Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Considering and analyzing various kinds of cooperation among supply chain members is an option for better managing each channel. It is noteworthy that in many real‐world cases, each of vertical and horizontal cooperation has an important role in the success of supply chains. Nevertheless, only vertical cooperation in most previous research is considered. This paper addresses both vertical and horizontal cooperation in two competitive reverse supply chains, each of which includes one collector, one remanufacturer, and one retailer. Our primary concern is to analyze quality improvement competition between the remanufacturers. Moreover, retail price competition between the retailers and the quality competition are simultaneously considered in the extended model. In this research, the investigated system has been analyzed under different structures including decentralized, centralized, horizontal cooperation, and coordinated decision‐making models. The results show that when the remanufacturers cooperate horizontally, the profit of each collector and that of the retailer will decrease compared with those in the decentralized structure. To overcome this problem, a new coordination contract named multiple‐link two‐part tariff is proposed to simultaneously coordinate the members of each chain. The proposed contract effectively convinces the remanufacturers to participate in the coordination model instead of the horizontal cooperation. Moreover, it provides a win–win–win condition for all chain members and improves the quality level of the remanufactured products. The results indicate the proper performance of the proposed contract in improving the benefits of the competing chains, especially when there exists no intense competition between the remanufacturers (i.e., when the market sensitivity to the quality of the remanufactured products is low and consequently less effort is needed to increase the quality of the remanufactured products). Moreover, the proposed contract not only is able to simultaneously increase both remanufactured products demand and of end‐of‐life products supply but also involves both economic and environmental benefits.     

Robust supply chain design under uncertain demand in agile manufacturing

This paper considers a supply chain design problem for a new market opportunity with uncertain demand in an agile manufacturing setting. We consider the integrated optimization of logistics and production costs associated with the supply chain members. These problems routinely occur in a wide variety of industries including semiconductor manufacturing, multi-tier automotive supply chains, and consumer appliances to name a few. There are two types of decision variables: binary variables for selection of companies to form the supply chain and continuous variables associated with production planning. A scenario approach is used to handle the uncertainty of demand. The formulation is a robust optimization model with three components in the objective function: expected total costs, cost variability due to demand uncertainty, and expected penalty for demand unmet at the end of the planning horizon. The increase of computational time with the numbers of echelons and members per echelon necessitates a heuristic. A heuristic based on a k-shortest path algorithm is developed by using a surrogate distance to denote the effectiveness of each member in the supply chain. The heuristic can find an optimal solution very quickly in some small- and medium-size cases. For large problems, a “good” solution with a small gap relative to our lower bound is obtained in a short computational time.     

Evaluation of sourcing contracts in wood supply procurement using simulation

Procurement operations in forest companies are exposed to various risks, which may increase procurement costs. Examples of risks are the contract's unreliability and contract breach. Deterministic planning models cannot perfectly reflect the complexities of real-world applications in the presence of sourcing risks when the future is uncertain. In practice, forest industries use contracts to guarantee the wood supply. Monthly forecasts are prepared for the delivery volume and are primarily based on the experience of procurement staff and the total volume of contracts. Missed deliveries in the contracts lead to a mismatch between the supply and demand for wood fiber and increase the costs of procurement as a result of high inventory costs or expensive purchases from the open market. Previous studies on simulating the impact of sourcing risks on procurement operations have been conducted; however, none have addressed the selection of procurement contracts in the presence of sourcing risks. In forest industry, numerous suppliers are available with sourcing contracts. Each contract possesses its own characteristics such as flexibility, volume, schedule, and price of delivery. A Monte Carlo simulation approach is implemented to analyze the behavior of a deterministic planning approach. Random events are generated by formulating different types of sourcing risks, having either short- or long-term impact. The simulation is embedded with a deterministic planning model in each period. Results showed that management of sourcing risks is easier with flexible contracts than with fixed contracts, despite their higher purchasing cost.     

