基于模糊博弈的英式拍卖动态模型

为了给竞价人或其代理的竞价提供决策支持,提出了模糊博弈的英式拍卖动态模型.以模糊参数出价意愿取代估价作为分析的基础,采用Bellman和Zadeh的模糊决策理论替代博弈论中的Nash平衡理论,分析英式拍卖中的竞价行为,建立英式拍卖静态博弈均衡模型,进而提出动态博弈模型和分析动态拍卖策略.通过仿真实验证明算法的有效性.     

博弈论在感知无线电决策机的应用研究

为了使决策机进行策略分析,得到最优的策略,对感知循环、博弈理论以及基于博弈的感知无线电决策机进行了分析.对感知无线电博弈模型中的游戏者、行为、收益等做了相应定义,并针对Neel的决策模型的局限进行了研究.对于多游戏者、多行为、以及多均衡等问题,Neel模型不能很好解决.通过博弈案例的求解分析了多纳什均衡解情况,说明只依靠博弈理论无法得到最优策略,并提出了解决问题的思路.     

基于事件驱动控制的混杂动态博弈系统的纳什均衡分析

本文研究了基于事件驱动控制的混杂动态博弈系统的纳什均衡分析问题. 首先, 分析了事件驱动机制对混 杂动态博弈过程的影响, 进而, 在进行状态空间描述的基础上, 给出了混杂动态博弈的纳什均衡的定义, 并建立了对 应博弈系统的策略型模型. 其次, 结合Lanchester方程, 分别讨论了两类混杂动态博弈系统的均衡问题, 包括事件驱 动策略设计和固定的情况, 获得了均衡解存在的必要条件. 最后, 通过数值模拟进行了应用分析, 验证了所取得结果 的合理性和科学性, 并总结了混杂动态博弈研究的未来工作.     

势博弈与时变Log-linear分布式拓扑控制算法

针对UWSNs由网络拓扑控制不稳定、频繁变化引起网络的能耗不均衡、网络生存周期短等问题,从分析传感器节点受水下不确定性因素对UWSNs的拓扑结构演化入手,构建分布式水下传感器节点状态变量描述模型,归纳出节点之间和节点与环境之间多目标交互、协同、决策的UWSNs拓扑控制优化问题,将多目标优化问题映射成博弈论优化问题,再利用势博弈与Log-linear分布式学习规则实现博弈中节点策略行为的更新过程,采用非齐次马尔可夫链理论证明网络拓扑控制目标函数的优化问题收敛到最大化势博弈函数的解,从而达到保持网络均衡、延长网络生存周期的目的.     

纵向产品差异的闭环供应链定价策略研究

为了解决闭环供应链中的定价策略问题,根据单一制造商和单一零售商构成的二级闭环供应链系统,应用博弈理论研究新产品与再造品之间存在纵向产品差异时闭环供应链中制造商和零售商的定价策略。得出了一个合作博弈的均衡解（合作决策）和一个非合作博弈（均衡解斯坦克尔伯格）的均衡解（分散决策）,并对两种定价策略作了进一步的比较,得出了一些有价值的结论。     

基于模糊回收价格的逆向供应链定价策略研究

在由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的逆向供应链系统中，回收产品质量的不确定性导致回收价格的不确定性．针对这种不确定性，将回收价格看作三角模糊数，应用模糊理论和博弈理论对回收价格浮动的基准点进行决策，分别得出了两个非合作博弈的均衡解（斯坦克尔伯格均衡和纳什均衡）和一个合作博弈的均衡解（联合定价），并给出了各均衡条件下制造商和零售商各自回收价格的浮动范围．     

无线多跳网络中节点效用的博弈机制研究

无线多跳网络中的节点通常都具有自主性和资源受限的特点,因此开展效用研究具有重要意义.论文提出将声誉机制与价格机制相结合,并应用博弈理论促使发送端同时兼顾所预付的通信价格与转发节点的可信度.根据博弈理论对无线多跳网络中节点行为进行了建模分析.最后,本文给出纳什均衡的存在条件,并且通过仿真实验证实了以誉价比机制作为发送端决策因素的合理性.     

