供应链渠道协调中的Stackelberg主从对策

针对供应链的渠道协调问题，给出一类供应链Stackelberg主从对策协调机制，其中分销商作为主方给出最小补充期和数量折扣策略，顾客是从方以最优库存策略响应。建立了顾客需求确定下的分销商成本优化模型，同时对比了两种不同数量折扣的协调作用。应用遗传算法对辽化石油分销系统Stackelberg主从对策问题进行离线仿真计算，得出了Stackelberg主从对策均衡解。     

Buyer–vendor coordination for fixed lifetime product with quantity discount under finite production rate

Buyer–vendor coordination has been widely addressed; however, the fixed lifetime of the product is seldom considered. In this paper, we study the coordination of an integrated production-inventory system with quantity discount for a fixed lifetime product under finite production rate and deterministic demand. We first derive the buyer’s ordering policy and the vendor’s production batch size in decentralised and centralised systems. We then compare the two systems and show the non-coordination of the ordering policies and the production batch sizes. To improve the supply chain efficiency, we propose quantity discount contract and prove that the contract can coordinate the buyer–vendor supply chain. Finally, we present analytically tractable solutions and give a numerical example to illustrate the benefits of the proposed quantity discount strategy.     

Simultaneous coordination of order quantity and reorder point in a two-stage supply chain

In this paper, we investigate the simultaneous coordination of order quantity and reorder point in a two-stage supply chain (SC). While coordination of order quantity has received much attention in the supply chain management literature, coordination of the reorder point has been less-studied. The retailer's reorder point has a direct impact on product availability and customer service level (CSL) and therefore has a great impact on SC profitability. Our proposed model adopts a two-stage SC with stochastic demand and lead times over multiple periods. The proposed coordination model assures global optimization of order quantity–reorder point decisions. Using a pricing scheme with a discount factor, we extract conditions in which both downstream and upstream members have sufficient motivation to participate in the coordination scheme. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed model can achieve channel coordination. Results of the modeling and analyses show that coordination of both reorder point and order quantity can lead to increased SC profitability as well as CSL improvement.     

Supply chain coordination model with controllable lead time and service level constraint

We consider the coordination issue in a decentralized supply chain composed of a vendor and a buyer in this paper. The vendor offers a single product to the buyer who is faced with service level constraint. In addition, lead time can be reduced by added crashing cost. We analyze two supply chain inventory models. The first one is developed under decentralized mode based on Stackelberg model, the other one is developed under centralized mode of the integrated supply chain. The solution procedures are also provided to get the optimal solutions of these two models. Finally, a price discount mechanism is proposed to induce both the vendor and the buyer to accept the centralized model. The feasibility and efficiency of the proposed models are manifested by numerical examples and some managerial implications are highlighted.     

Channel coordination with price discount mechanism under price‐sensitive market demand

This paper considers a two‐echelon supply chain with single vendor single buyer for trading a single product. The buyer's demand has been assumed to be price‐sensitive. We have assumed three‐level inspection at the vendor's end in order to maintain good quality of the items delivered to the buyer. We have developed models for both decentralized and centralized scenarios and have determined the optimal solution using the basic concepts of analytic geometry and algebra. In addition, we have proposed a price discount mechanism, where the vendor has provided discounts on the purchase cost to the buyer against the buyer's (increased) order quantity. Finally, in order to illustrate and validate the proposed model, a numerical example and sensitivity analysis is carried out, which has provided some important managerial implications. It has been observed from the numerical study that the proposed price discount policy coordinates the supply chain and has improved the profitability of the supply chain and its members.     

A multi-objective quantity discount and joint optimization model for coordination of a single-buyer multi-vendor supply chain

Supply chain management is concerned with the coordination of different parts of the production system. Companies have realized that they must closely collaborate with the suppliers of their strategic components or products. Recently, developing integrated inventory models for the supplier selection problem has attracted a significant amount of attention amongst researchers. In these models some incentives are required from the vendors to motivate the buyer to change his (her) policies to the policy which is optimal for the entire system. Quantity discount policies are used as common incentives in the literature. However, the literature on this problem does not incorporate quantity discount into the coordination model. This paper develops a multi-objective mixed integer nonlinear programming model to coordinate the system of a single buyer and multiple vendors under an all-unit quantity discount policy for the vendors. Due to the complexity of the problem two well known meta-heuristic algorithms are proposed to solve the problem. An illustrative example is given to show the behavior of the model. Results obtained from solving the sample problems show good performance of the proposed algorithms in finding the optimal solutions.     

