Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind.

Daniel Dennett's philosophical abolition of mind is examined with reference to its methodology, intent, philosophic origins, and internal consistency. His treatment of the contents of perception and introspection is shown to be derivative from realist reductionist misinterpretations of physics, physiology, and phenomenology of perception. In order to rectify inconsistencies of that realistic paradigm devolved from psycho-neural identity theory of mid-twentieth century, Dennett radicalizes its logic and redefines even veridical phenomenology of exteroception to be "illusory." This measure in extremis still does not save the appearances of his predecessors, nevertheless, for Dennett tacitly presupposes the existence of veridical phenomenology in his very treatment of non-veridical sensory phenomena that he uses to argue analogically from, to thereby suggest the plausibility of a parallel illusoriness of veridical phenomena of perception and introspection. This inhering inconsistency renders unsound Dennett's radical extension of the logic of identity theory, and ironically shows up the persistence of mental phenomenology that extant reductionism appears so desirous to argumentively eliminate. Nonetheless there is much to be learned from such an analysis of Dennett's purported elimination of mental contents, for a generalization of our critique throws light on the occult assumptions underlying realism and reductionism since early identity theory and its variants, and upon the possible viability of that programme as a whole. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Commentary on crooks.

Mark Crooks (see record 2004-18788-002) effectively demolishes Dennett's theory by concentrating on its internal defects. In which case I would like to contribute to this discussion by examining some scientific evidence that may be relevant. Dennett claims that hallucinations do not involve any actual sensory element but only a change in our beliefs. A schizophrenic does not actually hear the voices he complains about--he develops the false belief that he is hearing something. This puts hallucinations on a par with the patient's delusions e.g. his false belief that other people are persecuting him. The majority view, in contrast, is that hallucinations represent defective function in the sensory system. In this impasse, evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies should help. These allow us to identify those areas of the brain that are activated under the conditions we are interested in. If the majority are right, then a subject having hallucinations should show increased activity in some part of his sensory brain. On the other hand, if Dennett is right, the subject should show no such increased activity but, instead, possibly abnormal activity in the part of the brain related to the formation of delusions. To answer this question I performed a Medline search of the literature on imaging studies in hallucinations occurring under various circumstances. The results were interesting. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dennett as illusionist.

Mark Crooks's article (see record 200418788-002) correctly draws attention to the ambiguous use of the notion of 'illusion' by Daniel Dennett in its arguments against theories that postulate the existence of qualia. The present comment extends that criticism by showing how Dennett's strictures reveal a failure to perceive an illusion in Dennett's own arguments. First, the inadequacy of his dismissal of inner registration is shown to be based in a prejudicial interpretation of the case for qualia. Second, his resistance to the idea of the non-epistemicity of the sensory fields shows him failing to acknowledge, not only the evolutionary advantage of such fields, but also that the flexibility and relativity of perception from person to person allows human communication to increase the rate of adaptive response across the species. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Last Philosophical Behaviorist: Content and Consciousness Explained Away.

Rejoinders to Robert Bishop, John Smythies, and Edmond Wright concerning my paper Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. The untoward social and moral consequences of Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology (programmatic phenomenology denial) are documented. Rhetorical methodology, fallacious reasoning, and lack of empirical support for a philosophical abolition of consciousness and phenomenology are exposed. Consciousness denial by Dennett is shown to proceed by the same fallacious method involved in his phenomenological nihilism. Additional arguments are adduced against the presumed nonexistence of veridical and non-veridical percepts, as interpreted by elementary science of perception, and as this implicates a more general critique of naive realism and its applications to such hypothetical scenarios as our actual existence within cranial vats and the so-called inverted spectrum argument devolved from Locke. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Consciousness and the voices of the mind": Response to the discussants.

In planning the McMaster University Brain and Behaviour Research Programme's 1983 Bauer lecture, it was deemed that a topic in the area of cognitive neuroscience might be suitable, preferably one of a general nature that would be of interest to several disciplines. Consciousness, one of the most perplexing of human issues, requires that we question how the living material of the human brain results in the subjective awareness humankind experiences. Julian Jaynes was asked to present the lecture, which was entitled "Consciousness and the voices of the mind" (see record 2007-08986-001). In this article, Jaynes responds to comments on his lecture by Daniel Dennett (see record 2007-09336-002), Jonathan Miller (see record 2007-09336-003), and George Ojemann (see record 2007-09336-004). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Julian Jaynes's software archeology.

