From ecological to moral psychology: Morality and the psychology of Egon Brunswik.

Moral judgment and behavior are uniquely resistant to psychological analysis because morality generally is defined in terms that do not admit of psychological predication. Principal among these is the idea of freedom. An agent can act morally only on the condition that it is also free to do otherwise. The respective theoretical premises of C. Sunstein (1997) and E. Brunswik (1966) are contrasted in order to suggest that Brunswikian theory constitutes a distinct and highly promising new approach to the psychology of moral judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Is gratitude a moral affect?

Gratitude is conceptualized as a moral affect that is analogous to other moral emotions such as empathy and guilt. Gratitude has 3 functions that can be conceptualized as morally relevant: (a) a moral barometer function (i.e., it is a response to the perception that one has been the beneficiary of another person's moral actions); (b) a moral motive function (i.e., it motivates the grateful person to behave prosocially toward the benefactor and other people); and (c) a moral reinforcer function (i.e., when expressed, it encourages benefactors to behave morally in the future). The personality and social factors that are associated with gratitude are also consistent with a conceptualization of gratitude as an affect that is relevant to people's cognitions and behaviors in the moral domain. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reconciling the self and morality: An empirical model of moral centrality development.

Self-interest and moral sensibilities generally compete with one another, but for moral exemplars, this tension appears to not be in play. This study advances the reconciliation model, which explains this anomaly within a developmental framework by positing that the relationship between the self’s interests and moral concerns ideally transforms from one of mutual competition to one of synergy. The degree to which morality is central to an individual’s identity—or moral centrality—was operationalized in terms of values advanced implicitly in self-understanding narratives; a measure was developed and then validated. Participants were 97 university students who responded to a self-understanding interview and to several measures of morally relevant behaviors. Results indicated that communal values (centered on concerns for others) positively predicted and agentic (self-interested) values negatively predicted moral behavior. At the same time, the tendency to coordinate both agentic and communal values within narrative thought segments positively predicted moral behavior, indicating that the 2 motives can be adaptively reconciled. Moral centrality holds considerable promise in explaining moral motivation and its development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: An empirical examination of the moral individual.

Recognizing limitations in classic cognitive moral development theory, several scholars have drawn from theories of identity to suggest that moral behavior results from both moral judgments and moral identity. The authors conducted 2 survey-based studies with more than 500 students and managers to test this argument. Results demonstrated that moral identity and moral judgments both independently influenced moral behavior. In addition, in situations in which social consensus regarding the moral behavior was not high, moral judgments and moral identity interacted to shape moral behavior. This interaction effect indicated that those who viewed themselves as moral individuals pursued the most extreme alternatives (e.g., never cheating, regularly cheating)--a finding that affirms the motivational power of a moral identity. The authors conclude by considering the implications of this research for both theory and practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral obligation and attitudes: Their relation to behavioral intentions.

I. Ajzen and M. Fishbein (1969) have shown that behavioral intention can be viewed as a function of attitudes and subjective norms; however, moral values also may influence behavioral intentions in morally relevant situations. When a component measuring moral obligation was added to Ajzen and Fishbein's model in an experiment with 113 adults (mean age 42 yrs) in Baptist Sunday school classes who were exposed to 2 morally relevant and 2 not morally relevant hypothetical situations, it added significantly to prediction of behavioral intention. In the 2 "moral situations" (as defined independently by 3 criteria—importance, immunity from deliberate change, and form of moral pressure), moral obligation was more highly correlated with intention than attitude or social norms, but in 2 "nonmoral" situations it was not. Hence, moral considerations are necessary to predict behavioral intentions in moral situations. (13 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mapping the moral domain.

The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: (a) Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; (b) convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and (c) we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and moral identity centrality.

This article proposes and tests a social-cognitive framework for examining the joint influence of situational factors and the centrality of moral identity on moral intentions and behaviors. The authors hypothesized that if a situational factor increases the current accessibility of moral identity within the working self-concept, then it strengthens the motivation to act morally. In contrast, if a situational factor decreases the current accessibility of moral identity, then it weakens the motivation to act morally. The authors also expected the influence of situational factors to vary depending on the extent to which moral identity was central to a person’s overall self-conception. Hypotheses derived from the framework were tested in 4 studies. The studies used recalling and reading a list of the Ten Commandments (Study 1), writing a story using morally laden terms (Study 4), and the presence of performance-based financial incentives (Studies 2 and 3) as situational factors. Participants’ willingness to initiate a cause-related marketing program (Study 1), lie to a job candidate during a salary negotiation (Studies 2 and 3), and contribute to a public good (Study 4) were examined. Results provide strong support for the proposed framework. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The moral emotions: A social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt.

