The effects of majority versus minority source status on persuasion: A self-validation analysis.

The present research proposes that sources in the numerical majority (vs. minority) can affect persuasion by influencing the confidence with which people hold their thoughts in response to the persuasive message. Participants received a persuasive message composed of either strong or weak arguments that was presented by a majority or a minority source. Consistent with the self-validation hypothesis, we predicted and found that the majority (vs. minority) status of the source increased the confidence with which recipients held their thoughts. As a consequence, majority (vs. minority) sources increased argument quality effects in persuasion when source status information followed message processing (Experiment 1). In contrast, when the information regarding source status preceded (rather than followed) the persuasive message, it validated the perception of the position advocated, reducing message processing. As a consequence of having more confidence in the position advocated before receiving the message, majority (vs. minority) sources reduced argument quality effects in persuasion (Experiment 2). Finally, Experiment 3 isolated the timing of the source status manipulation, revealing that sources in the numerical majority (vs. minority) can increase or decrease persuasion to strong arguments depending on whether source status is introduced before or after processing the message. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Overt head movements and persuasion: A self-validation analysis.

The authors report 3 experiments that examine a new mechanism by which overt head movements can affect attitude change. In each experiment, participants were induced to either nod or to shake their heads while listening to a persuasive message. When the message arguments were strong, nodding produced more persuasion than shaking. When the arguments were weak, the reverse occurred. These effects were most pronounced when elaboration was high. These findings are consistent with the "self-validation" hypothesis that postulates that head movements either enhance (nodding) or undermine (shaking) confidence in one's thoughts about the message. In a 4th experiment, the authors extended this result to another overt behavior (writing with the dominant or nondominant hand) and a different attitude domain (self-esteem). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Positive mood can increase or decrease message scrutiny: The hedonic contingency view of mood and message processing.

Currently dominant explanations of mood effects on persuasive message processing (i.e., cognitive capacity and feelings as information) predict that happy moods lead to less message scrutiny than neutral or sad moods. The hedonic contingency view (D. T. Wegener & R. E. Petty, see record 1994-32368-001) predicts that happy moods can sometimes be associated with greater message processing activity because people in a happy mood are more attentive than neutral or sad people to the hedonic consequences of their actions. Consistent with this view, Experiment 1 finds that a happy mood can lead to greater message scrutiny than a neutral mood when the message is not mood threatening. Experiment 2 finds that a happy mood leads to greater message scrutiny than a sad mood when an uplifting message is encountered, but to less message scrutiny when a depressing message is encountered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Positive mood and persuasion: Different roles for affect under high- and low-elaboration conditions.

Two experiments examined the processes by which positive mood influences attitude change under high and low message elaboration conditions. To examine elaboration, Exp 1 included individuals who differed in their need for cognition, and Exp 2 manipulated the relevance of the message. In each study, Ss were exposed to a persuasive communication following a positive or neutral mood induction. In both studies, positive mood produced more positive attitudes toward the advocacy, but positive mood influenced the positivity of Ss' thoughts only under high-elaboration conditions. Path analyses showed that positive mood had a direct effect on attitudes in the low-elaboration conditions but influenced attitudes indirectly by modifying the positivity of thoughts in the high-elaboration conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thought confidence as a determinant of persuasion: The self-validation hypothesis.

Previous research in the domain of attitude change has described 2 primary dimensions of thinking that impact persuasion processes and outcomes: the extent (amount) of thinking and the direction (valence) of issue-relevant thought. The authors examined the possibility that another, more meta-cognitive aspect of thinking is also important--the degree of confidence people have in their own thoughts. Four studies test the notion that thought confidence affects the extent of persuasion. When positive thoughts dominate in response to a message, increasing confidence in those thoughts increases persuasion, but when negative thoughts dominate, increasing confidence decreases persuasion. In addition, using self-reported and manipulated thought confidence in separate studies, the authors provide evidence that the magnitude of the attitude-thought relationship depends on the confidence people have in their thoughts. Finally, the authors also show that these self-validation effects are most likely in situations that foster high amounts of information processing activity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Is this happiness I see? Biases in the identification of emotional facial expressions in depression and social phobia.

The present study was designed to examine the operation of depression-specific biases in the identification or labeling of facial expression of emotions. Participants diagnosed with major depression and social phobia and control participants were presented with faces that expressed increasing degrees of emotional intensity, slowly changing from a neutral to a full-intensity happy, sad, or angry expression. The authors assessed individual differences in the intensity of facial expression of emotion that was required for the participants to accurately identify the emotion being expressed. The depressed participants required significantly greater intensity of emotion than did the social phobic and the control participants to correctly identify happy expressions and less intensity to identify sad than angry expressions. In contrast, social phobic participants needed less intensity to correctly identify the angry expressions than did the depressed and control participants and less intensity to identify angry than sad expressions. Implications of these results for interpersonal functioning in depression and social phobia are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Updating positive and negative stimuli in working memory in depression.

