造商资金约束情况下银行借贷融资、股权融资和组合融资时的融资模型,探讨制造商的资金水平和消费者的绿色偏好对定价、绿色投入水平、产品的市场需求和融资方式选择策略的影响。最后,通过数值分析进行验证。研究发现：消费者绿色偏好与零售价格、批发价格和绿色投入努力水平、产品的市场需求和股权融资时双方可接受的股权转让比例正相关;在制造商资金约束而不融资时,制造商初始资金水平与制造商的批发价格、零售商的零售价格负相关,而与绿色投入努力水平正相关;银行借贷利率越大,制造商的可接受的股权转让比例增大。当制造商进行融资时, 若初始资金水平极低, 选择股权融资的方式进行融资, 随着初始资金水平的上升, 零售商应该选择银行贷款的方式进行融资;在股权融资比例达到一定值时,组合融资比银行借贷更加有利于制造商;而单纯股权融资比组合融资更有利。     

碳限额与交易机制和消费者低碳偏好下的供应链减排及融资策略

在碳限额与交易机制和消费者对低碳产品存在偏好的背景下,考虑由一个资金约束的制造商与一个资金充裕的零售商构成的供应链,针对银行贷款(BF)、提前支付折扣(APD)和提前支付回购(APB)3种融资方式,构建制造商主导的以企业利润最大化为目标的博弈模型,研究不同融资方式下低碳供应链的减排与定价决策,以及制造商的融资方式选择问题.研究表明:1)在3种融资方式下,减排投资成本系数的增加会降低制造商的最优单位产品碳减排量.2)提前支付下制造商的最优单位产品碳减排量始终高于BF方式.当碳交易价格较高或减排投资成本系数较高时,APB方式下制造商的碳减排量最高;否则,APD方式下制造商的碳减排量最高.3)与BF方式相比,提前支付更能提升制造商的利润,且制造商在APB方式下获利最多.     

风险规避型双渠道供应链的融资和定价决策

在零售商资金约束下,基于CVaR准则构建了风险规避的供应商和零售商组成的双渠道供应链的定价模型。分析了零售商资金充足时,供应商和零售商的最优决策、资金约束情况下零售商的银行借贷融资、延期支付策略和组合融资时零售商和供应商的最优决策以及零售商和供应商的风险规避程度对最优决策变量和收益的影响。通过数值分析,进一步验证了零售商和供应商的风险规避度对三种融资模式下零售商和供应商的最优决策变量和利润的影响。研究表明：资金充足和延期支付策略下最优决策变量与风险规避度的关系一致;银行借贷和组合融资下最优决策变量与风险规避度的关系一致;单一延期支付策略和组合融资优于单一银行借贷融资;组合融资比例大于一定值时,优于单纯延期支付策略。     

供应商竞争关系下的第三方物流融资及物流服务决策

研究第三方物流企业（3PL）在处于竞争关系中的供应商面临资金约束时的融资策略选择问题。考虑由两个竞争关系的供应商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链,3PL企业为供应链提供代采购、物流及融资服务,分别考虑在代采购中向供应商提供融资能够获得价格折扣和代采购中考虑额外资金成本情况下,3PL融资意愿选择,向供应商提供（不提供）融资。建立3PL、供应商和零售商在不同情况下的收益模型,并给出供应商和零售商的最优定价,以及3PL的最优物流服务收费决策,通过比较融资前后各个企业的收益分析3PL参与供应链融资的积极作用。研究发现3PL向处于竞争环境下的资金短缺供应商提供融资能够增加3PL、零售商和供应链整体的收益,且3PL更愿意在考虑自身资金成本的情况下向供应商提供融资,并且供应商之间竞争越激烈,3PL和零售商的获益越大。     

