Moral obligation and attitudes: Their relation to behavioral intentions.

I. Ajzen and M. Fishbein (1969) have shown that behavioral intention can be viewed as a function of attitudes and subjective norms; however, moral values also may influence behavioral intentions in morally relevant situations. When a component measuring moral obligation was added to Ajzen and Fishbein's model in an experiment with 113 adults (mean age 42 yrs) in Baptist Sunday school classes who were exposed to 2 morally relevant and 2 not morally relevant hypothetical situations, it added significantly to prediction of behavioral intention. In the 2 "moral situations" (as defined independently by 3 criteria—importance, immunity from deliberate change, and form of moral pressure), moral obligation was more highly correlated with intention than attitude or social norms, but in 2 "nonmoral" situations it was not. Hence, moral considerations are necessary to predict behavioral intentions in moral situations. (13 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Where lies social responsibility?

L. Krasner's article, "Behavior Control and Social Responsibility" (see record 1963-00116-001) bypassed several points of view which might clarify some of the issues discussed, and at the same time tone down what seems to be an exaggerated claim for urgency in dealing with problems of social responsibility. In the matter of considering moral and ethical issues, it is important to proceed with calmness and careful consideration rather than to become overly excited about finding the "right" solution. Even the "psychologist-researcher" is human and when he turns his hand to such things as communicating to the lay public he may fall into the pattern of the "sensationalists and popularizers," though obviously not so crudely. First among three basic questions and answers presented by Krasner is that concerning whether or not human behavior is controllable. His answer is to the effect that there is overwhelming experimental evidence that human behavior is controllable. Such a statement seems exaggerated in the face of other evidence from both experimental and clinical impressions. Krasner states that there is a "subtle but important" difference between the "psychology of behavior control" and the science of psychology. There are several objections to some of Krasner's implications that the behavioral scientist is not or at least is less bound by an ethical and moral system. There seem to be no logical grounds for distinguishing in principle between an ethics for behavioral scientists and an ethics for behavior controllers. The atomic scientists produced a bomb as scientists employed by their government while at war. They did their job effectively. As informed private citizens they held some moral reservations as to the consequences of their scientific endeavors. The behavioral scientist and the behavior controller can also perform their professional tasks dispassionately and efficiently, but as people they might well look to the ethical and moral issues involved. They can choose to take appropriate ethical and moral action as private citizens who have the advantages of specialized knowledge. The behavioral scientist and the behavior controller are not to be compartmentalized into a patchwork of separate roles, rather they are to see themselves as integrated individuals functioning in various ways which on occasion may bring about a conflict in ethical and moral values. Then they should be enabled to resolve the conflicts for themselves on a rational basis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ecological moral realism: An alternative theoretical framework for studying moral psychology.

The authors propose that the empirical study of human moral behavior as undertaken by positive psychologists, psychologists interested in the study of values, and experimental ethicists can be normative at its core, yet also remain truly scientific. To do this, those interested in the empirical study of human moral behavior should consider the concept of affordances, which is central to the Gibsonian ecological psychology tradition, as an approach to studying virtues and strengths. From this perspective, virtues can be better defined as part of moral analogues of affordances (MAAs). Just as the affordance "being-climbable" is a relation between climbing ability and height, so one can similarly define a MAA as an opportunity for moral behavior. Virtues, on this account, would be defined as abilities to behave appropriately in morally relevant situations. If one studies virtues as components of MAAs, virtues are only comprehensible in terms of morally relevant situations. Similarly, morally relevant situations are comprehensible only in terms of abilities to behave appropriately in them, that is, in terms of virtues. We believe that such an approach holds many advantages. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reconciling the self and morality: An empirical model of moral centrality development.

Self-interest and moral sensibilities generally compete with one another, but for moral exemplars, this tension appears to not be in play. This study advances the reconciliation model, which explains this anomaly within a developmental framework by positing that the relationship between the self’s interests and moral concerns ideally transforms from one of mutual competition to one of synergy. The degree to which morality is central to an individual’s identity—or moral centrality—was operationalized in terms of values advanced implicitly in self-understanding narratives; a measure was developed and then validated. Participants were 97 university students who responded to a self-understanding interview and to several measures of morally relevant behaviors. Results indicated that communal values (centered on concerns for others) positively predicted and agentic (self-interested) values negatively predicted moral behavior. At the same time, the tendency to coordinate both agentic and communal values within narrative thought segments positively predicted moral behavior, indicating that the 2 motives can be adaptively reconciled. Moral centrality holds considerable promise in explaining moral motivation and its development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification.

