The Last Philosophical Behaviorist: Content and Consciousness Explained Away.

Rejoinders to Robert Bishop, John Smythies, and Edmond Wright concerning my paper Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. The untoward social and moral consequences of Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology (programmatic phenomenology denial) are documented. Rhetorical methodology, fallacious reasoning, and lack of empirical support for a philosophical abolition of consciousness and phenomenology are exposed. Consciousness denial by Dennett is shown to proceed by the same fallacious method involved in his phenomenological nihilism. Additional arguments are adduced against the presumed nonexistence of veridical and non-veridical percepts, as interpreted by elementary science of perception, and as this implicates a more general critique of naive realism and its applications to such hypothetical scenarios as our actual existence within cranial vats and the so-called inverted spectrum argument devolved from Locke. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dennett as illusionist.

Mark Crooks's article (see record 200418788-002) correctly draws attention to the ambiguous use of the notion of 'illusion' by Daniel Dennett in its arguments against theories that postulate the existence of qualia. The present comment extends that criticism by showing how Dennett's strictures reveal a failure to perceive an illusion in Dennett's own arguments. First, the inadequacy of his dismissal of inner registration is shown to be based in a prejudicial interpretation of the case for qualia. Second, his resistance to the idea of the non-epistemicity of the sensory fields shows him failing to acknowledge, not only the evolutionary advantage of such fields, but also that the flexibility and relativity of perception from person to person allows human communication to increase the rate of adaptive response across the species. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Free will in absentia: Dennett on free will and determinism.

Mark Crooks (see record 2004-18788-002) has given a helpful discussion of Daniel Dennett's "philosophical abolition of mind," adding to the list of reasons why many philosophers jokingly say Dennett should have titled his 1991 book "Consciousness Explained Away". As Crooks argues, Dennett really is committed 'to our phenomenal experience, beliefs, desires, etc. as all being illusory in the strongest possible sense. Yet, when it comes to free will, Dennett fights hard to maintain that free will is something more than an illusion, that it is a capacity our neurophysiological machinery has. Dennett's new book-like his writings on mind and consciousness-is short on argument and long on rhetoric and cute stories. And herein lies Dennett's greatest strength, to seemingly make palatable ideas that many people think stand no chance. This, however, is also his greatest weakness in that ultimately the rhetoric fails to carry the day under closer scrutiny. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Commentary on crooks.

Mark Crooks (see record 2004-18788-002) effectively demolishes Dennett's theory by concentrating on its internal defects. In which case I would like to contribute to this discussion by examining some scientific evidence that may be relevant. Dennett claims that hallucinations do not involve any actual sensory element but only a change in our beliefs. A schizophrenic does not actually hear the voices he complains about--he develops the false belief that he is hearing something. This puts hallucinations on a par with the patient's delusions e.g. his false belief that other people are persecuting him. The majority view, in contrast, is that hallucinations represent defective function in the sensory system. In this impasse, evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies should help. These allow us to identify those areas of the brain that are activated under the conditions we are interested in. If the majority are right, then a subject having hallucinations should show increased activity in some part of his sensory brain. On the other hand, if Dennett is right, the subject should show no such increased activity but, instead, possibly abnormal activity in the part of the brain related to the formation of delusions. To answer this question I performed a Medline search of the literature on imaging studies in hallucinations occurring under various circumstances. The results were interesting. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychoanalytic and biological perspectives on depression: Contradictory or complementary?

The emergence of biological psychiatry as a major mental health movement and theoretical point of view presents important issues for psychoanalytic psychology in conceptualizing and treating psychopathology. Psychoanalytic and biological perspectives on depression, as well as other disorders, are often seen as representing contradictory and mutually exclusive theoretical models. This paper critically reviews some of the primary research evidence for the biological psychiatric diagnosis of endogenous depression, and challenges the tendency to construe findings as a basis for discounting the role of psychogenic factors or the value of psychological treatment approaches. Brief attention is given to philosophical issues of reductionism and mind-body dualism, which pose serious conceptual problems for a biological model of psychopathology. The potential for viewing biological and psychological factors as complementary is considered. Freud's early effort to devise a psychogenic model of psychopathology recognized this potential and is reflected in his attempt to build a metapsychological bridge between physiological and mental phenomena. Psychoanalytic theory may provide the essential framework for incorporating both biological and psychological perspectives on depression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Behavioral explanations and intentional explanations in psychology.

A recent criticism of behaviorism asserts that intentional explanations in psychology are acceptable and preferable to behavioral explanations. The philosopher D. C. Dennett justifies intentional explanations on the grounds that they are provisional and can be cashed out in principle. Skinner objected to such explanations on the grounds that they are never cashed out in practice. Their different views arise from their divergent goals for psychology: understanding intelligence and rationality vs understanding behavior. In the context of a science of behavior, intentional explanations only give the semblance of explanation because they rely on immediate causes that are fictional. Nonintentional explanations acceptable for a science of behavior are historical, much as in evolutionary biology. When Dennett's argument is applied to evolutionary biology, it becomes a justification of creationism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Propositional reasoning by model?

