多随从诱导策略

本文研究多随从诱导问题.当随从进行Nash不合作对策时,得到了连续诱导策略的一 个存在性充分条件与一种设计方法;当随从进行Nash协商对策时,得到了仿射型和连续型 诱导策略的存在性充分条件与设计方法.     

基于Agent的电子市场结伴购买算法

以电子商务市场中买方Agent的结伴购买为背景，研究了自利主体的动态结盟问题。基于博弈论，考虑协商花费为常数情况，若所有Agent都采用“底线”策略，存在唯一的纳什平衡解。最后给出了计算底线值的方法及算法。     

模糊协商微分对策及其折中解

对于协商问题，为避免非线性问题带来求解上的困难并且使其能够处理不确定信息，基于T-S模糊微分对策的思想，构造出协商微分对策的模糊线性化模型．进一步探讨了在模糊线性协商微分对策系统下相应于折中解的控制器的设计方法．对一个2∶2对策问题做了仿真，其效果说明了解决问题方法的可行性．     

一种多域间动态协商机制的设计与实现

针对区分服务网络中多域间基于服务级别约定（SLA）的实时协商问题,在分析协商过程中消费者和服务者的优化目标和约束后,从系统平衡的角度,提出一种多域间的动态协商模型。此模型能够减少价格的频繁抖动,提高资源分配的有效性,并给出一个具体的协商场景实例。最后通过实验验证了模型的有效性。     

防空监视网络传感器资源的动态协商分配

针对防空监视网络的传感器管理问题，讨论了传感器资源的多代理动态协商分配方法。结合防空监视网络传感器的功能，提出了传感器代理协商分配传感器资源的协商协议机制，设计了用于传感器资源协商分配的3个协议并且仿真评价了协议的应用条件。传感器资源的动态协商分配，充分利用了传感器代理的自治性和协作性，能够满足实现防空监视网络传感器资源的动态分配的实时性和准确性要求。     

多Agent系统中基于信任度评估模型的自动信任协商

在动态开放的系统中．由于Agent间交互存在着不确定性,安全成为一个重要问题。在现有的自动信任协商的基础上．考虑主观信任的作用．提出基于信任度评估模型的自动信任协商框架．详细介绍框架中的主要成分及其功能．着重讨论基于信任度评估模型的访问控制,以及在信任度评估模型基础上的两种协商对策：基于信任度评估模型的积极对策和基于信任度评估模型的谨慎对策。分别详细介绍采取上述两种对策的协商过程．并结合一应用实例说明基于信任度评估模型的积极对策的协商过程。     

基于多Agent的动态路径规划方法研究

简要地介绍了多Agent技术,并以城市交通诱导系统中的动态路径规划为研究对象,提出了一种基于范例推理合同网协商机制的多Agent动态路径规划方法。     

基于身份的移动网动态群组密钥协商方案

群组密钥协商是群组通信中非常重要的基本工具，如何得到一个安全有效的密钥协商协议是当前密码学研究中的一个重要问题。基于双线性对和随机预言模型，针对移动网络提出了一个动态群组密钥协商方案。此方案就计算复杂度和通信复杂度而言都是高效的，而且满足密钥协商所需要的安全要求。     

基于对策论的Multi—Agent多边协商机制研究

针对决策支持系统中智能化程度低和协作困难的问题,特别是对多层次、多目标的决策困难问题,提出了基于对策论的Multi-Agent多边协商机制完成决策支持任务;探讨了基于对策论的多边协商机制,给出了Agent协商联盟的构成条件,提出了一个基于对策论的Multi—Agent多边协商机制,设计了基于Multi—Agent多边协商联盟的构成算法。该算法利用Multi-Agent的多边协商解决了多层次、多目标、多属性的竞争决策问题。最后通过算法验证实例证明了协商机制能更好地帮助用户进行决策,提高了决策系统的灵活性和准确性。     

基于合同网协议交互投标的动态调度方法研究

柔性制造系统使生产加工路径有很多可选性，所以调度系统必须考虑机器调度问题。分配规则调度是一种最基本、最具影响力的动态调度方法。然而，分配规则调度方法很少考虑机器顺序选择。兼顾工件选择和机器选择两方面，本文运用交互投标过程，构建基于合同网协议调度的协商规则。研究作业车间动态调度问题，提出并构建了5种合同网规则调度方法。通过实验分析结果表明，基于合同网交互投标模式的规则调度能够大大改善调度系统性能，提高设备的利用率和设备负荷平衡指标。     

Efficiency-based multi-item bargaining design in cognitive radio networks with spectrum coordination

This paper studies the spectrum sharing problem with coordination-generated wireless resource for cooperative cognitive radio networks. A new alternating-offer spectrum bargaining framework is introduced with asymmetrically bilaterial wireless resource, in terms of sequential bargaining equilibria for frequency bands for high efficiency or approximate efficiency. In the proposed framework, the role of spectrum bargaining with user diversity can constrain many items with private information for spectrum allocation, thereby aggregating to a current frequency band surplus with spectrum trading to exchange the use in the reform of spectrum regulatory practice. While the users have an incentive in agreeing on a division of resource, they also have an interest in maximizing the amount of resource that it received. Furthermore, we develop an efficiency-based algorithm to explain why spectrum bargaining based on asymmetrical resource information can get little deviation from the first best resource utilization for high efficiency consideration. Simulation results show that the proposed multi-item spectrum bargaining scheme significantly outperforms the existing schemes.     