Controversies are rampant in contemporary psychology concerning the appropriate method for observing consciousness and the role inner experience should play in psychological theorizing. These conflicting orientations reflect, in part, methodological differences between natural science and human science interpretations of psychology. Humanistic psychology and philosophical phenomenology both employ a human science approach to psychology that seeks to explain behavior in terms of a person's subjective existence. Maslow's and Heidegger's formulations are both fulfillment theories in that they specify moral values that suggest how life ought to be lived. Natural science methodology rejects the possibility that moral imperatives can be validated, whereas human science methodology allows phenomenological convictions to justify recommendations about a fulfilled life and a good society. The social role of psychology is analyzed within the framework of phenomenological convictions and scientific truth. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: An empirical examination of the moral individual.

Recognizing limitations in classic cognitive moral development theory, several scholars have drawn from theories of identity to suggest that moral behavior results from both moral judgments and moral identity. The authors conducted 2 survey-based studies with more than 500 students and managers to test this argument. Results demonstrated that moral identity and moral judgments both independently influenced moral behavior. In addition, in situations in which social consensus regarding the moral behavior was not high, moral judgments and moral identity interacted to shape moral behavior. This interaction effect indicated that those who viewed themselves as moral individuals pursued the most extreme alternatives (e.g., never cheating, regularly cheating)--a finding that affirms the motivational power of a moral identity. The authors conclude by considering the implications of this research for both theory and practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral hypocrisy: Appearing moral to oneself without being so.

How can people appear moral to themselves when they fail to act morally? Two self-deception strategies were considered: (a) misperceive one's behavior as moral and (b) avoid comparing one's behavior with moral standards. In Studies 1 and 2 the authors documented the importance of the 2nd strategy but not the 1st. Among participants who flipped a coin to assign themselves and another participant "fairly" to tasks, even a clearly labeled coin that prevented misperception did not produce a fair result (Study 1). Inducing behavior–standard comparison through self-awareness did (Study 2). Study 3 qualified the self-awareness effect: When moral standards were not salient before acting, self-awareness no longer increased alignment of behavior with standards. Instead, it increased alignment of standards with behavior and produced less moral action. Overall, results showed 3 different faces of moral hypocrisy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relations of moral reasoning and vicarious emotion to young children's prosocial behavior toward peers and adults.

Four- and 5-year-old (primarily) Euro-American children (40 girls, 34 boys) participated in a study of moral reasoning, vicarious emotional responding, and prosocial behavior. Children's prosocial behavior and self-reported and facial reactions of vicarious emotion were obtained in response to 2 peer distress films and 2 adult distress simulations. Moral reasoning was assessed with prosocial moral dilemmas. Children's emotional responses were found to be related to analogous types of moral reasoning and were associated in expected ways with helping of peers and adults. Higher levels of moral reasoning were positively related to prosocial behavior. Children high in both other-oriented moral cognitions and sympathy were most helpful toward peers. The pattern of findings suggested that linkages are being formed in the preschool years not only between other-oriented affect and cognitions but also between those that are self-focused in nature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Behavior control and social responsibility.

"It is in the field of psychotherapy that the issues of the moral and ethical implications of behavior control first arose as a relevant problem." We "cannot avoid facing the issue of values." Psychology should "develop techniques of approaching experimentally the basic problem of social and ethical issues involved in behavior control." In connection with this, the psychologist-researcher "should undertake the task of contact with the public rather than leaving it to sensationalists and popularizers." Behavior control "represents a relatively new, important, and very useful development in psychological research." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differential construal and the false consensus effect.

People's own beliefs, values, and habits tend to bias their perceptions of how widely they are shared. The present research examined whether this "false consensus effect" is partly due to people's failure to recognize that their choices are not solely a function of the "objective" response alternatives, but of their subjective construal of those alternatives. Study 1 provided initial support for the importance of differential construal in people's consensus estimates by showing that larger false consensus effects tend to be obtained on items that permit the most latitude for subjective construal. Study 2 replicated this effect experimentally by asking Ss either a general or specific version of the same question. Larger false consensus effects were obtained on the general version that offered more latitude for construal. Studies 3 & 4 provided further support by showing that (a) Ss who made different choices tended to interpret the response alternatives in ways that reflected the choices they made and (b) subjects who were led to construe the alternatives in the same way tended to make the same choices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Symposium on relationships between religion and mental health: Discussion.

