Regular disjunction-free default theories

In this paper, the class of regular disjunction-free default theories is introduced and investigated.A transformation from regular default theories to normal default theories is established. The initial theory andthe transformed theory have the same extensions when restricted to old variables. Hence, regular default theoriesenjoy some similar properties (e.g., existence of extensions, semi-monotonicity) as normal default theories. Then,a new algorithm for credulous reasoning of regular theories is developed. This algorithm runs in a time not morethan 0(1.45~n), where n is the number of defaults. In case of regular prerequisite-free or semi-2CNF defaulttheories, the credulous reasoning can be solved in polynomial time. However, credulous reasoning for semi-Horndefault theories is shown to be NP-complete although it is tractable for Horn default theories. Moreover, skepticalreasoning for regular unary default theories is co-NP-complete.     

Reasoning with Sets of Defaults in Default Logic

We present a general approach for representing and reasoning with sets of defaults in default logic, focusing on reasoning about preferences among sets of defaults. First, we consider how to control the application of a set of defaults so that either all apply (if possible) or none do (if not). From this, an approach to dealing with preferences among sets of default rules is developed. We begin with an ordered default theory , consisting of a standard default theory, but with possible preferences on sets of rules. This theory is transformed into a second, standard default theory wherein the preferences are respected. The approach differs from other work, in that we obtain standard default theories and do not rely on prioritized versions of default logic. In practical terms this means we can immediately use existing default logic theorem provers for an implementation. Also, we directly generate just those extensions containing the most preferred applied rules; in contrast, most previous approaches generate all extensions, then select the most preferred. In a major application of the approach, we show how semimonotonic default theories can be encoded so that reasoning can be carried out at the object level. With this, we can reason about default extensions from within the framework of a standard default logic. Hence one can encode notions such as skeptical and credulous conclusions, and can reason about such conclusions within a single extension.     

Stable and extension class theory for logic programs and default logics

The stable model semantics (cf. Gelfond and Lifschitz [1]) for logic programs suffers from the problem that programs may not always have stable models. Likewise, default theories suffer from the problem that they do not always have extensions. In such cases, both these formalisms for non-monotonic reasoning have an inadequate semantics. In this paper, we propose a novel idea-that of extension classes for default logics, and of stable classes for logic programs. It is shown that the extension class and stable class semantics extend the extension and stable model semantics respectively. This allows us to reason about inconsistent default theories, and about logic programs with inconsistent completions. Our work extends the results of Marek and Truszczynski [2] relating logic programming and default logics.     

Uniform semantic treatment of default and autoepistemic logics

We revisit the issue of epistemological and semantic foundations for autoepistemic and default logics, two leading formalisms in nonmonotonic reasoning. We develop a general semantic approach to autoepistemic and default logics that is based on the notion of a belief pair and that exploits the lattice structure of the collection of all belief pairs. For each logic, we introduce a monotone operator on the lattice of belief pairs. We then show that a whole family of semantics can be defined in a systematic and principled way in terms of fixpoints of this operator (or as fixpoints of certain closely related operators). Our approach elucidates fundamental constructive principles in which agents form their belief sets, and leads to approximation semantics for autoepistemic and default logics. It also allows us to establish a precise one-to-one correspondence between the family of semantics for default logic and the family of semantics for autoepistemic logic. The correspondence exploits the modal interpretation of a default proposed by Konolige. Our results establish conclusively that default logic can be viewed as a fragment of autoepistemic logic, a result that has been long anticipated. At the same time, they explain the source of the difficulty to formally relate the semantics of default extensions by Reiter and autoepistemic expansions by Moore. These two semantics occupy different locations in the corresponding families of semantics for default and autoepistemic logics.     

Operational concepts of nonmonotonic logics part 1: Default logic

We give an introduction to default logic, one of the most prominent nonmonotonic logics. Emphasis is given to providing an operational interpretation for the semantics of default logic that is usually defined by fixed-point concepts (extensions). We introduce a process model that allows to exactly calculate the extensions of a default theory in a quite easy way. We give a prototypical implementation of processes in Prolog able to handle the examples that can be found in literature. Finally, we develop some theoretical results about default logic and give new simple proofs using the process model as a theoretical tool.     

