考虑碳限额与销售努力的低碳供应链融资决策

将零售商销售努力内化,构建制造商碳减排资金约束的决策模型,研究制造商分别通过银行借贷、股权融资和组合融资的运营决策和融资策略。研究发现：碳减排资金较为短缺时,银行借贷并不总能使制造商获益,只有银行借贷带来的边际收益高于资金的影子价格,即减排资金严重不足时,银行借贷才能为制造商带来收益。政府碳配额的取值不会影响制造商的低碳融资渠道选择,股权融资下的减排量和销售努力水平最高,社会效益最大,组合融资次之,银行借贷最低。分红比例小于一定值时,股权融资对制造商更有利,否则银行借贷才是最佳低碳融资渠道。     

信用担保与下侧风险控制下零售商资金约束供应链订货与定价策略

针对供应商、零售商和商业银行组成的供应链系统,考虑当零售商面临资金约束时,通过供应商信用担保贷款模式缓解零售商资金约束对供应链总体利润的影响.构建零售商和供应商期望利润模型,分别讨论银行风险中性及下侧风险控制下的零售商订货与供应商定价决策,并利用斯坦克尔伯格博弈求解.最后,对供应商担保系数、银行风险容忍系数进行灵敏度分析.研究表明:1)给定担保系数,只有当风险容忍系数小于一定的阈值时,银行下侧风险控制才会影响零售商以及供应商的最优决策;2)给定风险容忍系数,只有当担保系数小于一定的阈值时,供应商担保系数才会影响零售商以及供应商的最优决策;3)银行贷款限额是担保系数、风险容忍系数的严格递增函数.     

考虑信用融资的期权和实物产品最优组合采购策略

分析由零售商和银行组成的供应链系统, 在零售商面临资金约束的条件下, 通过引入期权采购和信用融资的组合方式, 实现企业的资金风险降低和运作效率提升. 通过建立博弈模型分析得出零售商的最优实物产品采购量和最优期权采购量的显性表达式, 证明银行的最优信用借款利率的存在性和唯一性条件. 通过比较存在资金约束情形下的其他运作方式, 发现信用融资是最有效的决策方式, 可以提升零售商的绩效, 最大可能实现全局最优.

     

绿色供应链的投贷联动融资决策均衡

以一个零售商和一个资金约束的制造商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,构建了制造商资金约束情况下银行借贷融资、股权融资和组合融资时的融资模型,探讨制造商的资金水平和消费者的绿色偏好对定价、绿色投入水平、产品的市场需求和融资方式选择策略的影响。最后,通过数值分析进行验证。研究发现：消费者绿色偏好与零售价格、批发价格和绿色投入努力水平、产品的市场需求和股权融资时双方可接受的股权转让比例正相关;在制造商资金约束而不融资时,制造商初始资金水平与制造商的批发价格、零售商的零售价格负相关,而与绿色投入努力水平正相关;银行借贷利率越大,制造商的可接受的股权转让比例增大。当制造商进行融资时, 若初始资金水平极低, 选择股权融资的方式进行融资, 随着初始资金水平的上升, 零售商应该选择银行贷款的方式进行融资;在股权融资比例达到一定值时,组合融资比银行借贷更加有利于制造商;而单纯股权融资比组合融资更有利。     

风险规避零售商期末二次订购的供应链决策模型

以风险规避零售商和风险规避供应商组成的两层供应链系统为研究对象, 在条件风险估值的风险度量准则下讨论两生产模式下风险规避零售商的最优订购策略和风险规避供应商的最优生产策略. 通过数值实验得出如下结论: 若零售商的风险规避度越小, 则零售商的第1 次最优订购量越多, 风险利润越大; 供应商的第1 次最优生产量随着供应商的风险规避度减小而增大; 零售商的风险规避度越小, 越不利于供应商的生产投机行为.

     

基于ACC支付模式的两层信用支付的EOQ模型

为了避免坏账,同时刺激下游零售商订购批量,上游供应商要求零售商采取ACC支付模式(提前支付advance、现金支付cash和延期支付credit).针对顾客资金情况,将顾客分为如下两类:第1类顾客资金充足,顾客会提前支付部分比例的货款,同时获得价格折扣,剩余货款采取延期支付的方式,这类顾客不仅享受价格折扣,同时享受延期支付策略;第2类顾客资金不足,顾客会采取部分货款货到付款,剩余货款采取延期支付的方式,这类顾客仅享受延期支付策略.构建由1个供应商与1个零售商和两类资金情况不同的顾客构成的两层信用支付供应链库存模型,证明最优解的存在性和唯一性.研究表明,零售商可以通过提高销售价格,争取更大的价格折扣,缩短零售商提前支付货款的时间期限,减少提前支付货款的比例等策略,以实现降低其年均成本.     