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social–functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1–3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

What is moral about guilt? Acting “prosocially” at the disadvantage of others.

For centuries economists and psychologists have argued that the morality of moral emotions lies in the fact that they stimulate prosocial behavior and benefit others in a person's social environment. Many studies have shown that guilt, arguably the most exemplary moral emotion, indeed motivates prosocial behavior in dyadic social dilemma situations. When multiple persons are involved, however, the moral and prosocial nature of this emotion can be questioned. The present article shows how guilt can have beneficial effects for the victim of one's actions but also disadvantageous effects for other people in the social environment. A series of experiments, with various emotion inductions and dependent measures, all reveal that guilt motivates prosocial behavior toward the victim at the expense of others around—but not at the expense of oneself. These findings illustrate that a thorough understanding of the functioning of emotions is necessary to understand their moral nature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

To be moral, must psychology have a moral face?

Comments on an article (see record 1992-34951-001) by Richard N. Williams which takes a look at the issue of human agency which has been confused with the question of determinism vs indeterminism. The author takes the position that to argue for agency is not necessarily to argue for indeterminism. The current author suggests that Williams has been persuaded from his philosophical reading that a moral-ethical understanding of behavior requires an intelligible notion of freedom. The current author feels that much more can be said about the senses of a deconstructed agency, its utility, and its respect for diversity engendered by psychological moral restraint, but not in these few pages. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The self-importance of moral identity.

Recent theorizing in moral psychology extends rationalist models by calling attention to social and cultural influences (J. Haidt, 2001). Six studies using adolescents, university students, and adults measured the associations among the self-importance of moral identity, moral cognitions, and behavior. The psychometric properties of the measure were assessed through an examination of the underlying factor structure (Study 1) and convergent, nomological, and discriminant validity analyses (Studies 2 and 3). The predictive validity of the instrument was assessed by examinations of the relationships among the self-importance of moral identity, various psychological outcomes, and behavior (Studies 4, 5, and 6). The results are discussed in terms of models of moral behavior, social identity measurement, and the need to consider moral self-conceptions in explaining moral conduct. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral hypocrisy: Appearing moral to oneself without being so.

How can people appear moral to themselves when they fail to act morally? Two self-deception strategies were considered: (a) misperceive one's behavior as moral and (b) avoid comparing one's behavior with moral standards. In Studies 1 and 2 the authors documented the importance of the 2nd strategy but not the 1st. Among participants who flipped a coin to assign themselves and another participant "fairly" to tasks, even a clearly labeled coin that prevented misperception did not produce a fair result (Study 1). Inducing behavior–standard comparison through self-awareness did (Study 2). Study 3 qualified the self-awareness effect: When moral standards were not salient before acting, self-awareness no longer increased alignment of behavior with standards. Instead, it increased alignment of standards with behavior and produced less moral action. Overall, results showed 3 different faces of moral hypocrisy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Knowledge, moral praise, and moral side effects.

Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004) claims that a morally praiseworthy agent cannot knowingly produce a morally positive side effect. I claim that the argument Nadelhoffer uses to establish this claim has two false premises. The two false premises are: (1) If something is a side effect, then it is not desired or intended; and (2) If agent S is morally praiseworthy and knows that her performing p will produce a morally positive q, then q forms part of S's reason for p-ing. I offer a counterexample that shows the falsity of (1) and (2). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inescapable moralities: Psychology as public philosophy.

Critical psychologists repeatedly lament the fact that we spend most of our time criticizing, unmasking and deconstructing prevailing psychological models, and rather less time rebuilding and reinventing them. Of course, important contributions have been made by theorists who present concrete alternatives to the theories and practices we challenge. Yet there have been relatively few attempts to articulate a guiding vision or visions of what we should be doing. This article discusses a symposium that was organized as an attempt to press beyond the "debunking" phase. All of the papers embody attempts to move into the less-travelled territory of moral conversation. They are predicated upon certain fundamental assumptions about the moral and political situatedness of psychology. The five papers that follow are offered with the recognition that they are neither the first nor the last word on the normative dimensions of psychological discourse. In addition to the specific contribution made by each author, the collective aim of the panel is both to highlight the ongoing moral situations in which we are all caught, and, perhaps most importantly, to invite further conversation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The structure of English.