Difficulties in the ability to update stimuli in working memory (WM) may underlie the problems with regulating emotions that lead to the development and perpetuation of mood disorders such as depression. To examine the ability to update affective material in WM, the authors had diagnosed depressed and never-disordered control participants perform an emotion 2-back task in which participants were presented with a series of happy, sad, and neutral faces and were asked to indicate whether the current face had the same (match-set) or different (break-set or no-set) emotional expression as that presented 2 faces earlier. Participants also performed a 0-back task with the same emotional stimuli to serve as a control for perceptual processing. After transforming reaction times to control for baseline group differences, depressed and nondepressed participants exhibited biases in updating emotional content that reflects the tendency to keep negative information and positive information, respectively, active in WM. Compared with controls, depressed participants were both slower to disengage from sad stimuli and faster to disengage from happy facial expressions. In contrast, nondepressed controls took longer to disengage from happy stimuli than from neutral or sad stimuli. These group differences in reaction times may reflect both protective and maladaptive biases in WM that underlie the ability to effectively regulate negative affect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can people feel happy and sad at the same time?

The authors investigated whether people can feel happy and sad at the same time. J. A. Russell and J. A Carroll's (1999) circumplex model holds that happiness and sadness are polar opposites and, thus, mutually exclusive. In contrast, the evaluative space model Q. T. Cacioppo & G. G. Berntson, 1994) proposes that positive and negative affect are separable and that mixed feelings of happiness and sadness can co-occur. The authors both replicated and extended past research by showing that whereas most participants surveyed in typical situations felt either happy or sad, many participants surveyed immediately after watching the film Life Is Beautiful, moving out of their dormitories, or graduating from college felt both happy and sad. Results suggest that although affective experience may typically be bipolar, the underlying processes, and occasionally the resulting experience of emotion, are better characterized as bivariate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Integration of social and utilitarian factors in decision making.

Decision making is influenced by social cues, but there is little understanding of how social information interacts with other cues that determine decisions. To address this quantitatively, participants were asked to learn which of two faces was associated with a higher probability of reward. They were repeatedly presented with two faces, each with a different, unknown probability of reward, and participants attempted to maximize gains by selecting the face that was most often rewarded. Both faces had the same identity, but one face had a happy expression and the other had either an angry or a sad expression. Ideal observer models predict that the facial expressions should not affect the decision-making process. Our results however showed that participants had a prior disposition to select the happy face when it was paired with the angry but not the sad face and overweighted the positive outcomes associated with happy faces and underweighted positive outcomes associated with either angry or sad faces. Nevertheless, participants also integrated the feedback information. As such, their decisions were a composite of social and utilitarian factors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The 120-S minute: using analysis of work activity to prevent psychological distress among elementary school teachers

To avoid exposure to unpleasant or unwanted emotional material, some people may distract themselves by summoning up pleasant thoughts such as happy memories. Manipulation of negative affect might therefore result in heightened accessibility of pleasant thoughts and memories, contrary to hypotheses of mood-congruent recall. In Experiment 1, repressors were faster to recall happy memories after watching an unpleasant film than after watching a neutral film. Nonrepressors showed the opposite effect (i.e., mood-congruent memory). In Experiment 2, after an unpleasant film, repressors were faster to recall a happy memory than to recall a sad memory. In Experiment 3, repressors spontaneously generated pleasant thoughts after watching an unpleasant film, whereas nonrepressors did not. Thus, repressors apparently cope with exposure to negative affective material by accessing pleasant thoughts. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive defenses against emotional distress and the associative structure of repression.     

Emotion perception is mediated by spatial frequency content.

Spatial frequencies have been shown to play an important role in face identification, but very few studies have investigated the role of spatial frequency content in identifying different emotions. In the present study we investigated the role of spatial frequency in identifying happy and sad facial expressions. Two experiments were conducted to investigate (a) the role of specific spatial frequency content in emotion identification, and (b) hemispherical asymmetry in emotion identification. Given the links between global processing, happy emotions, and low frequencies, we hypothesized that low spatial frequencies would be important for identifying the happy expression. Correspondingly, we also hypothesized that high spatial frequencies would be important in identifying the sad expression given the links between local processing, sad emotions, and high spatial frequencies. As expected we found that the identification of happy expression was dependent on low spatial frequencies and the identification of sad expression was dependent on high spatial frequencies. There was a hemispheric asymmetry with the identification of sad expression, especially in the right hemisphere, possibly mediated by high spatial frequency content. Results indicate the importance of spatial frequency content in the identification of happy and sad emotional expressions and point to the mechanisms involved in emotion identification. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Majority and minority influence: Source-position imbalance as a determinant of message scrutiny.