A note on the cumulativity of justified default logic

Cumulativity is an important property of nonmonotonic inference relations because it allows for the safe use of lemmas. This note shows that Justified Default Logic, Lukaszewicz variant of default logic, is cumulative for prerequisite-free default theories, a question that has been open in the literature. The proof is very simple and makes use of an operational interpretation of extensions.     

Reasoning about Minimal Knowledge in Nonmonotonic Modal Logics

We study the problem of embedding Halpern and Moses's modal logic of minimal knowledge states into two families of modal formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning, McDermott and Doyle's nonmonotonic modal logics and ground nonmonotonic modal logics. First, we prove that Halpern and Moses's logic can be embedded into all ground logics; moreover, the translation employed allows for establishing a lower bound (3p) for the problem of skeptical reasoning in all ground logics. Then, we show a translation of Halpern and Moses's logic into a significant subset of McDermott and Doyle's formalisms. Such a translation both indicates the ability of Halpern and Moses's logic of expressing minimal knowledge states in a more compact way than McDermott and Doyle's logics, and allows for a comparison of the epistemological properties of such nonmonotonic modal formalisms.     

Reasoning situated in time I: basic concepts*

Abstract

The needs of a real-time reasoner situated in an environment may make it appropriate to view error-correction and non-monotonicity as much the same thing. This has led us to formulate situated (or step) logic, an approach to reasoning in which the formalism has a kind of real-time self-reference that affects the course of deduction itself. Here we seek to motivate this as a useful vehicle for exploring certain issues in commonsense reasoning. In particular, a chief drawback of more traditional logics is avoided: from a contradiction we do not have all wffs swamping the (growing) conclusion set. Rather, we seek potentially inconsistent, but nevertheless useful, logics where the real-time self-referential feature allows a direct contradiction to be spotted and corrective action taken, as part of the same system of reasoning. Some specific inference mechanisms for real-time default reasoning are suggested, notably a form of introspection relevant to default reasoning. Special treatment of ‘now’ and of contradictions are the main technical devices here. We illustrate this with a computer-implemented real time solution to R. Moore's Brother Problem.     

Tableau-based characterization and theorem proving for default logic

In this paper, we present a new method for computing extensions and for deriving formulae from a default theory. It is based on the semantic tableaux method and works for default theories with a finite set of defaults that are formulated over a decidable subset of first-order logic. We prove that all extensions (if any) of a default theory can be produced by constructing the semantic tableau ofone formula built from the general laws and the default consequences. This result allows us to describe an algorithm that provides extensions if there are any, and to decide if there are none. Moreover, the method gives a necessary and sufficient criterion for the existence of extensions of default theories with finitely many defaults provided they are formulated on a decidable subset of FOL.This work was completed while the author was at CNRS, Marseille.     

On a rule-based interpretation of default conditionals

In nonmonotonic reasoning, a default conditional α→β has most often been informally interpreted as a defeasible version of a classical conditional, usually the material conditional. There is however an alternative interpretation, in which a default is regarded essentially as a rule, leading from premises to conclusion. In this paper, we present a family of logics, based on this alternative interpretation. A general semantic framework under this rule-based interpretation is developed, and associated proof theories for a family of weak conditional logics is specified. Nonmonotonic inference is easily defined in these logics. Interestingly, the logics presented here are weaker than the commonly-accepted base conditional approach for defeasible reasoning. However, this approach resolves problems that have been associated with previous approaches.      