多目标动态优化中Pareto随机合作博弈研究综述

随着经济全球化的不断深入,“合作共赢”的发展战略越来越被人们接受,进而合作博弈也被合理地应用到多个领域.与静态合作博弈相比,动态博弈的约束条件为动态方程,其具有优化行为、多个玩家共同存在、决策结果的持久性以及对环境变化的鲁棒性等特点.由于动态系统总是受到某些随机波动的干扰,将这些内部随机波动和外部随机扰动考虑到系统模型中更为实际.随机动态合作博弈同时考虑策略行为、动态演化与随机因素之间的相互作用,其可能是最复杂的决策形式之一.鉴于此,对多目标动态优化中随机合作博弈的进展进行综述:首先,回顾多目标合作博弈的研究背景,给出Pareto最优性的定义和基本性质;其次,综述确定性的合作博弈;再次,分别论述随机合作博弈和平均场随机合作博弈;最后,提出随机合作博弈几个未来研究方向.     

考虑广告投入影响的再制造闭环供应链优化决策博弈模型研究

针对制造/再制造产品的市场竞争与合作问题, 考虑广告投入对产品消费者效用的增长效应及消费者环境偏好的影响, 在构建制造产品和再制造产品的市场需求函数基础上, 应用博弈方法比较分析合作博弈、纳什均衡博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈三种决策模式下制造/再制造产品的最优定价和广告投入策略, 并针对非合作博弈下的效率损失设计了闭环供应链中制造和再制造过程的利益协调机制。数值算例分析表明, 合作博弈决策下供应链总利润最优、制造和再制造产品市场销售价格最高, 而合作博弈和Stackelberg主从博弈都会以牺牲再制造产品利润为代价获得最优利润, 因此再制造部门会偏好纳什均衡博弈, 采取以自身利益最优为目标的竞争策略, 没有动机成为制造部门的跟随者。     

基于博弈论的动态频谱分配技术研究

提出了一种改进的动态频谱分配博弈模型,对现有的频谱定价函数进行改进,在授权用户对单位频谱价格满意的条件下,频谱价格与授权用户提供带宽数量和次用户的频谱需求数量有关。此外,在次用户的效用函数中,考虑了频谱置换参数,并分析了置换参数和信道质量对次用户动态博弈以及次用户达到纳什均衡的影响。最后,分别用静态博弈和动态博弈分析了次用户之间的竞争频谱行为,并通过仿真验证,次用户的策略最终可以收敛到纳什均衡。     

A Predator-prey Particle Swarm Optimization Approach to Multiple UCAV Air Combat Modeled by Dynamic Game Theory

Dynamic game theory has received considerable attention as a promising technique for formulating control actions for agents in an extended complex enterprise that involves an adversary. At each decision making step, each side seeks the best scheme with the purpose of maximizing its own objective function. In this paper, a game theoretic approach based on predatorprey particle swarm optimization (PP-PSO) is presented, and the dynamic task assignment problem for multiple unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in military operation is decomposed and modeled as a two-player game at each decision stage. The optimal assignment scheme of each stage is regarded as a mixed Nash equilibrium, which can be solved by using the PP-PSO. The effectiveness of our proposed methodology is verified by a typical example of an air military operation that involves two opposing forces: the attacking force Red and the defense force Blue.      

Applying game theory mechanisms in open agent systems with complete information

Game theory is a popular tool for designing interaction protocols for agent systems. It is currently not clear how to extend this to open agent systems. By “open” we mean that foreign agents will be free to enter and leave different systems at will. This means that agents will need to be able to work with previously unseen protocols. There does not yet exist any agreement on a standard way in which such protocols can be specified and published. Furthermore, it is not clear how an agent could be given the ability to use an arbitrary published protocol; the agent would need to be able to work out a strategy for participation. To address this we propose a machine readable language in which a game theory mechanism can be written in the form of an agent interaction protocol. This language allows the workings of the protocol to be made public so that agents can inspect it to determine its properties and hence their best strategy. Enabling agents to automatically determine the game theoretic properties of an arbitrary interaction protocol is difficult. Rather than requiring agents to find the equilibrium of a game, we propose that a recommended equilibrium will be published along with the protocol; agents can then check the recommendation to decide if it is indeed an equilibrium. We present an algorithm for this decision problem. We also develop an equilibrium which simplifies the complexity of the checking problem, while still being robust to unilateral deviations.     