In planning the McMaster University Brain and Behaviour Research Programme's 1983 Bauer lecture, it was deemed that a topic in the area of cognitive neuroscience might be suitable, preferably one of a general nature that would be of interest to several disciplines. Consciousness, one of the most perplexing of human issues, requires that we question how the living material of the human brain results in the subjective awareness humankind experiences. Julian Jaynes was asked to present the lecture, which was entitled "Consciousness and the voices of the mind" (see record 2007-08986-001). In this article, Daniel Dennett presents his philosophical views of Jaynes's notion of the nature and origin of consciousness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Behavioral explanations and intentional explanations in psychology.

A recent criticism of behaviorism asserts that intentional explanations in psychology are acceptable and preferable to behavioral explanations. The philosopher D. C. Dennett justifies intentional explanations on the grounds that they are provisional and can be cashed out in principle. Skinner objected to such explanations on the grounds that they are never cashed out in practice. Their different views arise from their divergent goals for psychology: understanding intelligence and rationality vs understanding behavior. In the context of a science of behavior, intentional explanations only give the semblance of explanation because they rely on immediate causes that are fictional. Nonintentional explanations acceptable for a science of behavior are historical, much as in evolutionary biology. When Dennett's argument is applied to evolutionary biology, it becomes a justification of creationism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

McMaster-Bauer symposium on consciousness.

The McMaster University Brain and Behaviour Research Programme was initiated in 1977 with the purpose of facilitating inter-departmental and inter-faculty discussion and collaborative research concerning brain-behaviour relationships in a broad perspective. It was supported initially, in part, by the John A. Bauer Memorial Fund, which provided resources for guest lectures. In planning the Bauer lecture for 1983, it seemed that a topic in the area of cognitive neuroscience might be suitable, preferably one of a general nature that would be of interest to several disciplines. Consciousness is surely one of the most perplexing of human issues--the question being how the living material of the human brain results in the subjective awareness humankind experiences. It has been a topic considered for centuries by philosophers and psychologists, psychiatrists and physicists, among others. A recent book written by Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, embraced many issues from psychology and neurology to archaeology, anthropology, the classics, and religious studies. Jaynes was invited to give the 1983 Bauer lecture. At the same time, Jonathan Miller was invited to discuss some of the anthropological considerations of Jaynes's thesis; Daniel Dennett agreed to present his philosophical views of Jaynes's notion of the nature and origin of consciousness; and George Ojemann discussed the neurological aspects of Jaynes's theory. Included here are Jaynes's original lecture, entitled "Consciousness and the voices of the mind"; an open discussion with questions from the audience; the discussions by Miller, Dennett, and Ojemann; a panel discussion among the four presenters; and finally another open discussion that included questions for all four presenters. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Free will and psychotherapy: The enhancement of agency.

Proposes that to the extent that psychotherapy allows the individual to exercise greater freedom in his or her life it does so through enhancing psychological agency. The conceptions of free will and of agency used here are influenced strongly by J. F. Rychlak's (1988, and 1994) discussion of the human capacity for "dialectical" thinking. The author discusses these conceptions of agency in terms of some of R. Schafer's (1976, and 1983) recent ideas regarding psychoanalytic psychotherapy. A. H. Jenkins further notes that this conception of individuality is contextually embedded and thus is fully compatible with the idea of a person devoted to others in mutually gratifying relationships and committed to self-definition through participation in community life. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Images in mind: The evolution of a theory.

Reviews the book, Images in mind: The evolution of a theory by A. Paivio (see record 1991-98882-000). In this review I hope to capture some of the flavour of Images in Mind, in which Allan Paivio traces some of the signal events in the evolution of dual coding theory. I encourage each reader of the review to become a reader of the book. The main reward is a glimpse of the workings of a great mind, but there are practical benefits as well. I am reminded of an interview with Keith Richard of the Rolling Stones. When asked how he came up with so many songs, he replied that he just played through his "Buddy Holly Song Book," and something always came up. Reading papers by Paivio has the same effect on me; I can't read his work without many experiments "coming up." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of How the mind works.

Reviews the book, How the mind works by Steven Pinker (see record 1997-30233-000). In this book, the author writes with optimism and excitement about recent progress in psychology, but with despair about the human condition. The scope of the book is stated briefly: "I will try to explain what the mind is, where it came from, and how it lets us see, think, feel, interact, and pursue higher callings like art, religion, and philosophy" (p. 3). The reader will be disappointed in many of these explanations: the book dwells on the already-expansive topics of what the mind is, and where it came from. As for the rest, we are told that humans have innate knowledge of optics, logic, mathematics, physics, botany (p. 377), and even psychology (p. 329). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Free will and agency.

Comments on R. Williams's (see record 1992-34951-001) proposed solution to the free will–determinism debate. A. A. Sappington contends that Williams too quickly dismissed the concept of agency in the sense of people being in some way the cause of their own actions, and finds fault with Williams's definition of freedom in terms of "truthful living." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A psychiatric will.

