利益相关者的水资源配置博弈

水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。     

Water Resources Allocation Using a Cooperative Game with Fuzzy Payoffs and Fuzzy Coalitions

In this paper, two fuzzy cooperative games are utilized for modeling equitable and efficient water allocation among water users in both inter-basin and intra-basin water allocation problems. The proposed all-inclusive water allocation approach consists of three main steps, following Sadegh et al. (Water Resour Manage 24(12):2991?C2310, 2010). In the first step, an initial water allocation is carried out using an optimization model taking into account an equity criterion. In the second step, the water users form crisp coalitions with fuzzy characteristic functions to increase the total net benefit of the system and also their own benefits. In the methodology used in this step, the water users do not need to have exact information about their payoffs and they can evaluate their payoffs as fuzzy numbers. In the second step, based on the Hukuhara difference of fuzzy numbers, optimum water allocation strategies are determined using a game with fuzzy characteristic function. In the third step, we applied another methodology which considers a class of fuzzy games with fuzzy characteristic functions and also fuzzy coalitions for water allocation. The methodology of this step is on the basis of the Hukuhara difference and the Choquet integral. The usefulness of the mentioned methodologies is studied by applying them to three defined real life scenarios in a case study of water allocation in Iran. The results showed that the proposed methodologies are professionally appropriate to real-world uncertain problems of equitable and economic inter-basin and intra-basin water resources allocations.     

A Fuzzy Variable Least Core Game for Inter-basin Water Resources Allocation Under Uncertainty

In this paper, a new solution concept, called Fuzzy Variable Least Core (FVLC), is developed for fuzzy cooperative games. The FVLC is able to incorporate fuzzy input variables and result in fuzzy benefit shares of players participating in a coalition. This solution concept is used for water and benefit allocation to water users in inter-basin water transfer systems considering the uncertainties associated with their benefit coefficients. In the proposed water allocation methodology, an Integrated Stochastic Dynamic Programming (ISDP) model is developed to obtain the water rights of players and economic water allocation policies. In the next step, the total net fuzzy benefit of the system is reallocated to water users in an equitable and rational way using a FVLC-based model. In this model, a new algorithm is proposed for converting a multilateral cooperative game with fuzzy variables to some fuzzy bilateral cooperative games, which are solved using the FLVC solution concept. The applicability and efficiency of the proposed methodology is examined by applying it to a large scale inter-basin water transfer project in Iran.     

Optimal Inter-Basin Water Allocation Using Crisp and Fuzzy Shapley Games

In recent years, uneven distribution of available water resources as well as increasing water demands and overexploiting the water resources have brought severe need for transferring water from basins having sufficient water to basins facing water shortages. Therefore, optimal allocation of shared water resources in water transfer projects, considering the utilities of different stakeholders, physical limitations of the system and socioeconomic criteria is an important task. In this paper, a new methodology based on crisp and fuzzy Shapley games is developed for optimal allocation of inter-basin water resources. In the proposed methodology, initial water allocations are obtained using an optimization model considering an equity criterion. In the second step, the stakeholders form crisp coalitions to increase the total net benefit of the system as well as their own benefits and a crisp Shapley Value game is used to reallocate the benefits produced in the crisp coalitions. Lastly, to provide maximum total net benefit, fuzzy coalitions are constituted and the participation rates of water users to fuzzy coalitions are optimized. Then, the total net benefit is reallocated to water users in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Shapley Value game. The effectiveness of this method is examined by applying it to a large scale case study of water transfer from the Karoon river basin in southern Iran to the Rafsanjan plain in central Iran.     

Water and Pollution Discharge Permit Allocation to Agricultural Zones: Application of Game Theory and Min-Max Regret Analysis

This paper presents a new game theoretic methodology for water and discharge permit allocation to agricultural zones in shared rivers. The methodology consists of four main steps: (1) initial allocation of water rights and pollutant discharge permits, (2) forming possible coalitions and optimal water and discharge permit reallocation to water users participating in a coalition to increase their total net benefit, (3) equitable benefit reallocation by utilizing some solution concepts in cooperative game theory, and (4) identifying the best water and pollutant discharge permit allocation strategies by minimizing the maximum regret in the system. A new linear form for crop water production function is used in the objective function of the water allocation optimization models. To show the efficiency and applicability of the methodology, it is applied to the Karoon-Dez river system in Iran.     

A Nonlinear Interval Model for Water and Waste Load Allocation in River Basins

In this paper, a new methodology is proposed for simultaneous allocation of water and waste load in river basins. A nonlinear interval number optimization model is used to incorporate the uncertainties of model inputs and parameters. In this methodology, the bounds of the uncertain inputs are only required, not necessarily knowing their probability density or fuzzy membership functions. In the proposed model, the existing uncertainties in water demands and monthly available water are considered in the optimization model. Also the economic and environmental impacts of water allocation to the agricultural water users are taken into account. To have an equitable water and waste load allocation, benefits are reallocated to water users using some solution concepts of the cooperative game theory. Results of applying the methodology to the Dez river system in south-western part of Iran show its effectiveness and applicability for water and waste load allocation in an uncertain environment.     

