市场机制下机组启动费用的分摊研究

尝试运用基于合作博弈的成本分摊理论来分摊机组启动费用。研究了机组启动费用分摊的核的存在性问题,并指出该分摊不一定是凸博弈。分析了核仁分摊法和Shapley值分摊法的特点和适用范围,对比了两者的优缺点。此外,对机组空载费用的分摊问题也进行了有益的探索。文中,提出采用分时段分摊法和整体分摊法两种方法来分摊多时段的机组启动费用,并对比研究了两者的分摊结果。所提出的分摊方法与现有方法相比,在分摊合理性和公平性方面存在理论上的优势。数值算例结果表明,提出的分摊方法是公平、有效的。     

输电网合作投资费用的计算与分摊

电力市场环境下,输电费用的计算和分摊成为必须解决的问题之一。而此时各发电厂和用户都将成为独立行为的个体,他们具有合作的潜力以降低成本或获得最大利益。利用输电网的合作特性．给出了由发电厂投资修建输电网的计算方法,并提出结合合作博弈理论,采用核心、核仁、夏普利值三种方法将成本分摊到各个用户。     

联营交易模式下的阻塞成本分摊

在开放的电力市场环境下,输电阻塞不仅关系到系统的安全运行,还影响市场的有效运转.如何快速消除阻塞并实现其成本的合理分配是市场运行的基本内容之一.文章提出了一种联营交易模式下的阻塞成本分摊方法,该方法将对交易的分摊转化为全网→线路→交易的分摊,利用Shapley值实现阻塞成本在线路间的分配.多组测试数据表明,文中的方法能够实现收支平衡,分摊结果合理,且可避免针对交易进行成本分配而产生的计算量过大的问题.     

Loss allocation of radial distribution system using Shapley value: A sequential approach

This paper presents a new method to allocate the power loss in a radial distribution system to loads and distributed generations (DGs). Integration of DGs has increased the importance of loss allocation because it alters the total power losses. The proposed method calculates the loss allocation in sequential manner using Shapley value method specifically for radial distribution system. The losses allocated by using proposed method are same as obtained from the conventional Shapley value method which satisfy the axioms of fairness. An important virtue of proposed method is that it reduces the memory and computational burden as well as ensures the fair allocation and recovery of total complex losses. The results are discussed and illustrated on different test systems.     

联营电力市场结算盈余的分摊研究

在节点电价体系下,联营电力市场必将出现结算盈余。在理论上阐述了联营电力市场结算盈余产生的根本原因,然后尝试应用成本分摊理论来分摊网损结算盈余。并结合具体算例讨论了网损结算盈余分摊的核的存在性问题。在对网损结算盈余函数特性进行分析的基础上,提出采用Shapley值法来分摊网损结算盈余。基于Shapley值的网损结算盈余分摊方法平等地对待每个负荷,其分摊原理公平,计算方法简便,收支完全平衡。数值算例结果表明,基于Shapley值的网损结算盈余分摊方法是公平有效的。     

计及电量互保策略的售电公司两阶段日前决策方法

售电公司在购电量不足或负荷预测精度较差时,会面临严格的电量偏差考核,并可能产生较大亏损。为此,文中在日前交易前,基于场景分析法,以计入可中断负荷成本和售电公司间电量互保策略影响的售电公司购电费用期望为目标,建立了日前竞价策略模型;然后在市场出清后,根据市场出清价格,以售电公司间电量互保策略作为减少电量偏差的策略,优化可中断负荷量及电量互保下的转移电量,进一步减少电量偏差。在电量结算阶段,分别使用夏普利(Shapley)值和最小费用剩余资金(MCRS)法对售电公司集合总费用进行分配。通过算例仿真分析了不同场景下可中断负荷和电量互保策略下单位电量转移价格对电量偏差时售电公司集合费用的影响,并验证了2种费用分配方法的适用情况。     

A cooperative game theory analysis for transmission loss allocation

This paper presents an analysis and discussion, based on cooperative game theory, for the allocation of the cost of losses to generators and demands in transmission systems. We construct a cooperative game theory model in which the players are represented by equivalent bilateral exchanges and we search for a unique loss allocation solution, the Core. Other solution concepts, such as the Shapley Value, the Bilateral Shapley Value and the Kernel are also explored. Our main objective is to illustrate why is not possible to find an optimal solution for allocating the cost of losses to the users of a network. Results and relevant conclusions are presented for a 4-bus system and a 14-bus system.     