Why Non-Monotonic Logic is Inadequate to Represent Balancing Arguments

This paper analyses the logical structure of the balancing of conflicting normative arguments, and asks whether non-monotonic logic is adequate to represent this type of legal or practical reasoning. Norm conflicts are often regarded as a field of application for non-monotonic logics. This paper argues, however, that the balancing of normative arguments consists of an act of judgement, not a logical inference, and that models of deductive as well as of defeasible reasoning do not give an adequate account of its structure. Moreover, it argues that as far as the argumentation consists in logical inferences, deductive logic suffices for reconstructing the argumentation from the internal point of view of someone making normative judgements.     

子句型缺省逻辑中的分情形推理

引进一种树型方法以研究缺省逻辑中分情形推理下的Roos扩张,深入讨论了Roos扩张的计算,并分析了Roos扩张与Reiter扩张的关系.为计算Roos扩张,引入了从子句集分解最小文字集的算法.方法对于在缺省逻辑中计算Roos扩张以及分析分情形推理的计算复杂性是有用的.     

Automated Theorem Proving in Euler Diagram Systems

Diagrammatic reasoning has the potential to be important in numerous application areas. This paper focuses on the simple, but widely used, Euler diagrams that form the basis of many more expressive logics. We have implemented a diagrammatic theorem prover, called Edith, which has access to four sound and complete sets of reasoning rules for Euler diagrams. Furthermore, for each rule set we develop a sophisticated heuristic to guide the search for a proof. This paper is about understanding how the choice of reasoning rule set affects the time taken to find proofs. Such an understanding will influence reasoning rule design in other logics. Moreover, this work specific to Euler diagrams directly benefits the many logics based on Euler diagrams. We investigate how the time taken to find a proof depends not only on the proof task but also on the reasoning system used. Our evaluation allows us to predict the best choice of reasoning system, given a proof task, in terms of time taken, and we extract a guide for defining reasoning rules for other logics in order to minimize time requirements.     

贪婪缺省逻辑

提出一种贪婪缺省逻辑,旨在构造扩展的过程中尽可能的保留缺省规则当中的信息.给出了贪婪缺省逻辑的推演系统-GD系统和贪婪缺省的GD-扩展的定义.并且证明了对于缺省理论 的一个扩展,必定存在一个贪婪缺省理论的GD-扩展使得缺省逻辑的扩展是贪婪缺省逻辑扩展的子集.并且存在贪婪缺省理论 的某一GD-扩展,该GD-扩展不包含缺省理论的任一扩展.因此缺省逻辑和贪婪缺省逻辑是两种不同的逻辑.     

Studying properties of classes of default logics

The study of different variants of default logic reveals not only differences but also properties they share. For example, there seems to be a close relationship between semi-monotonicity and the guaranteed existence of extensions. Likewise, formula-manipulating default logics tend to violate the property of cumulativity. The problem is that currently such properties must be established separately for each approach. This paper describes some steps towards the study of properties of classes of default logics by giving a rather general definition of what a default logic is. Essentially our approach is operational and restricts attention to purely formula-manipulating logics. We motivate our definition and demonstrate that it includes a variety of well-known default logics. Furthermore, we derive general results regarding the concepts of semi-monotonicity and cumulativity. As a benefit of the discussion we uncover that some design decisions of concrete default logics were not accidental as they may seem, but rather they were due to objective necessities.     

基于DFL的模糊缺省推理研究

统计缺省理论是经典缺省逻辑（Reiter缺省）的推广,借助错误参数ε,允许我们在标准的推理统计中模型化普遍的推理模式。本文针对研究对象以及它们之间的动态模糊性,提出了基于动态模糊逻辑（DFL）的模糊缺省推理,并通过算子语义的方法计算模糊缺省扩充。     

Defeasible logic versus Logic Programming without Negation as Failure

Recently there has been increased interest in logic programming-based default reasoning approaches which are not using negation-as-failure in their object language. Instead, default reasoning is modelled by rules and a priority relation among them. In this paper we compare the expressive power of two approaches in this family of logics: Defeasible Logic, and sceptical Logic Programming without Negation as Failure (LPwNF). Our results show that the former has a strictly stronger expressive power. The difference is caused by the latter logic's failure to capture the idea of teams of rules supporting a specific conclusion.