零售商资金约束的双渠道供应链决策研究

考虑一个零售商资金约束的双渠道供应链模型. 在信息对称的情况下, 根据零售商资金不足问题的解决方式不同, 利用Stackelberg 博弈理论分别对推迟支付模型和借贷支付模型进行分析, 给出了供应商与零售商的最优决策, 并证明了零售商选择推迟支付模型不仅可以增加利润, 而且有利于其提高市场竞争力、拓展市场, 说明了无论供应商的生产预算情况如何, 都愿意向零售商提供推迟支付服务的依据. 最后, 通过数值分析验证了结论的正确性.     

基于信用担保的资金约束供应链订货与定价决策

受自由现金流的限制, 中小企业需要外部融资来实现良性运营, 供应商信用担保贷款是一种有效手段. 考虑银行下侧风险控制的担保贷款模型, 根据供应链购销过程中的订货量和批发价参数决策, 评价供应链内部无风险资本转移过程. 通过建立供应商担保费率、风险担保比率设计和银行利率组合模型, 确定贷款担保系统的最优决策. 研究结果表明: 在具有贷款可获得性的资金约束供应链中, 存在最优订货量与批发价的组合, 且供应商销售收入存在最值; 在担保贷款过程中, 存在最优风险分担比例, 通过设计合理的风险控制模型, 可提高零售商资金水平, 达到供应链的协同.

     

供应商竞争关系下的第三方物流融资及物流服务决策

研究第三方物流企业（3PL）在处于竞争关系中的供应商面临资金约束时的融资策略选择问题。考虑由两个竞争关系的供应商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链,3PL企业为供应链提供代采购、物流及融资服务,分别考虑在代采购中向供应商提供融资能够获得价格折扣和代采购中考虑额外资金成本情况下,3PL融资意愿选择,向供应商提供（不提供）融资。建立3PL、供应商和零售商在不同情况下的收益模型,并给出供应商和零售商的最优定价,以及3PL的最优物流服务收费决策,通过比较融资前后各个企业的收益分析3PL参与供应链融资的积极作用。研究发现3PL向处于竞争环境下的资金短缺供应商提供融资能够增加3PL、零售商和供应链整体的收益,且3PL更愿意在考虑自身资金成本的情况下向供应商提供融资,并且供应商之间竞争越激烈,3PL和零售商的获益越大。     

基于零售商资金约束供应链采用RFID技术的决策及融资分析

为研究零售商存在资金约束和库存错放时,供应链成员采用无线射频识别(radio frequency identification,RFID)技术及融资决策的均衡问题,以单制造商和单资金约束零售商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,基于报童模型构建供应链成员采用RFID技术前后零售商是否融资4种情景下的收益模型,求解出相应的最优解并探讨供应链成员RFID采用决策与零售商的融资策略.研究发现:当零售商的自有资金适中时,供应链成员采用RFID技术一定程度上能够缓解零售商的资金约束;零售商选择融资时,供应链及其成员能够承担更高的RFID成本;零售商分摊RFID固定成本的比例对制造商、零售商和供应链能够承担的RFID标签成本阈值有决定性的影响.     

带有订单转保理的供应链金融的收益共享博弈模型

当作为供应商的中小企业出现了严重的财务困境问题时,急需有效融资工具和创新管理模式加以解决.订单转保理可以令资质良好的零售商为资金短缺的供应商提供融资担保,有效解决供应商的订单减少和融资难的问题.然而,分散决策的订单转保理融资模式,使得做担保的零售商的收益降低,不能明显改善供应链效率.针对此问题,研究订单转保理模式下的供应链协调模型,并重点研究由供应商与零售商组成的二级供应链的订单转保理收益共享模型.研究发现:收益共享决策模型供应链总收益小于集中决策供应链总收益,大于分散决策的供应链总收益,表明供应链成员相互合作程度越高,越有利于供应链发展,从而表明协调在供应链中发挥重要作用.然而,集中决策模型只能得到供应链最优总收益,无法得到供应商和零售商的最优收益.收益共享模型不仅能够提高产品订货量,降低产品批发价格,增加供应商和零售商的收益,而且通过最优的收益共享系数可以得到供应商和零售商的最优收益.收益共享机制能够为供应商和零售商共赢协调发展提供新的运作管理模式.     

贸易信用下考虑零售商违约风险的供应链协调问题研究

本文研究延迟支付和提前支付同时存在下的供应链协调问题。考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链,市场需求随机,延迟支付下零售商会增加订购数量,但由于其违约风险的存在,供应商会降低其交付量,最终导致供应商交付量小于零售商订购量,降低供应链收益。要求零售商提前支付部分货款则可以有效避免零售商的违约问题,通过建立延迟支付和提前支付同时存在下的零售商收益模型和供应商的收益模型,给出了零售商的最优订购量决策和供应商的最优交付量决策,通过调整延迟支付期限和提前支付比例,使得二者相等,并等于供应链整体收益最大化下的生产数量,实现供应链协调。最后通过数值算例分析了相关参数的敏感性等问题。     

Financing decisions in supply chains with a capital‐constrained manufacturer: competition and risk