Two theories of propositional deductive reasoning are considered: the mental models of P. N. Johnson-Laird et al (see PA, 79:41765) and the mental logic of M. D. Braine (1994). The model theory is said to account for practically all of the known phenomena of deductive propositional reasoning, offer a general theory of conditionals, account for the most important aspects of Braine's theory, and predict new phenomena that rule theories cannot explain. It is argued that (1) the model theory is flawed in a way that is difficult to overcome, (2) conditionals are seriously misrepresented, (3) the algorithms proposed to implement it either allow invalid inferences or are psychologically useless, (4) Braine's theory accounts for all of the new phenomena worth considering, and (5) the model theory can predict Braine's results only at the cost of self-refutation. It is concluded that the mental model theory of propositional reasoning offers no reason to reject the program of mental logic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Feeling pain and being in pain, 2nd edition.

Reviews the book, Feeling pain and being in pain, 2nd edition by Nikola Grahek (see record 2007-00636-000). This remarkable little book was originally published in Germany in 2001 and saved from obscurity by Daniel Dennett, who ensured its republication after the author's untimely death. It claims to provide no new theory and no new data on pain but instead walks the reader through a number of phenomena that eventually lead one to see pain in a new light. What makes this book such a gem is the refusal of its author to stray from what is known or can be known. No far-fetched notions of the relationship between pain and psychology, frequently encountered in the psychological pain literature, intrude on his prudent figuring; nor is there a promise of what is just around the corner, claims of what further research is needed, and so on. Grahek sticks to the clinical and neurophysiological data, for they are already sufficiently rich to allow him to characterise those very different features of the pain experience: feeling pain versus being in pain. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The death of desire. A study in psychopathology.

Reviews the book, The death of desire. A study in psychopathology by M. Guy Thompson (1985). Thompson has written an amiable book, filled with the spirit of ecumenism. A practising clinical psychologist, his thesis is that desire is the "foundation of the human subject," that it is "located in the heart of the unconscious," that, if once "situated in phenomenology," this unconscious can reveal "the nature of intersubjective relations." Accordingly, pathological phenomena would be attributable to the deadening of this desire—hence, the book's title. Thompson clearly intends a dialogue between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The result is an attempt at synthesis that takes R. D. Laing on the one hand and Jacques Lacan on the other—two rather strange bedfellows—as his chief sources of inspiration. Taken as a whole, this book's reach outstretches its grasp. It really does not offer a cogent, coherent synthesis of phenomenology and psychoanalysis but seems rather to offer a congenial amalgam of the many insights experienced by a highly intelligent, versatile and sensitive man during the long, fecund years of his training. As such it is endlessly stimulating, if never quite convincing, and offers singular promise for the future work of its author. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Motion perception: a modern view of Wertheimer's 1912 monograph

Max Wertheimer's 1912 monograph on apparent motion is a seminal contribution to the study of visual motion, but its actual contents are not widely known. This article attempts to clarify what the monograph did and did not contribute, emphasizing links between Wertheimer's principal findings and the results of subsequent investigations of motion perception, including currently active lines of research. The topics discussed include Wertheimer's experimental tests of explanations for apparent motion; his work with motion phenomena that lie between succession and optimum motion; his studies of the influence of attention on motion; explorations of various forms of hysteresis and motion transparency; and Wertheimer's work with a motion-blind patient.     

Husserl revisited: The forgotten distinction between psychology and phenomenology.

Argues that as phenomenology attracts growing attention in current psychology, it is increasingly important for psychologists to understand that phenomenology encompasses much more than a mere appreciation for subjective self-report data. The ideas of E. Husserl, the so-called founder of phenomenology, are reexamined to enlighten psychologists about phenomenology's contrasting approach to the study of consciousness. Whereas psychology studies actual subjective responses to actual environmental events (empirical data), phenomenology studies the essential character of consciousness in meaning-conferring acts (essential knowledge). Husserl proposed phenomenology as a positive alternative to the experimental methods of the new scientific psychology. Husserl believed phenomenology was needed to clarify the essential, but unanalyzed, pre-understandings of mental phenomena that guide psychology's experimental investigations. (36 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stereoscopic transparency: a test for binocular vision's disambiguating power

It has been suggested that to resolve ambiguities implicit in binocular perception of complex visual scenes, the brain adopts a continuity constraint assuming that disparities change smoothly with eccentricity. Stereoscopic transparency is characterized by abrupt changes of binocular disparity across retinal locations. The focus of the present study is how the brain uses the continuity constraint in the perception of stereoscopic transparency despite the presence of abrupt disparity changes. Observers viewed random-dot stereograms of overlapping transparent plane and cylindrical surfaces and had to distinguish between two orientations of the cylindrical surface under conditions of strictly controlled depth fixation. Surprisingly, maximal dot density of the transparent plane at which perception is still veridical dramatically decreases as depth separation between the surfaces grows. Persistence of this relationship, when binocular matching processes at each surface are separated to on and off brightness channels, suggests at least two stages in the underlying computation binocular matching and inter-surface interactions. We show that these phenomena cannot be accounted for by either higher severity of matching with high dot densities or the ability of the denser surface to pull vergence to its depth. We also measure contrast sensitivity and near-far symmetry of the underlying mechanism and propose a model of competitive interactions between dissimilar disparities.     