价格折扣契约下应对突发事件下的闭环供应链协调策略

针对MRCRM模式下的闭环供应链,在考虑随机性基础上,分析了价格折扣契约对闭环供应链的协调作用,对于突发事件可能造成闭环供应链协调被打破的问题,提出了具有抗突发事件性的价格折扣契约,使之能实现对突发事件的协调应对,最后应用一个算例对比加以说明。     

考虑服务竞争的O2O 供应链决策与协调

O2O 模式下的双渠道供应链颠覆了传统的渠道价格竞争模式、价格协同机制和服务水平, 已成为决策的关键要素. 当供应链发生需求和服务替代系数突变时, 通过KKT条件求出不同扰动情形下制造商垂直O2O 供应链和零售商水平O2O 供应链的决策值, 然后设计了两部定价契约协调需求和服务替代系数同时扰动下的O2O 供应链. 研究表明, 两部定价契约可以协调零售商O2O 供应链, 当突变范围较大时, 作为博弈主导方的零售商将放弃加价销售,转向收取固定的转移支付.

     

Supply chain coordination for a deteriorating item with stock and price‐dependent demand under revenue sharing contract

This paper deals with an integrated single‐manufacturer single‐retailer supply chain model for a single item. The market demand is assumed to be dependent on both the on‐hand stock and price, and the manufacturer and the retailer are in an agreement of lot‐for‐lot policy. The proposed model is developed under the contract that the retailer offers the manufacturer a percentage of revenue (s)he generates by selling a lot. We determine optimal policies for both the centralized and decentralized coordination systems. A comparison of these policies is made with a numerical example. Sensitivity analysis is performed to examine the stability of the solution.     

Supply chain network equilibrium with revenue sharing contract under demand disruptions

Contract is a common and effective mechanism for supply chain coordination, which has been studied extensively in recent years. For a supply chain network model, contracts can be used to coordinate it because it is too ideal to obtain the network equilibrium state in practical market competition. In order to achieve equilibrium, we introduce revenue sharing contract into a supply chain network equilibrium model with random demand in this paper. Then, we investigate the influence on this network equilibrium state from demand disruptions caused by unexpected emergencies. When demand disruptions happen, the supply chain network equilibrium state will be broken and change to a new one, so the decision makers need to adjust the contract parameters to achieve the new coordinated state through bargaining. Finally, a numerical example with a sudden demand increase as a result of emergent event is provided for illustrative purposes.     

基于以太坊和动态定价的数据交易模式研究

为了解决现有数据交易模式中交易流程耗时较大且效率较低,信息泄露和公平支付问题,提出一种改进的数据交易模式,通过智能合约预置额外的约束条件,集成了数据交易和仲裁纠纷解决的功能,用于实现交易的公平自治性和交易时间控制,以规避数据交易过程中恶意交易行为。在此基础上,为实现所提出的数据交易模式中价格的动态平衡,基于经济建模方法和动态定价的公平合理性,设计一个自动平衡总供给和总需求的动态定价机制,依据购买需求和数据资源的市场供给进行价格动态调整。从模型的动态性对模型进行了论证,证明了交易价格和需求可以收敛。基于以太坊实验环境部署并执行该合约,并对该智能合约的各功能成本和安全性进行测试和分析。仿真实验结果表明,该改进交易模式在动态定价下能够以较低的执行成本进行数据交易,并且该智能合约存在较少代码漏洞,满足可行性和安全性要求。     

基于LA型供应商的易逝品供应链价格补贴契约

针对由单个损失厌恶型供应商和单个风险中性型零售商组成的供应链系统,在前景理论框架下,研究了存在缺货损失下的基于批发价格契约和价格补贴契约的易逝品供应链协调问题。首先分析了分散化供应链系统在批发价格契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策,并将供应商的最优生产量与集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量进行了比较;从理论上严格证明了当供应商的最优生产量小于集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量时,供应商不能通过批发价格契约使得自己的生产量为集中化供应链的生产量。然后分析了在缔结政府提供的价格补贴契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策。研究结果表明,损失厌恶型供应商在批发价格契约下的最优生产量可能偏离系统最优生产量,这时政府可以通过价格补贴契约来协调整个供应链。     