模糊环境下考虑零售商风险偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型

在模糊需求环境下绿色供应链运作系统中,研究由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级绿色供应链.首先,引入创新成本,分别建立风险中性制造商为主导者,具有中性、悲观和乐观等风险偏好的零售商为跟随者的两级绿色供应链Stackelberg博弈模型;然后,推导出最优决策的期望值和机会约束规划模型,并进行算例分析,比较产品绿色度、批发价格及零售价格与不同置信水平之间的相互影响,探讨具有不同风险偏好的零售商对模糊绿色供应链中制造商、零售商及供应链整体运作绩效的影响.研究结果表明:悲观决策模型中,伴随置信水平的增加,产品的绿色度水平、批发价格及创新成本逐步下降,零售价格、制造商、零售商及绿色供应链整体利润逐步上升;在乐观决策模型中,结论相反.     

Ordering and returns handling decisions and coordination in a supply chain with demand uncertainty

We develop a newsvendor model to study the retailer's order quantity, the manufacturer's returns handling strategy, and channel coordination. The manufacturer chooses one of two returns handling strategies: manufacturer handling or retailer handling under the coordinated and decentralized scenarios, respectively. Under the coordinated scenario, we find that when consumer's returns handling cost under manufacturer handling or the manufacturer's returns handling cost is small, consumer returns should be handled by the manufacturer. Under the decentralized scenario, when the retailer's returns handling cost or the consumer's returns handling cost under retailer handling is low, the manufacturer will choose manufacturer handling; both the manufacturer and the retailer may be better off using manufacturer handling (a win–win situation). The impact of the returns handling strategy on the retailer's ordering quantity largely depends on its effect on the consumer's returns handling cost. Finally, we also design buyback contracts to coordinate the supply chain and find that both wholesale price and buyback price under manufacturer handling are higher than those under retailer handling.     

不同权力结构下供应链减排策略随机微分博弈

在由单个制造商和单个零售商构成的低碳供应链中,制造商与零售商之间不同的权力结构决定着他们的减排策略与博弈方式.同时,低碳产品商誉与需求受到制造商与零售商减排策略及随机因素的长期动态影响.在不同的权力结构下,对制造商减排努力策略与零售商宣传努力策略进行随机微分博弈分析;在集中式决策基础上,分别构建制造商主导与零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈、无主导Nash博弈模型,求解模型并对结果进行理论分析与数值实验.研究发现:相较于自己作为主导者,对方作为主导者会促使制造商或零售商做出更大的减排努力或宣传努力;与有主导者的供应链相比,无主导者的供应链可能实现更大的低碳产品商誉;制造商作为主导者能够提升低碳产品商誉与需求以及供应链总利润.随机因素促使制造商和零售商分别提高了减排努力和宣传努力以及低碳产品商誉.     

Trade credit insurance in a capital‐constrained supply chain

We examine the role of trade credit insurance in a capital‐constrained supply chain with one (or two) loss‐neutral retailer(s) and one loss‐averse manufacturer. We model the interplay between these supply chain participants as a Stackelberg game and analyze their operating and financing decisions. In one capital‐constrained retailer case, we find that either the manufacturer's high loss aversion level or the retailer's low initial capital motivates the manufacturer to adopt insurance. Insurance drives more credit financing with more attractive financing terms (a lower wholesale price), which promotes the manufacturer to collect better product sales and performance. Although the retailer enjoys improved profit from insurance, its default risk increases. In contrast, in one capital‐constrained retailer and one well‐funded retailer scenario, numerically, when the manufacturer's loss aversion level is high or the weak retailer's initial capital is low, insurance is also adopted but is not always preferred by the capital‐constrained retailer due to competition. In addition, as the demand substitution rate increases, the manufacturer is more likely to prefer insurance due to better performance.     