Signal-detection methods in personality and perception.

Discusses methodological problems encountered in the use of traditional threshold measures in the study of personality and perception. The threshold is shown to: (1) yield results dependent upon the psychophysical method used, (2) be arbitrary in definition, (3) be unimproved by corrections for guessing, and (4) confound the O's sensory capabilities with his criterion for reporting a given stimulus event. Methods derived from signal-detection theory are described. Studies using the logic and methods of signal-detection analysis in personality and perception research are reviewed and their implications discussed. (35 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ten frequently asked questions about implicit measures and their frequently supposed, but not entirely correct answers.

Self-report measures are often criticised for their susceptibility to self-presentation and their inability to capture mental contents that are inaccessible to introspection. Over the past decade, researchers have attempted to overcome these problems by means of implicit measures, which infer mental contents from participants’ performance on experimental paradigms. In the present article I provide an overview of the currently available implicit measures and discuss 10 common assumptions about these measures. I argue that many of these assumptions are either inconsistent with the available evidence or theoretically problematic for conceptual reasons. Nevertheless, implicit measures have proven their usefulness in predicting behaviours that are difficult to predict with traditional self-report measures. Thus, even though implicit measures may not be able to provide the information that is sometimes attributed to these measures, they represent a valuable addition to the toolbox of psychological instruments in understanding the determinants of human behaviour. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Experiments on subjective duration 1868-1975: A collection of power function exponents.

Exponents of the psychophysical function for subjective duration are compiled from 111 studies undertaken with the methods of magnitude estimation, magnitude production, and ratio setting. The determination of exponents from ratio-setting data is based on a new model for time perception that also allows the computation of exponents from equal-setting (duration reproduction) data (i.e., from experiments that did not involve the S's numerical behavior). The following problems are dealt with in terms of their influence on the exponent of subjective duration: practice, sensory modality (used in presenting the duration, including empty intervals), drugs, group differences (age, mental retardation, psychosis, neurosis), and experimental effects (methods, very short durations, intramodal range effect). A general conclusion is that time perception is not veridical and that the exponent on the average approximates 0.9. (4 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A measurement-theoretic analysis of the fuzzy logic model of perception.

The fuzzy logic model of perception (FLMP) is analyzed from a measurement-theoretic perspective. FLMP has an impressive history of fitting factorial data, suggesting that its probabilistic form is valid. The authors raise questions about the underlying processing assumptions of FLMP. Although FLMP parameters are interpreted as fuzzy logic truth values, the authors demonstrate that for several factorial designs widely used in choice experiments, most desirable fuzzy truth value properties fail to hold under permissible rescalings, suggesting that the fuzzy logic interpretation may be unwarranted. The authors show that FLMP's choice rule is equivalent to a version of G. Rasch's (1960) item response theory model, and the nature of FLMP measurement scales is transparent when stated in this form. Statistical inference theory exists for the Rasch model and its equivalent forms. In fact, FLMP can be reparameterized as a simple 2-category logit model, thereby facilitating interpretation of its measurement scales and allowing access to commercially available software for performing statistical inference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The psychological unconscious: Found, lost, and regained.

In response to A. G. Greenwald's (see record 1992-33868-001) article on contemporary research on unconscious mental processes, 3 issues are addressed: (1) the independence of much recent research and theory from psychodynamic formulations; (2) the broad sweep of the psychological unconscious, including implicit perception, memory, thought, learning, and emotion; and (3) the possibility that the analytic power of unconscious processing may depend both on the manner in which mental contents are rendered unconscious and the manner in which they are to be processed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testing the validity of the colonial mentality implicit association test and the interactive effects of covert and overt colonial mentality on Filipino American mental health.

Colonial mentality (CM) has been found to be an important factor for Filipino American mental health. However, the link between CM and mental health may be more complex and might be influenced by whether Filipino American individuals hold covert CM, overt CM, or both. Relatedly, although the Implicit Association Test has been used to capture the covert and automatic aspect of CM, suggesting that this component of CM is less amenable to accurate self-report and introspection, the validity of such a method and its ability to predict mental health variables has yet to be supported. Furthermore, the possibility that the link between overt CM and mental health may be dependent on the covert aspect of CM has yet to be empirically explored. Thus, I examined the construct validity and utility of the Colonial Mentality Implicit Association Test (CMIAT) as a measure of the covert aspect of CM and investigated the interactions between covert and overt CM in predicting mental health among a sample of 102 Filipino Americans. Results suggest that the CMIAT may be a valid and useful tool for capturing the covert and automatic component of CM and that covert CM may be moderating the link between overt CM and mental health. Implications for CM theory and for Filipino American mental health are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)