Incorporating Economic and Political Considerations in Inter-Basin Water Allocations: A Case Study

When an inter-basin water transfer is expected among basins with some level of unfriendliness or hostility, ignoring political considerations, which are generally not integrated in economic investigations, can impede an integrated and efficient management. In this paper, a new economic-political methodology is proposed for the optimal and efficient allocation of water resources among water users in inter-basin water transfer systems. The proposed framework quantifies both the economic payoffs using an “n-person real fuzzy cooperative game”, and the political formation prospect of any coalition, using a Modified Political Accounting System (MPAS). The proposed economic-political methodology is applied to a large scale inter-basin water allocation problem including water donor and receiving basins struggling with water scarcity. The results show how including political considerations in the study may provide a more satisfactory solution compared to the just cost-effective water allocations.     

An Interval Parameter Model for Cooperative Inter-Basin Water Resources Allocation Considering the Water Quality Issues

In this paper, a new methodology based on interval optimization and game theory is developed for optimal operation of an inter-basin water transfer system considering efficiency, equity and sustainability criteria. A linear version of the agricultural water production function is proposed and used for incorporating deficit irrigation. The interval programming and cooperative game theory are utilized for equitable reallocation of benefits to water users in both water donor and receiving basins. To assess the sustainability of water allocation policies, water quality and environmental flow in the donor basin and groundwater table drawdown in the receiving basin are taken into consideration. The effectiveness of this methodology is examined by applying it to a large scale case study of water transfer from the Karoon river basin in south-west to the Rafsanjan plain in the central part of Iran.     

Asymmetry and Equity in Water Resources Management; Critical Institutional Issues for Southern Africa

Water users wish to achieve the highest benefits from water resources. Rules limit the manner in which water users may utilise the water resources occurring within their constituencies or territories. However an asymmetrical situation exists whereby downstream users may not affect upstream users but upstream users do cause downstream impacts. Because of this asymmetry the equitable sharing of water resources between upstream and downstream users will always imply that upstream users have to forego some potential water benefits. The general question that this paper addresses is: which institutional arrangements can be devised to (re-)establish an equilibrium between up- and downstream entities within a catchment area or river basin? The paper addresses this question by first focusing on some local and national water allocation arrangements. After briefly reviewing the different management regimes, customary and colonial, that co-evolved in Southern Africa, it assesses the water management principles that are currently being espoused. The focus then turns to the principles in international water law that deal with the allocation of water in transboundary river basins. It is concluded that it often proves difficult to reach agreement over how to share the scarce resource. The paper then discusses the current trend to look beyond water and beyond the river basin when seeking peaceful means to share a common water resource. The concept of “hydrosolidarity” emerges as a normative value that may help to recreate a balance between the various (asymmetrical) interests that exist within a river basin. The paper concludes that water resources can only be governed wisely is there is capacity to understand and monitor the water fluxes within a river basin. If such capacity is wanting, priority should be given to strengthen it.     

不确定性多目标模糊规划在水资源优化配置中的应用

在充分考虑水资源系统中供需水不确定性的基础上,基于多目标规划、模糊规划和区间规划原理,以经济效 益、社会效益和环境效益最大为目标,以需水量、可供水量和不同子区用水部门间的用水公平性为主要约束,构 建一种适用于多水源、多子区、多用户的考虑供需水不确定性的多目标模糊规划模型,以期通过平衡水资源配置 系统中用户配置水量、缺水风险与系统收益三者的关系,实现系统综合效益最大。模型以衡水市历年供水、用水 及社会经济等数据确定规划年的水资源参数及经济参数,采用区间参数反映系统中的不确定性,通过引入模糊隶 属度函数,利用两步交互式算法,将多目标规划转化为单目标规划进行求解,以 2025 年为衡水市规划水平年,得 到规划水平年下的 11 个子区、4 种水源、4 个用水行业的最优配水方案。结果表明：本研究制定的水资源优化配 置方案可实现“外调水优先利用、地下水控制利用”,同时考虑用水的公平性约束后,在缺水条件下可有效控制水 资源向每立方米水效益高的区域和部门流动,有利于多区域、多部门共担缺水风险;该水资源优化配置方案可有 效缓解衡水市水资源供需矛盾,实现多水源和多目标之间的协同互补。研究成果可为河北省其他县域的水资源 优化配置提供技术参考。     

Water Costs Allocation in Complex Systems Using a Cooperative Game Theory Approach