需求和价格时间敏感下供应链应对突发事件

在市场需求和价格同时对响应时间敏感的情况下,研究收入共享契约如何协调供应链应对突发事件．首先,给出了常规情况下供应链协调模型;然后,在突发事件引起需求扰动因子分布函数变化的前提下,详细讨论了突发事件对供应链的影响,并给出了供应链最优应对策略;最后,对原有收入共享契约进行了改进,并证明新契约能够协调供应链,实现突发事件的最优应对．     

模糊需求下的闭环供应链协调机制研究

研究一个由制造商和零售商在模糊需求环境下的两级闭环供应链的协调机制问题。将市场需求视为模糊变量,建立模糊截集理论下的集中决策模型和收益-费用共享契约模型,给出模型中的最优策略,并以三角形模糊变量为例,对模型进行优化。通过数值算例对模型中的参数进行求解,并对分析结论进行验证。研究结果表明,在模糊需求环境下的闭环供应链中,零售商的最优订购量在模糊需求中心点的左、右浮动,并随着零售价格的提高而增加,通过改变收益-费用系数可以实现供应链成员之间的完美协调。     

Supply chain coordination with two production modes and random demand depending on advertising expenditure and selling price

This article discusses production and order as well as advertising coordination issues in a single-manufacturer single-buyer supply chain, where the manufacturer sells a newsvendor-type product through the buyer who faces a random demand depending on advertising expenditure and selling price. The buyer has two ordering opportunities: the one happens before the beginning of the season, and the other takes place at the end of the season. The ordered items are produced by the manufacturer in two production modes for different requirements. The first production mode is relatively cheap but requires a long lead-time, whereas the second is expensive but offers quick response. Under such a setting, the centralised and decentralised decision models are developed, respectively, and the closed form solution to each model is provided as well. Moreover, we point out that the traditional revenue-sharing contract fails to coordinate the supply chain. We thus propose an improved revenue-sharing contract that requests the manufacturer not only shares the buyer's revenue but also bears a portion of the buyer's operating costs. Such a contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate its profit between two parties.     

考虑损失厌恶和锚定心理的供应链订货与协调

为更合理地实现供应链协调的整体最优绩效,以具有损失厌恶和锚定心理的零售商和风险中性的供应商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,探讨回购契约下的供应链订货及协调情况。建立集中和分散决策下考虑零售商损失厌恶和锚定心理的回购契约协调模型,分析了零售商最优订货量与批发价格、回购价格之间的关系,以及各契约参数对回购价格和各节点利润的影响,并给出了供应链实现协调需要达成的条件。结果表明,当零售商订购的产品为高利润产品时,能够实现供应链整体最优绩效,达到供应链协调,且利润在供应链双方之间的分配随着批发和回购价格的提升而向供应商倾斜,但零售商损失厌恶和锚定心理的加深会使得供应商提升回购价格,使整体供应链的利润下降,成本费用增加。     

Production planning and backup sourcing strategy of a buyer-dominant supply chain with random yield and demand

This paper studies the backup sourcing strategy of the buyer and the production planning of the supplier in presence of both random yield and random demand. Since the production is susceptible to the randomness of yield beyond the control of the supplier, the buyer may access to a backup sourcing option for the finished items. We analyse the value of backup sourcing for both the decentralised and centralised channels. Backup sourcing strategy of the buyer may lower the supply chain's performance. We show that the order quantity of the buyer does not change the stocking factor of the supplier's input. Meanwhile, compared with the centralised operation, the decentralised operation is more dependent on the backup sourcing to reduce supply shortage of the contracting supplier. From the channel's perspective, an incentive scheme is developed to facilitate the coordination of both the buyer and the contracting supplier, we show that the proposed option contract can allow the supply chain members to share the respective risks involved in the production and selling processes. Finally, we also provide qualitative insights based on numerical examples of the centralised and decentralised solutions.     