A cooperative exchanging mechanism among seller agents for group-based sales

Agent-mediated electronic markets have been a growing area in intelligent agent research and development in recent years. Agents can act autonomously and cooperatively in an electronic market on behalf of their users. In such an electronic market, if a seller agent does not have enough of a particular item, it misses the opportunity to sell the item. Buyers also miss the opportunity to purchase the item. Namely, the overall negotiation utility is decreased. Thus, we propose a new cooperation mechanism among seller agents based on exchanging their goods in our agent-mediated electronic market system, G-Commerce. In G-Commerce, seller agents and buyer agents negotiate with each other. In our model, seller agents cooperatively negotiate in order to sell goods in stock. Buyer agents cooperatively form coalitions in order to buy goods based on discount prices. Seller agents’ negotiations are completed by using an exchanging mechanism for selling goods. Our experiments show that this exchanging mechanism enables seller agents to sell goods in stock effectively. We also demonstrate how our exchanging mechanism satisfies Pareto optimality.     

Single-vendor multi-buyer discount pricing model under stochastic demand environment

In this paper, a single-vendor multi-buyer discount pricing model has been developed under stochastic demand information. The vendor offers multiple pricing schedules to encourage the buyers to adopt the global optimal policy instead of their individual optimal ordering policy. The global optimal solution ensures that each buyer is assigned to the best schedule with maximum benefit. The results show that coordination benefit increases with increase in the number of pricing schedules. However, the system performance deteriorates with increasing demand variability and service level. Hence, if the system contains high degree of uncertainty or each buyer sets her service level too high, coordination through discount policy may not be an efficient mechanism to enhance channel profitability.     

Cost allocation model for optimizing supply chain inventory with controllable lead time

The coordination issue of a decentralized supply chain composed of a vendor and a buyer is considered in this paper. The vendor offers a single product to the buyer and the lead time can be controllable with adding crashing cost. Two supply chain inventory models with controllable lead time under different decision modes are considered, one is proposed under decentralized model based on Stackelberg model, the other is proposed under centralized model of the integrated supply chain. The solution procedures are also suggested to get the optimal solutions of these two models. In addition, an asymmetric Nash bargaining model based on satisfaction level is also developed to get the best cost allocation ratio between the vendor and the buyer by taking their individual rationalities into consideration. The results of numerical example show that shortening lead time reasonably can reduce inventory cost and the cost allocation model based on satisfaction level developed in this paper is effective.     

Coordinating orders in a two echelon supply chain with controllable lead time and ordering cost using the credit period

In this research, a coordination mechanism based on a credit period in a two echelon supply chain with one buyer and one supplier, is designed. The buyer is faced with uncertain demand by coping with normal distribution. Both lead time and ordering cost for receiving his order can be reduced at an added cost; in other words, they are controllable. The optimization models with and without integration are proposed. Then a way to coordinate orders in supply chain based on the credit period so that the total cost of supply chain would be minimized is designed. By using this mechanism we also discuss how the credit period is to be determined in order to achieve channel coordination and a win-win outcome. Finally, numerical examples are solved to illustrate the theoretical results and obtain the managerial insights.     

需求随机偏差下带有主从零售商的供应链协调

研究了确定环境下带有主从零售商的供应链协调的基本模型,提出了应急环境下当需求偏差随机发生时集权和分权供应链的最优决策.证明了无论需求随机偏差存在与否都可以运用线性数量折扣合同使得供应链有效达到协调,并相应给出了最优批发单价、最优线性折扣率和转移支付的范围.最后对最优售价、最优总订货量和最优批发单价随需求偏差幅度及其概率的变化进行了仿真分析.     

Coordinated ordering decisions for products with short lifecycle and variable selling price

The supplier–buyer coordination is an important policy in the supply chain management. The buyer in the two-echelon inventory system with regular selling season has to face the uncertainty of customer demand, supplier’s delivery time and variable price change. At the same time, the supplier has to consider the inventory holding and delay cost. The objective of this study is to develop an integrated supply chain strategy for products with short lifecycle and variable selling price to entice cooperation. The strategy must provide a win–win situation for both the supplier and the buyer. A numerical case example, sensitivity analysis and compensation mechanism are given to illustrate the model.     

A supply chain contract with flexibility as a risk-sharing mechanism for demand forecasting

Demand forecasting is one of the main causes of the bullwhip effect in a supply chain. As a countermeasure for demand uncertainty as well as a risk-sharing mechanism for demand forecasting in a supply chain, this article studies a bilateral contract with order quantity flexibility. Under the contract, the buyer places orders in advance for the predetermined horizons and makes minimum purchase commitments. The supplier, in return, provides the buyer with the flexibility to adjust the order quantities later, according to the most updated demand information. To conduct comparative simulations, four-echelon supply chain models, that employ the contracts and different forecasting techniques under dynamic market demands, are developed. The simulation outcomes show that demand fluctuation can be effectively absorbed by the contract scheme, which enables better inventory management and customer service. Furthermore, it has been verified that the contract scheme under study plays a role as an effective coordination mechanism in a decentralised supply chain.     