Two experiments addressed the issue of whether endorsement of a position by a numerical majority or a minority leads to greater scrutiny of the information presented in a persuasive message. In Exp 1, a counterattitudinal position was endorsed by a majority or a minority and was supported by strong or weak arguments. Argument quality had a larger impact on attitudes with majority than with minority endorsement. In Exp 2, a proattitudinal or a counterattitudinal message was endorsed by a majority or a minority and was supported by strong or weak arguments. When the source and message position were unexpected (i.e., majority-counter and minority-pro messages), argument quality had a larger impact on attitudes than when the source and message position were expected (i.e., majority-pro and minority-counter messages). Thus, either majority or minority endorsement can enhance message scrutiny if the source-position pairing is surprising. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empirical tests of the absolute sleeper effect predicted from the discounting cue hypothesis.

Two experiments tested the sleeper effect with respect to persuasion research (i.e., the finding that a persuasive message has a greater delayed than initial impact on Ss' attitudes). These experiments included strong tests of the discounting cue hypothesis because they (a) demonstrably created the conditions that the theory indicated were necessary for the effect to occur, (b) demonstrably minimized the impact of a force known to countervail against the effect, and (c) employed statistical tests that had adequate power to detect the effect should it occur. In Exp I, 161 undergraduates read 1 of 2 persuasive messages accompanied by a discounting cue. All the requirements for a strong test were demonstrably met with 1 message, and an absolute sleeper effect was obtained when attitudes were measured again after 5 wks. In Exp II, 493 undergraduates read a persuasive message and 1 of 5 discounting cues. All the requirements for a strong test were demonstrably met in 3 cue conditions, and absolute sleeper effects were found in each of them after 6 wks. Absolute sleeper effects were not observed in the 2 cue conditions in which the necessary conditions for the effect were not met. It is concluded that absolute sleeper effects can be reliably obtained when all the necessary theoretical conditions are met, a known countervailing force is absent, and the statistical tests have adequate power. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The time for doing is not the time for change: Effects of general action and inaction goals on attitude retrieval and attitude change.

Implicit in many informal and formal principles of psychological change is the understudied assumption that change requires either an active approach or an inactive approach. This issue was systematically investigated by comparing the effects of general action goals and general inaction goals on attitude change. As prior attitudes facilitate preparation for an upcoming persuasive message, general action goals were hypothesized to facilitate conscious retrieval of prior attitudes and therefore hinder attitude change to a greater extent than general inaction goals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that action primes (e.g., “go,” “energy”) yielded faster attitude report than inaction primes (e.g., “rest,” “still”) among participants who were forewarned of an upcoming persuasive message. Experiment 2 showed that the faster attitude report identified in Experiment 1 was localized on attitudes toward a message topic participants were prepared to receive. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 showed that, compared with inaction primes, action primes produced less attitude change and less argument scrutiny in response to a counterattitudinal message on a previously forewarned topic. Experiment 6 confirmed that the effects of the primes on attitude change were due to differential attitude retrieval. That is, when attitude expression was induced immediately after the primes, action and inaction goals produced similar amounts of attitude change. In contrast, when no attitude expression was induced after the prime, action goals produced less attitude change than inaction goals. Finally, Experiment 7 validated the assumption that these goal effects can be reduced or reversed when the goals have already been satisfied by an intervening task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of message repetition and position on cognitive response, recall, and persuasion.

Although the mere exposure effect has been researched widely, surprisingly little is known about the attitudinal and cognitive effects of message repetition. It was hypothesized that the sequence of topic-relevant thoughts generated in response to a (repeated) persuasive message would parallel attitude change. To test this prediction, 2 experiments were conducted. In Exp I, 133 undergraduates heard a communication either 0 (control), 1, 3, or 5 times in succession, rated their agreement with the advocated position, and listed the message arguments they could recall. In Exp II, 193 undergraduates heard a communication either 1, 3, or 5 times, rated their agreement, listed their thoughts, and listed the message arguments they could recall. In both experiments, agreement first increased, then decreased as exposure frequency increased (regardless of the position advocated), but agreement was unrelated to the recall of the message arguments. In Exp II, analyses of the listed thoughts revealed that counterargumentation decreased, then increased, whereas topic-irrelevant thinking increased as exposure frequency increased; as expected, only topic-relevant thoughts were related to agreement. Results are interpreted in terms of an attitude-modification model in which repetition and content of a persuasive advocacy affect the type and number of thoughts generated; these thoughts, in turn, affect the attitudinal reaction to the advocacy. (63 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Repressive coping: Distraction using pleasant thoughts and memories.