"To prepare to serve the personal needs of those who come to the pastor, psychology and clinical training have come into the curriculum of theological education… . It may be noted… that the deeper the psychotherapy the more like a religious conversion it becomes." Ostow finds that the most effective psychological controls in animal and human behavior "are exactly those which religion has developed with conspicuous success." Goodwin Watson notes that amoral therapy is a contradiction in terms, for every personal choice is a moral one. "Mental health is everybody's business. Every profession and every discipline of knowledge is responsible to give from its wisdom to the cause of healthy living on this planet. Psychology and psychiatry are making notable contributions. Religion and ethics too are disciplines needed on this frontier. From the ultimate concern of ethical religion we may ask faithful devotion to the human quest for wholeness." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral reasoning and political orientation: The context sensitivity of individual rights and democratic principles.

Following Emler, Renwick, and Malone's (1983) argument that political values are likely to influence the perceived importance of different moral considerations, in this study we tested people's preferences for specific moral justifications as a function of the interaction of political standpoint and political issue. We avoided a possible shortcoming of the role-playing methodology used in the Emler et al study by requesting subjects of different political persuasions to indicate the extent to which they saw particular moral premises as relevant to their positions on two political topics. We found that left- and right-wing thinkers' preference for "principled" moral criteria varied according to the compatibility of these considerations with their opinion on a specific issue. The results are interpreted as supporting the Emler et al case and as suggesting an interdependence of social reasoning and social context. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of a moral development discussion group on delinquent and predelinquent boys.

50 delinquent or predelinquent 13–15 yr old males in institutional or dayschool special education programs were divided into 3 groups: moral discussion group; a placebo group that received a values clarification program, which was similar in content to the moral discussion group approach; and a control group, which received no treatment. The discussion and placebo groups addressed hypothetical, real-life, classroom behavior, and S-presented dilemmas. Pre- and posttest scores were obtained on a moral judgment interview and a self-control rating scale. Results indicate that the moral discussion group had a significant impact on Ss' moral reasoning ability as compared with the placebo and control groups. Findings also indicate that gains in moral reasoning did not necessarily lead to improved classroom behaviors. (80 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of a narrative model on children's moral judgments.

Tested the hypothesis that children's moral orientation can be influenced by exposure to narrated models that express consistent moral judgments based on either the consequences of an action or the motives of the individual. 66 1st and 2nd graders were randomly assigned to 3 conditions: objective model (judgments based on consequences), subjective model (judgments based on motives), or no model, with an equal number of males and females in each group. Following the procedure of Piaget and others, a pretest presented all Ss with pairs of stories contrasting a well-intentioned act involving serious consequences with an ill-intentioned act involving minor consequences. In the experimental phase which followed the pretest by 2 wks, Ss were exposed to narrative characters who made consistent moral judgments. A posttest conducted by another E followed immediately. Results indicate that the objective model condition significantly increased responding based on consequences, and the subjective model condition significantly increased responding on motives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological effects of immoral actions: The experimental evidence.

Considers the psychological consequences of immoral actions. Research on the effects on adults of breaking conventionally defined moral rules in controlled experiments is critically reviewed, including aggression, counterattitudinal advocacy, dishonesty, and interpersonal damage studies. It is established that immoral actions do affect the transgressor, with most of the impact related to the transgression. In experimental settings, major distortions do not result. Methodological issues with dependent measures are indicated, and patterns of research activity are discussed. Sense of responsibility for immoral actions and subjective definition of behavior as immoral may mediate effects. Current theories on reaction to transgression—cognitive dissonance, equity restoration, guilt, and negative-state relief—are evaluated. Limitations of existing experimentation, ways to increase its relevance to the full range of immoral actions, and ethical issues in the experimental study of immorality are indicated. (85 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral agency and the sexual transmission of HIV.