基于需求偏差的供应链协调问题

分析了单供应商和单零售商组成的供应链在需求预测偏差下的协调问题.当市场规模和价格敏感系数同时发生变化时,为使供应链收益最大,提出了调整生产计划和零售价格的协调机制.进一步证明了利用数量折扣机制可协调需求偏差下的分权供应链,而且该机制还实现了供应链收益在供应商和零售商间的任意分配.最后进行了实例分析.     

B2B在线市场运作、协调与优化问题研究进展

分析了在线市场的传媒背景、信息透明度和传媒多样性问题，并分析了在线市场的协调策略和供应链合同策略问题．作为B2B在线市场的主流模式，重点分析了以采购商为中心的B2B在线市场，特别是其中的供应链协调，如回购退货协调、远期和现货合同协调问题．进一步分析了以供应商和第三方为中心的B2B在线市场的运作、协调与优化问题．最后，提出了B2B在线市场运作比例和规模、双边际化和牛鞭效应、供应链合同、资金财务策略和信息共享环境下的协调等若干需深入探讨的问题．     

On coordination under random yield and random demand

This paper analyzes coordination in a supply chain with random yield and random demand (SCRYRD). We study wholesale price, buy-back, revenue share, quantity discount and quantity flexibility contracts. We show that the randomness in the yield does not change the coordination ability of the contracts but affects the values of the contract parameters. In particular, all contracts are shown to coordinate the supply chain under voluntary compliance except the wholesale price contract. We also provide a sensitivity analysis of the optimal policy parameters to the cost and demand parameters.     

供应商驱动下异质零售商的量折扣协调机制

为解决多个异质零售商的订货策略及系统利润分配问题,提出了一种市场年总需求有限情形下的量折扣协调方法。理论分析表明,量折扣策略能保证零售商积极响应合作决策下的最优订货量,并有效提高渠道效益至一体化时的最优水平,供应链成员收益达到pareto改善,实现了供应链系统的完美协调。通过数值算例对上述结论作了进一步释义与分析。     

A multi-agent system model for supply chains with lateral preventive transshipments: Application in a multi-national automotive supply chain

In this study, a multi-agent system model is developed to observe the effects of ordering parameters on a supply chain with lateral preventive transshipments. The proposed model involves ordering and premium freight bidding processes of the agents. The model is implemented to a multi-national supply chain considering both supply and demand side uncertainties. Effects of safety stock and supplier flexibility levels on performance are examined by simulation from both agent and system-wide perspective. The results reveal the viability of the proposed model.     

Coordinating supplier׳s reorder point: A coordination mechanism for supply chains with long supplier lead time

In this paper, the issue of the upstream stochastic lead time in supply chain (SC) is investigated. A coordination mechanism is developed for reducing the harmful effect of upstream lead time. The supplier stochastic lead time can substantially harm the whole supply chain service level, especially when it is accumulated with downstream stochastic lead times. In this study, aggregation of both the supplier and the retailer stochastic lead time is analyzed in a two-stage supply chain (SC). To dampen harmful effects of a long aggregate lead time, a ‘per order extra payment’ model is developed for convincing the supplier to increase its reorder point. Numerical experiments show that coordinating the supplier׳s reorder point creates a significant profit for the whole supply chain. In addition, the proposed model is capable of optimizing the supplier׳s reorder point and fairly sharing the extra benefits. Some conditions are also extracted, under which the proposed model shows good performance.     

Coordination policy for a two-stage supply chain considering quantity discounts and overlapped delivery with imperfect quality

Unlike the traditional integrated supplier–buyer coordination model, this research incorporates overlapped delivery and imperfect items into the production–distribution model. This model improves the observable fact that the system might experience shortage during the screening duration and also takes quantity discount into account. This approach has not been discussed in previous integrated supplier–buyer coordination models. The expected annual integrated total cost function is derived and properties and theorems are explored to help develop an algorithm. A solution procedure, free from the convexity associated with an algorithm is established to find the optimal solution. A numerical example is given to illustrate the proposed procedure and algorithm. A sensitivity analysis is made to investigate the effects of five important parameters (the inspect rate, the annual demand, the defective rate, the holding cost, and the receiving cost) on the optimal solution. Managerial insights are also discussed.