市场价格信息不对称的银企融资决策

研究市场价格信息不对称下, 受资金约束的零售商为获取最优订货量从资本市场借贷的供应链运营和融资决策问题. 采用Stackelberg 博弈, 构建并分析混同契约和甄别契约模型. 研究表明: 甄别契约能更好地激励零售商透露真实信息, 使供应链整体利润增加; 银行更偏好高价格零售商以降低借贷风险, 银行在甄别契约下的期望利润总是大于混同契约下的期望利润; 高价格零售商的期望利润受到价格波动和其类型比例的双重影响, 在一定条件下选择甄别契约会得到额外的信息租金.

     

需求随机偏差下带有主从零售商的供应链协调

研究了确定环境下带有主从零售商的供应链协调的基本模型,提出了应急环境下当需求偏差随机发生时集权和分权供应链的最优决策.证明了无论需求随机偏差存在与否都可以运用线性数量折扣合同使得供应链有效达到协调,并相应给出了最优批发单价、最优线性折扣率和转移支付的范围.最后对最优售价、最优总订货量和最优批发单价随需求偏差幅度及其概率的变化进行了仿真分析.     

突发事件下三级供应链联合契约协调

突发事件会对基于随机需求的市场产生巨大的波动，造成供应链系统的不稳定，打破原有的协调。为此，构建了突发事件下供应链协调的应对策略，建立了收益共享-两部收费（RS-TT）联合契约。研究表明：突发事件前，联合契约可以实现供应链的协调；突发事件后，原契约不会起协调作用。因此，对原契约及契约参数进行改进，并通过算例分析验证了改进后的契约可以使供应链达到全局最优的状态且具有抗突发事件性。     

三级跨国供应链应对非常规突发事件决策研究

针对非常规突发事件未引起价格敏感系数发生变化和引起价格敏感系数发生变化两种情形,通过考虑配件供应商的恢复时间、风险储备程度、所在国汇率和市场价格敏感系数的变化以及制造商与销售商之间存在数量折扣契约等因素,研究了集权式与分权式决策情形下的三级组装型跨国供应链的最优决策问题; 分析了数量折扣契约的变化对最优决策的影响,证明了数量折扣契约的抗突发性;通过数值模拟讨论了跨国供应链的最优应对决策。     

需求和价格同时波动零售商损失厌恶的应急数量弹性契约

针对零售商为损失厌恶者的二级供应链, 考虑突发事件导致商品市场需求和市场价格均随机波动, 分别构建应急数量弹性契约的集中和分散决策模型, 得出突发事件下供应链系统实现协调的最优决策, 并探讨契约弹性幅度、批发价和损失厌恶程度的变化对于零售商最优订货策略和供应链上各成员利润的影响. 研究结果表明, 在合理的区间范围内调整契约弹性幅度和批发价均能使得突发事件下的供应链协调发展. 最后通过算例验证了所得结论的正确性.     

Supply chain coordination using time-based temporary price discounts

In this paper, the issue of supply chain coordination (SCC) in a buyer–seller supply chain (SC) with an order size constraint is investigated. The buyer keeps safety stock to cope with lead time demand uncertainties from customers’ side. Unsatisfied demand will be lost. Therefore the whole SC sales volume depends on the service level provided by the buyer. By proposing a time-based temporary price discount in each replenishment cycle, the seller intends to convince the buyer to optimize its safety stock globally. Maximum and minimum discounts, which are acceptable for both parties, are determined and an appropriate discount schedule is derived. A set of numerical experiments are conducted to show performance of the proposed model. The results show that the safety stock coordination is profitable; the proposed model is capable of coordinating supply chain. In addition, the model can share extra benefits between SC members fairly.