Reviews the book, The structure of English by C. C. Fries (1952). A grammar based on a consistent and meaningful analysis of language into significant component parts has long been a felt need both for linguists as well as for psychologists. The present work attempts to provide an empirical grammatical system free of the logical flaws that permeate contemporary grammar. The use of this book for a psychologist lies in investigations concerned with predicting the verbal behavior of the same people in different situations and of different people in the same situations. In this work lies at least the beginning of a solution to the problem of defining a unit in content analysis; it, furthermore, provides psychologists with a better means of comparing the functional relationships between different parts of speech in mental patients, since the parts of speech are more soundly defined than they have been in previous studies. Finally, in studies of learning, the knowledge of functional units of speech as defined by Fries can be used to study the laws of acquisition and extinction of verbal behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Measurement of moral values: A review and critique.

A historical review of the literature on efforts to assess strength of moral values led to the conclusion that existing instruments have weaknesses which limit their utility for psychological research. The most important of these weaknesses are: (1) questionable assumptions about the relationship of moral values and moral behavior, (2) a focus on moral abstractions rather than moral behavior in realistic contexts, (3) reliance on subjective and inferential scoring procedures which stress "correct" moral values, and (4) inadequate standardization. It is concluded that moral values are best conceptualized as subjective and individual attitudes whose measurement is most meaningfully achieved independent of a concern with moral behavior and conventional standards of moral evaluation. (2 p. ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Family metaphors and moral intuitions: How conservatives and liberals narrate their lives.

This research examines life-narrative interviews obtained from 128 highly religious and politically active adults to test differences between political conservatives and liberals on (a) implicit family metaphors (G. Lakoff, 2002) and (b) moral intuitions (J. Haidt & C. Joseph, 2004). Content analysis of 12 key scenes in life stories showed that conservatives, as predicted, tended to depict authority figures as strict enforcers of moral rules and to identify lessons in self-discipline. By contrast, liberals were more likely to identify lessons learned regarding empathy and openness, even though (contrary to prediction) they were no more likely than conservatives to describe nurturant authority figures. Analysis of extended discourse on the development of religious faith and personal morality showed that conservatives emphasized moral intuitions regarding respect for social hierarchy, allegiance to in-groups, and the purity or sanctity of the self, whereas liberals invested more significance in moral intuitions regarding harm and fairness. The results are discussed in terms of the recent upsurge of interest among psychologists in political ideology and the value of using life-narrative methods and concepts to explore how politically active adults attempt to construct meaningful lives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Vicarious moral licensing: The influence of others' past moral actions on moral behavior.

This article investigates the effect of others' prior nonprejudiced behavior on an individual's subsequent behavior. Five studies supported the hypothesis that people are more willing to express prejudiced attitudes when their group members' past behavior has established nonprejudiced credentials. Study 1a showed that participants who were told that their group was more moral than similar other groups were more willing to describe a job as better suited for Whites than for African Americans. In Study 1b, when given information on group members' prior nondiscriminatory behavior (selecting a Hispanic applicant in a prior task), participants subsequently gave more discriminatory ratings to the Hispanic applicant for a position stereotypically suited for majority members (Whites). In Study 2, moral self-concept mediated the effect of others' prior nonprejudiced actions on a participant's subsequent prejudiced behavior such that others' past nonprejudiced actions enhanced the participant's moral self-concept, and this inflated moral self-concept subsequently drove the participant's prejudiced ratings of a Hispanic applicant. In Study 3, the moderating role of identification with the credentialing group was tested. Results showed that participants expressed more prejudiced attitudes toward a Hispanic applicant when they highly identified with the group members behaving in nonprejudiced manner. In Study 4, the credentialing task was dissociated from the participants' own judgmental task, and, in addition, identification with the credentialing group was manipulated rather than measured. Consistent with prior studies, the results showed that participants who first had the opportunity to view an in-group member's nonprejudiced hiring decision were more likely to reject an African American man for a job stereotypically suited for majority members. These studies suggest a vicarious moral licensing effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)