Describes the use of a "psychiatric will" as a simple contract between the author and his recurrently manic patients to determine whether the patient will give the author power to hospitalize him/her in certain health states. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comments on Ferguson's "Forty years of useless research?" (Vol. 24, no. 2, April 1983).

The authors comment on Kinglsey Ferguson's "Forty Years of Useless Research?" (see record 2007-03833-001). Ferguson has raised an important issue for all readers to consider. He has taken a courageous stand and is attempting to stimulate us, as he does his undergraduate students, to explore nondefensively where we stand as a science and what we need to do to improve the quality of our work. It it is only through the respectful marriage of the art and science of psychology that our field will prosper. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Free will and psychotherapy: Complaints of the draughtsmen's daughters.

Free will is discussed from a feminist/social constructionist perspective, especially in relationship to therapy. According to many psychological studies, women are perceived as less likely to exercise their free will and to suffer serious psychological consequences. Feminist critiques challenge this argument and the underlying liberal humanist image of the fully human being as an individual who is endowed with free will. It is stressed that within the binary construction of gender difference, the qualities associated with the free willed individual are identical with those associated with men; women become the inferior other. An alternative construction of human ideal is advocated: relational selves. This repositioning dislocates other formulations, including free will, and changes the notion of therapy into a relational activity, suggesting that it may be as liberating to men as to women. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Free will or choice.

Comments on the article by Tyler entitled "Toward a Workable Psychology of Individuality" (see record 196003597-001), stating that it seems as though she should have mentioned in connection with her notion of choice Hartman's and Bellak's contribution. They speak of the 'relatively conflict free sphere of the ego.' This appears especially appropriate since she states: 'To understand an individual we must know how conscious he is of the choices he is making.' (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Edmund Jacobson (1888–1983).

Presents an obituary for Edmund Jacobson. As an independent graduate student, he studied the startle reflex and became interested in why it was exaggerated in some of his subjects. This line of inquiry eventuated in Jacobson's world-famous methods of Progressive Relaxation, which allowed him to eliminate the exaggerated startle reflex in overly tense individuals. Science always dominated his clinical work, and Jacobson saw his clinical purpose as that of advancing the science of mind. A hallmark of this scientific approach to clinical problems was Jacobson's effort to develop objective measures of the progress of his patients. With A. J. Carlson, he established amplitude of the patellar tendon reflex as inversely related to degree of bodily tension. When his patients' complaints decreased, so did muscular tension. Later, Jacobson replaced this technique with the more refined measure of electromyography (EMG). Another of Jacobson's major accomplishments resulted from his classical research on the direct electrical measurement of covert behavior during mental activities. From these findings he developed a concept of neuromuscular circuits of bodily function that constitute mind. Jacobson's conception that neuromuscular circuits generate cognitive processes has been effectively applied in relaxing undesired mental events such as occur in phobias, anxiety states, and depression. Jacobson's last research at the age of 93 was on the intricate measurement of tension profiles. This application of quantitative electromyography will probably find its way into the practice of medicine, behavioral and other realms. Despite his many accomplishments, Jacobson will be remembered first for scientific research leading to an understanding of mind, and second for the clinical method of progressive relaxation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why Freud failed: Some implications for neurophysiology and sociobiology.

Many parallels have recently been drawn between Freud's early work and the goals of the contemporary neurophysiology of mind and sociobiology. In this article it is argued that the portrayal of Freud as a reductionist and a biological determinist is incorrect. As a consequence, so is the perceived alignment of Freud with neurophysiology and sociobiology. But it is also true that, in his early work, Freud faced many of the same problems and issues that confront those interested in theories of mind and of human nature, and an understanding of how Freud faced these issues may inform our increasing interest in views of mind and behavior emanating from the life sciences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Wise after the fact.

Comments on the article Proverbs as psychological theories...or is it the other way around by Tim Rogers (see record 1991-03999-001). Since Rogers cites the author's own investigation of proverbs (1988)--later expanded into a book-length treatment of popular beliefs (1990)--the author shares his bemuscinent over his continued admiration for oftrepeated beliefs that are demonstrably false and, in some instances (e.g., "Spare the rod and spoil the child"), dangerous. Because he cannot defend the truth value of proverbs, Rogers decides instead to challenge truth as the relevant criterion for judging them. Similarly, even though proverbs A and B may well contradict one another (e.g., Absence makes the heart grow fonder vs. Out of sight, out of mind), he denies that this is troubling since, after all, A will apply in one situation and B in another. Anyone who is not satisfied with this defense is said to be a partisan of "a natural science model of psychology" (p. 200), "logical empiricism," or something he calls "eliminative materialism." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)