Sexual transmission of HIV occurs because an infected person has unprotected sex with a previously uninfected person. The majority of HIV infections are transmitted by individuals who are unaware of their infection, and most persons who are diagnosed with HIV significantly reduce or eliminate risk behaviors once they learn they have HIV. However, a minority of known-infected individuals engage in transmission risk behavior, sometimes without disclosure to their partners. Such behavior may involve a breakdown or temporary suspension of moral mechanisms, such as personal responsibility beliefs and anticipatory self-evaluative reactions to one’s behavior. The present article reviews the literature on sexual transmission risk behavior within A. Bandura’s (1999) theoretical framework of moral agency. The article first reviews evidence for the operation of moral agency in transmission risk behavior and HIV status disclosure. Next, suggestive evidence is presented for the operation of mechanisms of moral disengagement described by Bandura. Finally, the article reviews a small number of interventions that have been shown to be effective in reducing transmission risk behavior, through the lens of moral agency, and make recommendations for future intervention research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Getting even for customer mistreatment: The role of moral identity in the relationship between customer interpersonal injustice and employee sabotage.

Research on the "dark side" of organizational behavior has determined that employee sabotage is most often a reaction by disgruntled employees to perceived mistreatment. To date, however, most studies on employee retaliation have focused on intra-organizational sources of (in)justice. Results from this field study of customer service representatives (N = 358) showed that interpersonal injustice from customers relates positively to customer-directed sabotage over and above intra-organizational sources of fairness. Moreover, the association between unjust treatment and sabotage was moderated by 2 dimensions of moral identity (symbolization and internalization) in the form of a 3-way interaction. The relationship between injustice and sabotage was more pronounced for employees high (vs. low) in symbolization, but this moderation effect was weaker among employees who were high (vs. low) in internalization. Last, employee sabotage was negatively related to job performance ratings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Personality disorder is disease.

There is no inconsistency in maintaining, on the one hand, that man is morally accountable for most of his misdeeds and that psychological rather than medical training is basic to competence in the personality disorders, "and affirming, on the other hand, that the latter disorders are genuine manifestations of illness." On these points, issue is taken with the positions of Szasz (1960) and Mowrer (1960). "Szasz' (1960) contention that the concept of mental illness 'now functions merely as a convenient myth' is grounded on four unsubstantiated and logically untenable propositions" which are specified and criticized. "Definition of behavior disorder in terms of sin or difficulties associated with ethical choice and responsibility would substitute theological disputation and philosophical wrangling about values for specifiable quantitative and qualitative criteria of disease." From Psyc Abstracts 36:02:2JA69A. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can research on morality be "scientific"?

Proposes a particular ground for moral formulation that is consistent with the consensually based scientific ethic. Researchers' acts of formulating investigatory designs constitute moral values, but these assumptions of value often go unnoticed because they violate the positivist mandate that science should be value neutral. Only a special kind of consensus is "scientific" (as opposed to ideological) because the scientific ethic accepts knowledge as truthful only when it is openly achieved after evenhanded consideration and tested in debate. Since truth in science is a moral issue, close examination should be made of science's moral grounds. The kinds of analyses typically performed by philosophers are an essential part of this empirical search. The author concludes that moral research cannot be "scientific" if this means being value neutral, but it can be scientific in the sense of impartially submitting all formulations to the full reality of people's moral consensuses and interactions in everyday life. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral identity and the experience of moral elevation in response to acts of uncommon goodness.

Four studies using survey and experimental designs examined whether people whose moral identity is highly self-defining are more susceptible to experiencing a state of moral elevation after being exposed to acts of uncommon moral goodness. Moral elevation consists of a suite of responses that motivate prosocial action tendencies. Study 1 showed that people higher (vs. lower) in moral identity centrality reported experiencing more intense elevating emotions, had more positive views of humanity, and were more desirous of becoming a better person after reading about an act of uncommon goodness than about a merely positive situation or an act of common benevolence. Study 2 showed that those high in moral identity centrality were more likely to recall acts of moral goodness and experience moral elevation in response to such events more strongly. These experiences were positively related to self-reported prosocial behavior. Study 3 showed a direct effect on behavior using manipulated, rather than measured, moral identity centrality. Study 4 replicated the effect of moral identity on the states of elevation as well as on self-reported physical sensations and showed that the elevation mediates the relationship between moral identity, witnessing uncommon goodness, and prosocial behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)