A decision approach with multiple interactive qualitative objectives for product conceptual schemes based on noncooperative-cooperative game theory

Product development based on a morphological matrix involves the process of decision-based design. Although the decision process can generate conceptual schemes under the guidance of qualitative decision objectives, analysis of the interactions among the qualitative objectives is seldom considered, which can lead to unreliable optimal solutions by combining conflicting principle solutions. In addition, due to the ambiguity of the constraints among the qualitative objectives, multiple feasible schemes with equilibrium states are not considered in the concept decision stage. To solve these problems, a decision approach with multiple interactive qualitative objectives is developed for conceptual schemes based on noncooperative-cooperative game theory to consider the tradeoffs among objectives (e.g., cost, quality and operability) using discrete principle solution evaluation data. First, the morphological analysis method can obtain feasible schemes and determine the principle solutions for each subfunction. Second, the principle solutions are quantified using linguistic terms. Then, the subfunctions are categorized through cluster analysis to determine the suitable principle solution. Third, based on the clustering results, a noncooperative game decision model is constructed to identify multiple Nash equilibrium solutions that satisfy the constraints among the objectives. Fourth, a cooperative game decision model is constructed to obtain the optimal scheme as screened by the noncooperative game model. The case study proves that this approach can choose a relatively superior scheme under the existing technical conditions, thereby preventing inconsistency with the actual design expectations.     

无线Mesh网络MAC性能的博弈分析及优化

将博弈论用于IEEE802．11无线Mesh网络媒体接入控制协议的性能分析和优化。通过将节点间的信道竞争过程建模为非完全信息动态博弈,求解博弈的纳什均衡,即各节点的最优分组发送概率,并据此提出改进的DCF协议（G-MAC）：各节点首先通过监测信道,对当前博弈状态（竞争信道的节点数）进行估计;然后根据估计到的博弈状态调整其均衡策略（最小竞争窗口）;最后通过有限次动态博弈获得最佳系统性能。同时,提出了一种能准确估计博弈状态的虚拟帧发送机制（VDCF）,使空闲节点在转换为发送状态时可快速调整到均衡策略。仿真研究表明：G-MAC协议可以显著提高无线Mesh网络的系统吞吐量,降低延迟、延迟抖动和丢帧率。     

Externalities,incentives and strategic complementarities: understanding herd behavior in IT adoption

Herd behavior arises in many instances of information technology (IT) adoption. This study examines the economic and behavioral bases for herd behavior and decision conformity. We investigate the roles of payoff externalities, observational learning and managerial incentives in influencing IT adoption decision-making. Our study underscores the benefits of viewing various drivers of IT adoption herding in a unified framework focusing on equilibrium coordination under strategic complementarities. Motivated by the recent advance in behavioral economics and behavioral game theory, our study relates IT adoption herding to a range of individual-level problems, including managerial incentives, managerial behavioral biases and limited rationality. We develop a coordination game of IT adoption within the unified framework. Our analysis of the game demonstrates that, under strategic complementarities, behavioral biases or incentive problems of a small minority of decision-makers may dramatically impact aggregate outcomes.     

Static Bayesian games with finite fuzzy types and the existence of equilibrium

This paper studies a special game with incomplete information, in which the payoffs of the players are both random and fuzzy. Such a game is considered in the context of a Bayesian game with the uncertain types characterized as fuzzy variables. A static fuzzy Bayesian game is then introduced and the decision rules for players are given based on credibility theory. We further prove the existence of the equilibrium of the game. Finally, a Cournot competition model with fuzzy efficiency under asymmetric information is investigated as an application and some results are presented.     

基于博弈论的入侵检测模型

入侵检测系统是保障网络动态安全的一个重要组成部分,但现有的入侵检测技术仍然存在着不容忽视的虚警和漏警,如何制订响应决策成了入侵检测系统的一大难题。将博弈论的思想引入入侵检测系统的决策过程中,提出了一个基于博弈论的入侵检测模型及其分析方法,并给出了实验分析。     

基于博弈论的移动目标最优防御策略研究

基于博弈论的网络安全防御大多数使用完全信息静态博弈或不完全信息动态博弈理论建立攻防模型,但完全信息静态博弈使用场合受限,实用性不强,所以使用不完全信息动态博弈建立攻防模型更贴近实际情况,而以往由不完全信息动态博弈建立的攻防模型认为观测到的攻击策略为真实攻击策略则没有考虑观测到的攻击策略很可能会出现误差。为此,引入最小风险的贝叶斯决策的思想,将防御系统对攻击策略发生误判、错判时,采取的防御策略对系统带来的风险考虑在内,建立了基于不完全信息动态博弈的移动目标最优防御策略模型。该策略模型通过分析防御决策风险大小,使防御策略收益量化更加精准、全面,并利用不完全信息动态博弈的精炼贝叶斯均衡选取最优防御策略。通过实例进行分析,验证了模型的有效性。