考虑电池寿命的混合储能微电网优化配置

针对偏远地区供电困难的问题,提出一种考虑电池寿命的混合储能微电网优化配置方法。首先,考虑到储能特性,构建了电池寿命模型和水轮机效率模型。基于用电习惯,建立了居民、商业、工业区域的需求响应模型。进而,以年投资成本和日运行成本最低为目标,建立微电网的双层优化配置模型,并通过线性化方法将原问题转化为混合整数线性规划问题。最后,使用基于需求度的Shapley值法对经济成本进行分摊,并分析电池寿命和负荷互补效应对系统经济性的影响。算例表明：所提方法能有效提高电池寿命,降低经济成本;基于需求度的Shapley值法相较于常规Shapley值法在分摊上更加合理;负荷的互补度与共建微电网节省的经济成本成正比。     

基于Shapley值的网损分摊新方法

介绍了目前网损分摊方法的研究现状，提出了一种基于Shapley值的网损分摊新方法，这种方法根据每个交易加入交易联盟后给交易联盟带来的边际网损大小来分摊网损，该网损分摊方法平等地对待所有可能的交易加入次序，并且考虑了所有可能存在的包含该交易在内的交易联盟，因此能够被各市场成员视为公平，另外，这种网损分摊方法能保证收支完全平衡，并且能够向各交易提供适当的经济激励信号，促进电力负荷的合理分布，从而降低系统的总网损，数值算例结果表明，基于Shapley值的网损分摊方法是公平，有效的。     

市场条件下的机组启动费问题

机组在启动过程中需要耗费高额的启动费，这部分启动费是应由电网公司在制定日计划时予以考虑，还是应由发电公司在报价时自行考虑？针对这一问题，作者以对比机组启动费用与发电效益为出发点，提出了根据机组的启机效率，使用寿命以及国家现阶段的政策导向等多方面因素，由电力市场调度交易中心和发电公司以及市场监管部门兼顾各方利益，共同核定机组的含有技术和经济双重性的参数－“最小经济运行小时数”，并由发电公司依据机组自身特性和市场状况，自行处理启动费；而调度交易中心在制定竞价上网发电计划及结算时则不再单独考虑和支付机组启停费用的观点：文中同时还提出了分摊机组启动费的两种方法－平均分摊法和负荷比例分摊法，并对比了这两种分摊方法对双方经济性的影响。     

阻塞费用的计算和分摊方法

在电力市场条件下，阻塞定价已成为阻塞管理的核心。最近，阻塞费用分摊方面的研究工作相当活跃。基于此，总结了各种交易模式下阻塞费用的计算方法，并对阻塞费用的分摊方法，即平均分摊法和责任分摊法，进行了综述。在责任分摊法中，阐述了使用程度分摊法和裁减量分摊法。     

可再生能源多能互补系统多主体效益均衡模型

清洁能源发电出力具有较强的不确定性。传统的效益分配的方法仅以交易量为依据,无法保证备用机组参与的积极性。首先基于Shapley值法和Solidarity值法构建了可再生能源多能互补系统多主体效益基础分配方法,并引入成本、贡献和风险因子构建了改进分配方法;其次设计了可再生能源多能互补系统构成结构和交易策略,并构建了系统净效益测算模型;然后构建了以效益最大化为目标函数的运营优化模型;最后选取某实例对象,设置多种情景,算例分析证明了所提方法的有效性。     

Revenue adequate bidding strategies in competitive electricitymarkets

Energy trading in a competitive electricity market can be modeled as a two-level optimization. At the top level a centralized economic dispatch (CED) uses a priority list method to solve the fundamental problem of reliable market clearing with price discovery. The lower level consists of a set of decentralized bidding (DB) subproblems. The DB model uses a self-unit scheduling simulator based on parametric dynamic programming to produce hourly bid curves for the central dispatch coordinator. Unit operating constraints and costs such as the unit minimum-up and minimum-down times, ramp rates, and the unit start-up, no-load and sunk capital costs are internalized in the bid curves through the simulator. A special algorithm is presented to solve the revenue adequacy problem for marginal units. Both CED and DB models are based on the revenue maximization in contrast with the cost minimization criteria used in the conventional unit commitment (UC). The proposed method has been tested in a study case and some interesting results have been demonstrated     

基于最优潮流与合作博弈理论的互联电网经济效益分析

实施输电网络开放、促进区间经济功率交换,是电力市场化的重要内容。中以最优潮流和节点电价作为分析工具,基于合作博弈理论中的核仁,提出了多区域电力系统互联运行的成本和利润分配方法。对IEEE30节点系统的分析计算结果表明,与基于Shapley值的分配相比较,所提出的方法实现了系统互联运行成本和利润在市场参与之间的合理分配,既满足个体理性,也满足集体理性,保证了联盟结构稳定。     