The management of complex water resource systems that address water service recovery costs and consider adequate contributions and priorities require methods that integrate technical, economic, environmental, social and legal aspects into a comprehensive framework. In Europe, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 2000/60/EC recommends that the pricing politics in a river basin take into account the cost recovery and the economic sustainability of the water use. However, the current cost allocation methods do not consider the user’s willingness to pay and often do not permit a total cost recovery. Thus, a new approach is required that includes these requirements when defining water rates. This article presents a methodology to allocate water service costs in a water resource system among different users that attempts to fulfil the WFD requirements. The methodology is based on Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) techniques and on the definition of the related characteristic function using a mathematical optimisation approach. The CGT provides the instruments that are necessary to analyse situations that require a cost-sharing rule. The CGT approach can define efficient and fair solutions that provide the appropriate incentives among the parties involved. Therefore, the water system cost allocation has been valued as a game in which it is necessary to determine the right payoff for each player that is, in this case, a water user. To apply the CGT principles in a water resources system, the characteristic function needs to be defined and evaluated using an adequate modelling approach; in this study, it is evaluated using the optimisation model WARGI. (Sechi and Zuddas 2000). The so-called “core” represents the game-solution set. It represents the area of the admissible cost allocation values from which the boundaries on the cost values for each player can be supplied. Within the core lie all of the allocations that satisfy the principles of equity, fairness, justice, efficiency and that guarantee cost recovery. The core of a cooperative game can represent a useful instrument to define the water cost rates. Furthermore, it can be used as a valid support in water resource management to achieve the economic analysis required by the WFD. The methodology was applied to a multi-reservoir and multi-demand water system in Sardinia, Italy.     

Water Resources Allocation Using Solution Concepts of Fuzzy Cooperative Games: Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core

In this paper, two new solution concepts for fuzzy cooperative games, namely Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core are developed. They aim for optimal allocation of available water resources and associated benefits to water users in a river basin. The results of these solution concepts are compared with the results of some traditional fuzzy and crisp games, namely Fuzzy Shapley Value, Crisp Shapley Value, Least Core, Weak Least Core and Normalized Nucleolus. It is shown that the proposed solution concepts are more efficient than the crisp games. Moreover, they do not have the limitation of Fuzzy Shapley Value in satisfying the group rationality criterion. This paper consists of two steps. In the first step, an optimization model is used for initial water allocation to stakeholders. In the second step, fuzzy coalitions are defined and participation rates of water users (players) in the fuzzy coalitions are optimized in order to reach a maximum net benefit. Then, the total net benefit is allocated to the players in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Least Core, Fuzzy Weak Least Core and some traditional fuzzy and crisp games. The effectiveness and applicability of the proposed methodology is examined using a numerical example and also applying it to the Karoon river basin in southern Iran.     

Development of a Dynamic Long-Term Water Allocation Model for Agriculture and Industry Water Demands

Demands growth and water resources limitation, enforce water sector policy makers to integrate water supply–demand interactions in a coherent framework for efficient water allocation. Water supply–demand interaction, changes long-term trend of water demands, which in turn has a substantial influence on water allocation. Researches on water allocation modeling lack adequate projection of relationship between water supply and demand. Socio-economic factors representing water allocation stakeholders’ benefits, account for the main share of water supply–demand interaction. Identification, representation and consideration of these factors in a water allocation model, is the main limitation of researches on this issue. In this paper a new long-term water allocation model at basin level is developed and introduced. This model considers water supply–demand interaction in agriculture and industry sectors, by use of socio-economic parameters; such as, production, cultivated land area, revenue and employment. The model main advantage is its ability to reflect the interrelationship between essential hydro-system and supply–demand components. It can explore both socio-economic and water allocation consequences of various policy choices. The model is used to assess two different development policies at basin level. The first one is fourth 5-year development plan of Iran, which fixes predefined growth rate for different sectors. The second one assumes the present state continues up to the end of planning horizon. A typical multi-reservoir water basin is modeled and analyzed for two policies. Indices that summarize long-term state of hydro-system and stakeholders are defined and used in policies assessment and decision making. Results of these assessments show fourth 5-year development policy provides opportunities for substantial improvement in water allocation and stakeholders’ benefits.     