Supply chain finance is a crucial topic. In this paper, we consider that a capital‐constrained manufacturer can borrow money from either a bank (bank credit financing) or a retailer (trade credit financing). Our analysis compares supply chain performance under these two financing schemes. Furthermore, we extend our model to evaluate the impacts of retail competition and supply chain member's risk aversion on supply chains, which consist of one capital‐constrained manufacturer and two competing retailers. We consider three financing schemes: only bank credit financing, dual trade credit financing, and bank and trade credit mix financing. We find that without retail competition, the retailer is always willing to use the trade credit financing; whereas with retail competition, if one retailer provides the trade credit but the other does not, the credit provider could receive the superior profit. Thus, providing an appropriate trade credit financing scheme is critically important for retailers. Moreover, we find that without retail competition, when a trade interest rate is relatively low, both the retailer and manufacturer could reach a win‐win situation in the trade credit financing. However, with retail competition, supply chain members (i.e., two retailers and one manufacturer) will not have an all‐win situation no matter which specific financing scheme is adopted and only a win‐win‐lose situation exists when using the credit mix financing scheme or the dual trade credit financing in supply chains. Last but not least, regardless of risk neutrality or aversion of supply chain members, their pricing decisions among three financing schemes are similar. This implies that the impacts of supply chain members’ risk aversion are limited in supply chain financing scheme selection. More managerial insights are discussed.     

The supplier's optimal guarantee policy in newsvendor finance

The retailer is a capital‐constrained newsvendor and can borrow money from the bank if necessary. To help the retailer get a bank loan at a lower interest rate, the supplier provides guarantee for the retailer's loan up to a prespecified amount. In a Stackelberg game, the supplier decides the wholesale price and the guarantee amount as a leader, and then the retailer determines the order quantity and the amount of the loan as a follower. The supplier is risk‐neutral while the retailer's risk preference is reflected by a spectral risk measure (risk‐neutral, risk‐averse, or risk‐seeking). For a given wholesale price and guarantee amount, the retailer's objective function is quasi‐concave in the order quantity. The optimal solutions for the supplier and the retailer are derived. The supplier's expected profit with optimized wholesale price increases with the guarantee amount, and thus the supplier's optimal policy is to provide a full guarantee for the retailer's loan. When the supplier can limit his guarantee responsibility by a proportion of the outstanding loan obligation, the supplier's optimal policy is also to provide a full guarantee. Even if the retailer incurs bankruptcy costs in the event of repayment default, the supplier's optimal guarantee policy remains the same in these two different forms of limited guarantee. However, when the wholesale price is exogenous, that is, not a decision variable, the full guarantee is not necessarily optimal for supplier.     

Financing strategies for a capital‐constrained manufacturer in a dual‐channel supply chain

This study investigates a co‐opetition‐type dual‐channel supply chain that consists of a competitive supplier (CS) and a capital‐constrained manufacturer (CCM). The CCM procures key components from and simultaneously competes with the CS in the consumer market. To address the CCM's capital constraint, we consider three financing strategies, namely, trade credit, bank loan, and hybrid financing (i.e., combined use of bank loan and equity financing). Game models are established to characterize the interactions between the CS and CCM. The corresponding equilibria are derived under each strategy. Then, comparative analyses are conducted, and the CS's and CCM's preference structures regarding the three strategies are revealed. On this basis, the equilibrium strategy can be concluded as either trade credit or hybrid financing, but never bank loan. Specifically, when the equity financing ratio is small or large, trade credit is an equilibrium strategy. When the equity financing ratio is medium, the equilibrium strategy between trade credit and hybrid financing is determined by consumers’ product preference and loan interest rate.     

市场价格信息不对称的银企融资决策

研究市场价格信息不对称下, 受资金约束的零售商为获取最优订货量从资本市场借贷的供应链运营和融资决策问题. 采用Stackelberg 博弈, 构建并分析混同契约和甄别契约模型. 研究表明: 甄别契约能更好地激励零售商透露真实信息, 使供应链整体利润增加; 银行更偏好高价格零售商以降低借贷风险, 银行在甄别契约下的期望利润总是大于混同契约下的期望利润; 高价格零售商的期望利润受到价格波动和其类型比例的双重影响, 在一定条件下选择甄别契约会得到额外的信息租金.

     

A single-period inventory and payment model with partial trade credit

In this paper, we consider the ordering and payment issues for a retailer facing stochastic demand. We assume that the retailer can enjoy the partial trade credit from his supplier and borrow money from bank as well if needed, and he can also earn return by investing his superfluous on-hand cash (if any). The retailer’s objective is to maximize the expected cash level at the end of the selling period. We formulate the model of this problem by taking initial inventory and capital levels as the two-dimensional state. First, given the exogenous fraction of immediate payment, we show that unlike the critical fractile solution the retailer’s optimal ordering strategy is a two-threshold policy, which is independent of the retailer’s initial inventory level and capital level. Second, we consider an extensive model where the fraction of immediate payment is decided by the retailer. We employ the sequential optimization procedure to solve the extensive problem, and present the structure of the retailer’s optimal policies under different partial-trade-credit penalty rates. Numerical experiments show that if the fraction of immediate payment is exogenous, both partial trade credit and loan opportunity are detrimental to the capital-constrained retailer in many cases, although they can stimulate the retailer to order more.