不同担保模式下考虑零售商公平关切的闭环供应链博弈模型

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的闭环供应链,运用Stackelberg动态博弈理论,构建不同担保模式下考虑零售商公平关切的决策博弈模型,探讨产品担保模式及零售商公平关切对闭环供应链定价及担保期决策、经济效益和环境效益的影响,分析不同担保模式的担保效率.研究结果表明:当消费者对新产品和再制造品差异化担保期较为敏感时,制造商或零售商会为再制造品提供长期担保服务;零售商公平关切会降低新产品和再制造品批发价格,其对再制造品销售价格、担保期以及供应链经济环境效益的影响与产品担保模式密切相关;两种担保模式的经济环境效益与担保成本和再制造品相对环境优势相关,当零售商担保的相对成本优势和再制造品相对环境优势显著(微弱)时,零售商(制造商)担保模式是闭环供应链利益相关者的一致选择;零售商担保模式能够减缓零售商公平关切对闭环供应链经济效益及环境效益的负面影响.     

公平关切下零售商主导的闭环供应链决策模型

将公平关切性引入到零售商主导的闭环供应链中, 分别在零售商公平中性和公平关切下, 分析闭环供应链成员及整体的最优决策问题, 并对两种情形下的均衡结果进行比较. 研究表明, 主导零售商的公平关切性对其自身效用的最大化是有利的, 对制造商和第三方利润的最大化是不利的. 零售商公平关切程度相对较弱时, 其公平关切程度的增强对闭环供应链系统是不利的, 反之, 其公平关切程度的增强对闭环供应链系统是有利的.     

零售商销售代理的协同激励对供应链绩效影响

以制造商、零售商和销售代理组成的三级供应链系统为背景,分析销售代理的协同激励对供应链绩效的影响.应用委托代理理论,针对协同激励和传统激励两种情形设计相应的契约,并作对比分析.研究结果表明,协同激励时,制造商收益增加,零售商收益减少,整个供应链系统收益增加.同时可以发现,制造商给予零售商的分成系数和零售商给予销售代理的佣金均减少,底薪的变化则由销售代理的风险规避系数而定.     

Cooperative advertising in a capacitated manufacturer–retailer supply chain: a game‐theoretic approach

To achieve a more realistic understanding of how the supply chain's components interact, it is helpful to consider the operational limitations of the underlying supply chain while analyzing cooperative advertising. This paper studies cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain under the practical operational assumption that the manufacturer's production capacity is limited. The retailer advertises locally, and the manufacturer advertises in national media and supports part of the retailer's promotional costs. Equilibria are determined under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, both retailer and manufacturer move simultaneously, while in the second scenario, they move sequentially, with the manufacturer being the leader. The sales function is a bivariate version of the diminishing returns response function. When the production capacity is unlimited, several important properties can be proven, which cannot be shown analytically for the existing sales functions. Considering the production‐capacity constraint leads to new managerial insights into cooperative advertising. For example, only if the production capacity is large enough, both manufacturer and retailer are better off under the second scenario than the first scenario. In other words, the sequential move is not necessarily Pareto‐improving when the production capacity is limited. It is also observed that, under the first scenario, there are multiple equilibria whenever the production capacity is not too high. Under the second scenario, the manufacturer supports the retailer only when the retailer's margin is relatively small compared to the manufacturer's margin and production capacity.     

Pricing strategies for dual‐channel supply chains under a trade credit policy

This paper discusses the impact of a trade credit policy on alleviating conflicts arising on a dual‐channel supply chain that includes one manufacturer and one value‐added retailer. We use the Stackelberg game to model the problem and characterize optimal pricing strategies for each supply chain partner, examining different circumstances in terms of retail price and trade credit contracts. When a consistent price strategy is applied in the dual channels under conditions of an exogenous credit period, trade credit can help both partners to achieve win‐win situations in the following circumstances: (1) when the retail channel's market share is small and the retailer's interest rate is high; or (2) when the retail channel's market share is large and the retailer's interest rate is lower than the manufacturer's. The study also concludes that when an inconsistent price strategy is applied, a trade credit contract can alleviate channel conflicts when the retailer's interest rate is higher than the manufacturer's. Otherwise, the partners may terminate cooperation. However, when the manufacturer has the power to determine and set the credit period, trade credit cannot alleviate channel conflicts under consistent price and inconsistent price scenarios.