To avoid exposure to unpleasant or unwanted emotional material, some people may distract themselves by summoning up pleasant thoughts such as happy memories. Manipulation of negative affect might therefore result in heightened accessibility of pleasant thoughts and memories, contrary to hypotheses of mood-congruent recall. In Experiment 1, repressors were faster to recall happy memories after watching an unpleasant film than after watching a neutral film. Nonrepressors showed the opposite effect (i.e., mood-congruent memory). In Experiment 2, after an unpleasant film, repressors were faster to recall a happy memory than to recall a sad memory. In Experiment 3, repressors spontaneously generated pleasant thoughts after watching an unpleasant film, whereas nonrepressors did not. Thus, repressors apparently cope with exposure to negative affective material by accessing pleasant thoughts. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive defenses against emotional distress and the associative structure of repression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of repetition-induced familiarity on agreement with weak and strong arguments.

Repeated statements are perceived as more valid than novel ones, termed the illusion of truth effect, presumably because repetition imbues the statement with familiarity. In 3 studies, the authors examined the conditions under which and the processes by which familiarity signals from repetition and argument quality signals from processing of message content influenced agreement with persuasive arguments. Participants with low or high motivation to process information were presented persuasive arguments seen once or twice. In all 3 studies, repetition increased the persuasiveness of weak and strong arguments when little processing of message content occurred. Two of the studies used a process dissociation procedure to reveal that both greater controlled processing (which reflected argument content) and the greater automatic influence of familiarity (which reflected repetition) were associated with increased acceptance of strong arguments but that greater controlled processing dissipated the benefits of familiarity for agreement with weak arguments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Facial expression in adults with Down's Syndrome.

The facial expressions of adults with Down's syndrome (DS; n?=?15) as they watched happy, sad, and neutral videotapes were compared with those of a healthy age-matched control group (n?=?20). Facial movements were analyzed with the Facial Action Coding System (P. E. Ekman & W. V. Friesen, 1978). While watching happy stimuli, the 10 DS adults who were able to appropriately rate their reactions smiled with a cheek raise as frequently as control adults, suggesting that the expression of positive affect in these individuals is normal. Contrary to predictions, however, the DS group exhibited fewer smiles without cheek raises than did control adults and were more likely not to smile. Neither group showed prototypic sad facial expressions in response to sad stimuli. Independent of emotion, DS participants made more facial movements, including more tongue shows, than did control participants. Differences in facial expression in DS adults may confuse others' interpretations of their emotional responses and may be important for understanding the development of abnormal emotional processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior.

Current empirical evidence regarding nonconsciously priming emotion concepts is limited to positively versus negatively valenced affect. This article demonstrates that specific, equally valenced emotion concepts can be nonconsciously activated, remain inaccessible to conscious awareness, and still affect behavior in an emotion-specific fashion. In Experiment 1A, participants subliminally primed with guilty emotion adjectives showed lower indulgence than did participants subliminally primed with sad emotion adjectives; even after the addition of a 5-min time delay, these results were replicated in Experiment 1B. Participants in the different priming conditions showed no differences in their subjective emotion ratings and were unaware of the emotion prime or concept activation. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated these findings using a helping measure, demonstrating that individuals primed with guilt adjectives show more helping than do individuals primed with sadness adjectives. In all studies, effects were moderated by individuals' specific emotion-response habits and characteristics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An exploratory study of musical emotions and psychophysiology.

A basic issue about musical emotions concerns whether music elicits emotional responses in listeners or simply expresses emotions that listeners recognize in the music. To address this, psychophysiological measures were recorded while 40 college students heard 2 excerpts chosen to represent each of 3 emotions: sad, fear, and happy. The measures covered cardiac, vascular, electrodermal, and respiratory functions. Other Ss indicated dynamic changes in emotions they experienced while listening to the music on 1 of 4 scales: sad, fear, happy, and tension. Both physiological and emotion judgments were made on a second-by-second basis. The physiological measures all showed a significant effect of music compared to the pre-music interval. Analyses including correlations between physiology and emotion judgments, found significant differences among the excerpts. The sad excerpts produced the largest changes in heart rate, BP, skin conductance, and temperature. The fear excerpts produced the largest changes in blood transit time and amplitude. The happy excerpts produced the largest changes in the measures of respiration. These emotion-specific physiological changes only partially replicated those found for nonmusical emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)