A Comparative Study of Flexibility in Water Allocation in the Context of Hydrologic Variability

River flow that is characterized by variability requires commensurate flexibility in allocating water so that water users are able to plan their activities and respond accordingly. An indicator-based assessment method is proposed in this study to evaluate the flexibility of water allocation, based on a concept that a flexible water allocation regime provides greater opportunity for users to freely decide individual water use and leads to more variability and diversity for water consumption among the users. This is demonstrated by using historical water-use data and applying the assessment method in three river basins with different water allocation regimes. These allocation regimes include the seasonal and volumetric water allocation system in the Yellow River of China, duration-based water allocation in Northwestern China, and capacity sharing in southern Queensland in the northern Murray Darling Basin of Australia. Historical water-use variability and diversity are defined and assessed. The result shows that water allocation flexibility varies across the different water entitlement regimes. Duration-based water allocation, a type of allocation that provides the highest degree of water-use autonomy, is ranked as the most flexible regime. Seasonal water allocation, which has the highest level of centralized regulation, shows the lowest flexibility. The proposed indicator based assessment method would be useful for evaluating the flexibility of policy options for water allocation. This could be helpful for improving the capability of water allocation regimes to cope with the changing environment and improving the effectiveness of water allocation systems.     

A cooperative framework for optimizing transboundary hydropower development

Hydropower development may result in water conflicts among the riparian nations, which, however, can be resolved by benefit sharing. An optimization framework is proposed for a transboundary sub-basin following a cooperative game theoretical approach. A broad range of factors at different levels of cooperation between the riparian countries has been used in the optimization model. As an illustration, the framework is implemented in the Sesan and Sre Pok sub-basins of the Lower Mekong Basin. Higher levels of cooperation lead to greater total net benefits as well as greater benefits to individual countries.     

辽河流域水资源综合规划概要

《辽河流域水资源综合规划》内容包括水资源及开发利用现状、水资源供需分析、水资源配置、水生态保护、水资源管理制度建设、实施安排意见及效果评价、环境影响评价和保障措施等方面内容.本规划将作为今后一段时间辽河流域水资源开发、利用、保护、管理的基本依据.     

松花江流域水资源综合规划概要

《松花江流域水资源综合规划》内容包括水资源开发利用现状、水资源供需分析、水资源配置、水生态保护、水资源管理制度建设、实施安排意见及效果评价、环境影响评价和保障措施等方面内容.本规划将作为今后一段时间松花江流域水资源开发、利用、保护、管理的基本依据.     

Pricing and Water Resource Allocation Scheme for the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China

The eastern route of the South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD-ER) project is a massive-scale interbasin system to transfer water from the Yangtze River to North China. With the infrastructure construction close to completion, the project is now faced with many complicated operations management problem at different levels. The problems are unique in that, on the one hand, the project is expected to be financially self-sustainable by charging water usages, and on the other hand, the water price is regulated for its nature as a social product. One such problem is to achieve a rational water allocation among different users by appropriate pricing schemes. In this paper, we study how to use a two-tier pricing scheme to balance the water allocation by using a Stackelberg game model. From the study, we find that (1) the Stackelberg game always has equilibrium solutions to balance the benefit of every party in the system, which implies that the two-tier pricing scheme can effectively coordinate the water allocation; (2) the two-tier pricing scheme can also result in multiple desirable by-products such as encouraging the implementation of water saving mechanism and giving the local water users certain priority; and (3) the government can adjust the pricing parameters to control and balance the profit of every party. As such we conclude that the two-tier pricing scheme is an effective way that integrates both the government control and market powers to ensure the public interest and the economic benefit, which is suitable for SNWD-ER project.     

南水北调东线水资源供应链定价模型

把南水北调东线供水工程作为一个水资源的供应链,交易主体由水供应商和分销商组成,从交易主体市场资金运营的角度,建立了合作博弈的联合定价模型,并设计了政府最高限价的两部制(基本水价与计量水价相结合的水价制)动态定价约束.通过数值算例验证了模型的有效性.其结果表明,联合定价模型所获得的供应链整体利润比Stackelberg博弈模型高,并且在联合定价下通过利润分配因子的设计可实现供应链整体、生产商、分销商的多赢.     

A Multi-objective Linear Programming Model with Interval Parameters for Water Resources Allocation in Dalian City

Water resources management has been of concern for many researchers since the contradiction between increased water demand and decreased water supply has become obvious. In the real world, water resources systems usually have complexities among social, economic, natural resources and environmental aspects, which leads to multi-objective problems with significant uncertainties in system parameters, objectives, and their interactions. In this paper, a multi-objective linear programming model with interval parameters has been developed wherein an interactive compromising algorithm has been introduced. Through interactive compromising conflicts among multi-objectives, a feasible solution vector can be obtained. The developed model is then applied to allocation of multi-source water resources with different water qualities to multiple users with different water quality requirements for the Dalian city for 2010, 2015 and 2020 planning years. The model pursues the maximum synthesis benefits of economy, society and the environment. The results indicate that the proportion of reused water to the total water amount is gradually increasing, and the proportion of agricultural water consumption to the total water consumption is gradually decreasing. The allocation of multi-source water resources to multiple users is improved due to incorporation of uncertain factors into the model that provide useful decision support to water management authorities.