Probabilistic Game Approaches for Network Cost Allocation

In a restructured power market, the network cost is to be allocated between multiple players utilizing the system in varying capacities. Cooperative game approaches based on Shapley value and Nucleolus provide stable models for embedded cost allocation of power networks. Varying network usage necessitates the introduction of probabilistic approaches to cooperative games. This paper proposes a variety of probabilistic cooperative game approaches. These have variably been modeled based upon the probability of existence of players, the probability of existence of coalitions, and the probability of players joining a particular coalition along with their joining in a particular sequence. Application of these approaches to power networks reflects the system usage in a more justified way. Consistent and stable results qualify the application of probabilistic cooperative game approaches for cost allocation of power networks.      

Hydro unit start-up costs and their impact on the short termscheduling strategies of Swedish power producers

This paper is about start-up costs of hydro power units. In the introduction we address three questions about start-up of hydro power units: what causes the costs in the start-up? How much does a start-up cost? How do start-ups effect the short-term scheduling strategies of power producers in Sweden? In order to answer these questions, we have interviewed employees working with generation planning at the eight largest power producers in Sweden. We found five aspects causing start-up costs: loss of water during maintenance; wear and tear of the windings due to temperature changes during the start-up; wear and tear of mechanical equipment during the start-up; malfunctions in the control equipment during the start-up; and loss of water during the start up. The aspects causing the largest costs are maintenance due to the wear and tear and the unavailability and personnel costs due to malfunctions in the control equipment. The cost of lost water is usually small. Our conclusions are the following: start up cost will depend on the nominal power of the unit and the unit model; the majority of the power producers consider start-ups in their planning; there is a need for better knowledge about start-up cost; and there is a need for planning software which considers start-up costs of hydro units     

热电联产项目供热、供电成本分摊机制的研究

合理的电价和热价有利于推动热电联产事业的发展，热电联产项目的热价和电价主要与其成本有很大关系，文中对热、电成本分摊比进行分析研究得出：对于可变成本应按热量法求出燃料消耗比来分摊，对于供采暖热负荷的两用机组将其供热发电节煤量的1/3效益补贴在供热方面是合理的；对于固定成本与财务费用，小型热电广以燃料分摊比来分摊计算是可行的．而两用机组按纯供热投资所占两用机组总投资的百分比．或接平均供热抽汽量计算出减少的发电量与额定发电量的比值来分摊是合理的。     

Transmission Cost Allocation Based on Data Envelopment Analysis and Cooperative Game Method

Transmission cost allocation is a traditional but challenging problem in electric power industries. Many factors can affect the transmission cost allocation. But most traditional allocation methods focus on just one point. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach has the characteristic of multi-criterion. It can overcome the drawbacks of traditional allocation methods. This paper combines the game theory and DEA approach to solve the problem of transmission cost allocation. In order to take various key points of power transmission into account, three criterions are proposed. These criterions reflect the effect of load demand, transmission line usage and marginal cost on transmission cost allocation. Nucleolus and Shapley value are used to solve the DEA game programming. For measuring the fairness of the transmission cost allocation methods, this paper proposes an algorithm to evaluate the satisfaction of users with the different allocation methods. The DEA game approach is applied to IEEE 14-bus system. The results which are compared with that of other three traditional allocation methods demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method.     

基于合作博弈论的电能替代效益分摊方法

电能替代对于落实节能环保政策、实现能源战略转型具有实际意义。为了将电能替代效益公平合理地分摊给电力用户,激励用户参与电能替代,提出一种基于合作博弈理论的电能替代效益分摊方法。分析电能替代对降低生产运行成本和减少污染排放的价值,并对其进行量化;基于合作博弈理论,采用核仁和Shapley值法对电能替代效益进行分摊。算例验证了所提电能替代效益分摊方法的有效性和合理性。     

基于机会约束的多微网合作调度模型

考虑微网运行过程中风电和光伏输出功率的不确定性以及经济成本、环境成本等运行指标，本文首先建立基于机会约束规划的微网非合作调度模型。在此基础上，提出了以微网联盟总成本最小为目标的多微网合作调度模型。然后，给出了结合蒙特卡罗模拟的遗传算法对模型进行求解，并用Shapley值法对合作收益进行分配。最后通过算例分析了不同置信水平时微网非合作调度方式以及合作调度方式下各微网调度结果。结果表明:与非合作调度方式相比，合作调度方式下各微网成本均有所降低，并且在两种调度方式下，微网的运行成本均会随着置信水平的降低而降低，从而验证了所提出的合作模型的经济性。