考虑消费者质疑的电商供应链销售模式及区块链应用决策

区块链技术能够有效缓解线上销售导致的消费者对绿色产品的质疑,而不同销售模式会影响制造商的区块链应用决策.基于此,分别在转销和代销模式下,构建制造商未应用/应用区块链的4种电商供应链决策模型,分析消费者质疑下的制造商销售模式选择及区块链应用策略,以及区块链应用对环境及社会福利的影响.研究发现,电商平台拓展市场能力及消费者环保意识的增强,均有利于减弱因消费者质疑以及区块链应用成本增加导致的消极影响.制造商与电商平台仅在佣金率适中时同时倾向代销模式,且消费者质疑与区块链应用成本的增加均会使得双方共同偏好代销模式的可能性变小.只有当区块链应用成本较小或消费者质疑程度较高时,制造商与电商平台才能从区块链应用中获益,并且转销模式下双方获益的阈值区间始终更大.即使制造商应用区块链能够提高产品绿色设计水平及其利润,也不一定能起到减弱产品环境总影响以及增加社会福利的作用.     

考虑产品绿色度的制造商销售模式选择研究

针对电商平台销售渠道背景下制造商的销售模式选择问题,在一个绿色产品制造商和一个平台商组成的供应链中,考虑产品绿色度,运用Stackelberg博弈理论建立不同决策模型,研究制造商引入电商平台渠道的条件、最优销售模式和产品绿色度。研究发现：制造商不引入电商平台渠道,只通过自建网络直销渠道销售绿色产品时,产品绿色度最低;引入电商平台渠道可以激励制造商提升产品绿色度。代销模式下,产品绿色度最高,制造商的利润也最多;消费者对产品绿色度敏感程度的增强会促使制造商提升产品绿色度,但绿色投资成本的增加会降低制造商生产绿色产品的积极性。     

考虑Showrooms效应的供应链定价与渠道模式策略

构建双渠道和线上到线下(O2O)两种模式下的供应链博弈模型,研究Showrooms效应影响下的供应链定价和渠道模式策略选择问题.研究结果表明:无论何种渠道模式,Showrooms效应和线下展厅服务使得制造商和零售商提高线上和线下渠道的零售价格;双渠道模式下制造商将降低批发价格,而O2O模式下制造商不一定降低批发价格.线下展厅服务和Showrooms效应可以增加线上、线下渠道和总需求量,实现零售商利润增加,零售商会提供线下展厅服务并愿意接受O2O模式.只有当Showrooms效应较小时,制造商选择O2O模式,此模式在大部分条件下可以提高供应链运作效率.因此,当Showrooms效应和线上渠道需求比例满足一定条件时,O2O模式是制造商和零售商的一致选择,从而实现由双渠道模式到O2O模式的成功转型.     

BOPS模式下基于成本共担契约的供应链协调策略

随着线上线下融合的全渠道零售兴起,线上购买线下自提(buy online and pickup in store, BOPS)模式成为供应链管理领域的热点问题.针对由制造商与具有销售努力行为的线下零售商构成的提供BOPS服务的全渠道供应链,构建BOPS销量计入线上渠道和BOPS销量计入线下渠道整合模型,探讨不同BOPS销量整合模式下供应链的定价及销售努力策略,进一步分析基于销售努力成本共担机制实现全渠道供应链的协调问题.研究结果表明:基准情形下的集中决策有助于提高销售努力水平并提升供应链整体绩效;分散决策中BOPS销量计入线上渠道能让供应链系统获利更多.在满足参与约束的前提下,不同BOPS销量整合模型中成本共担契约的实施均能够缓解双重边际化效应,激励零售商提高销售努力水平,实现供应链系统收益的帕累托改进.     