基于Stackerlberg和议价博弈的Femtocell网络功率控制

针对Femtocell网络中存在的干扰问题,提出一种基于Stackerlberg博弈和议价博弈的功率控制策略.首先,给出既可以使Femtocell网络系统容量最大化,又可以体现效用公平的效用函数;然后,在保证宏小区用户效用最大化的条件下,考虑到Femtocell家庭用户的收益,给出Stackelberg博弈模型;接着,考虑到Femtocell家庭用户之间的效用公平和最小服务质量要求,给出基于议价博弈的Kalai-Smorodinsky议价解,并证明议价解的存在性和唯一性.使用拉格朗日乘子法给出宏小区的最优价格,保证宏小区的效用最大化.仿真结果表明,该策略在满足宏蜂窝网络效用最大化的情况下,不但能够满足Femtocell家庭用户最小服务质量需求和公平性,而且Femtocell网络的收益也能得到较好的保证.     

Decomposition of the Game of Agents in Problems of Incentive

The problem of incentive in the multiagent active system with nonseparable cost functions of the agents is tackled by decomposing the game of agents, that is, constructing an incentive system realizing the optimal—for the principal—strategies of the agents as the equilibria in the dominant strategies.     

基于谈判集的模糊合作博弈的收益分配方案

为了弥补核心作为博弈解可能为空集的缺陷,将经典合作博弈中的谈判集解拓展到模糊合作博弈中,提出了模糊合作博弈的模糊谈判集的概念.探讨模糊网络博弈的模糊谈判集和核心的等价性质,并对相关结论加以证明.研究表明,模糊合作博弈的模糊谈判集是经典合作博弈谈判集的自然拓展,该结果丰富了对模糊合作博弈的解的研究,也表明了模糊网络博弈核心的非空性,进而保证其最优分配方案的存在性.     

Femtocell网络的鲁棒议价博弈功率控制

针对具有不完美信道状态信息的Femtocell双层网络，为了保证网络效用最大化、最小服务质量要求及Femtocell用户之间的效用公平，提出了基于议价博弈的鲁棒功率控制方案.在保证宏小区用户正常传输情况下，考虑到Femtocell家庭用户的最小服务质量要求，将Femtocell网络的鲁棒功率控制问题转化为议价博弈功率控制问题.为了保证Femtocell家庭用户之间的公平性，给出了Kalai-Smorodinsky（K-S）议价博弈解，证明了议价博弈解的存在性和唯一性，并提出了一种基于二分查找算法的分布式鲁棒功率控制方案.仿真结果表明，所提出的算法不仅具有较好的收敛性能，而且能够较好地保证用户之间的公平性.     

Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem

A dynamic game model of bioresource management problem is considered. The center (referee) which shares a reservoir, and the players (countries) which harvest the fish stock on their territory are the participants of this game. In this paper we investigate the new type of equilibrium—cooperative incentive equilibrium. The equilibria are constructed in the case, when the players punish each other for a deviation from the cooperative equilibrium, and in the case, when the center punishes them for a deviation. Some results of the numerical modelling are given.     

一种基于合作博弈论的自动驾驶车道变更模型

提出一个新颖的车道变更模型,采用合作博弈方法激励车辆参与合作.首次将合作博弈理论应用到车道变更领域,设计用于两车变道的纳什讨价还价变道模型,然后扩展为三车的合作博弈变道模型,并求出变道模型的纳什讨价还价解和夏普利值.为了进一步激励车辆参与合作,在收益分配方案中加入支付补偿部分来实现整体收益的可转移性,从而取得模型的解....     

Stochastic characterization of the spectrum sharing game in ad-hoc networks

This work focuses on infrastructure-less ad hoc wireless networks where multiple transmitter/receiver pairs share the same radio resources (spectrum); transmitters have to choose how to split a total power budget across orthogonal spectrum bands with the goal to maximize their sum rate under cumulative interference from concurrent transmissions. We start off by introducing and characterizing the non-cooperative game among transmitter/receiver pairs when the network topology is deterministically given. The corresponding Nash equilibria are derived, highlighting their dependency on the topological parameters (distances between wireless nodes, propagation model, and background noise power). The analysis is then extended to the case of random network topologies drawn from a given spatial stochastic process. Tools of stochastic geometry are leveraged to derive a statistical characterization of the equilibria of the spectrum sharing game. Finally, a distributed algorithm is proposed to let the players of the spectrum sharing game converge to equilibria conditions. Numerical simulations show that the proposed algorithm drives the users to stable points that are close to the equilibria of the game requiring limited information exchange among nodes.     

Game Theoretic subcarrier and power allocation for wireless OFDMA networks

This paper proposes a bargaining game theoretic resource(including the subcarrier and the power) allocation scheme for wireless orthogonal frequency division multiple access(OFDMA) networks.We define a wireless user s payoff as a function of the achieved data-rate.The fairness resource allocation problem can then be modeled as a cooperative bargaining game.The objective of the game is to maximize the aggregate payoffs for the users.To search for the Nash bargaining solution(NBS) of the game,a suboptimal subcarrier allocation is performed by assuming an equal power allocation.Thereafter,an optimal power allocation is performed to maximize the sum payoff for the users.By comparing with the max-rate and the max-min algorithms,simulation results show that the proposed game could achieve a good tradeoff between the user fairness and the overall system performance.