制造商的线上销售模式选择和合作广告研究

基于一个制造商和一个网络零售商组成的供应链，考虑零售价格和广告水平对需求的共同影响，依据销售模式的不同以及是否开展合作广告建立四种Stackelberg博弈模型。通过对比分析渠道成员在不同模型下的均衡利润，研究制造商的销售模式选择以及其与网络零售商的合作广告决策。研究发现：代销模式下，开展合作广告对制造商和网络零售商均有利；转销模式下，制造商应分担少于一半的广告费用来获得更多利润，而这将损害网络零售商的利润；无论是否开展合作广告，制造商选择代销模式可获得更多利润；不开展合作广告时，网络零售商在转销模式下获利更多，而开展合作广告时，网络零售商在何种销售模式下获利更大取决于广告投入分担率的大小。     

O2O商业模式——电子商务进入一个新阶段

广义的Online To Offline,包括利用线上品牌带动线下销售;也包括利用线上渠道扩展线下渠道,以数据业务带动传统业务(如连锁经营、旅游等).狭义的O2O模式,指深层次的线上线下融合,是战略层次的融合,是模式创新.     

基于多渠道供应链博弈的线上价格策略

对一个开辟线上直销渠道的制造商和一个双渠道零售商组成的供应链系统，考虑线下渠道促销努力及消费者搭便车行为，在零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈下，就线上价格是否一致，研究了各渠道的定价策略。结果表明：当制造商线上渠道基本市场份额较大时，对制造商和零售商来说，线上价格不一致是最优策略。当制造商线上渠道基本市场份额较小时，双方都倾向拥有线上价格的决定权；并且当制造商承担部分促销成本时，零售商能接受制造商决定线上价格。     

移动互联网时代O2O融合发展研究

随着移动互联网的迅猛发展,客户接触产品或服务购买的渠道越来越多样化,这让以"Brick+Click"线下渠道为主的传统企业不得不纷纷涉"电"。如何定位线下渠道与线上渠道关系,并让两者有机融合、有序发展成为摆在传统企业面前亟待解决的难题。本文分析了传统企业进入互联网领域的风险、线上线下渠道的定位、线上线下渠道融合的必要性及难点,提出了线上线下渠道融合发展的演进路径及融合策略,并给出渠道融合应用场景示例。     

米卡会:选择比努力更重要

随着整个社会商业环境的网络化,消费者、渠道、厂家三者同时面临变革,汽车后市场厂家发展电商已是必然,可是,发展纯线上电商所带来的线上线下价格双轨制、渠道冲突等各种痛点却一直让厂家难以承受。"传统销售+O2O电商拓展"这种"1+1"的发展模式已经成为厂家发展的唯一出路。但O2O的线上、线下应该如何布局?O2O电商平台是自建?还是合作?后市场厂家还得面对两难抉择。     

低碳环境下双渠道供应链线上线下广告策略的微分博弈分析

以一个由绿色制造商与零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,基于微分博弈分别比较分析集中式决策、采用竞争型广告策略的分散式决策与采用支持型广告策略的分散式决策模型下,双渠道供应链的最优均衡决策与最优利润.研究发现:集中式决策下的最优低碳水平、最优线上与线下广告水平均高于分散式决策,而产品最优销售价格可能高于、等于或低于分散式决策;分散式决策下,采用支持型广告策略的双渠道供应链的产品最优低碳水平、最优销售价格和最优线上广告投入水平与采用竞争型广告策略的双渠道供应链均衡策略一致;一定条件下,支持型广告策略使得分散式双渠道供应链得到Pareto改进,此时的最优线下广告投入水平优于竞争型广告策略下的最优线下广告投入水平.     

供应受限和需求不确定环境下制造商技术选择

基于有限产能供应商既供应高技术原材料给自有制造商又供应给下游制造商的供应链结构,研究在供应受限和需求不确定情况下供应商的渠道分布策略和制造商的最优订购以及高低技术选择策略.结果表明:1)供应商的高技术材料生产能力充足时,供应商采用双渠道分布策略,制造商高技术材料的订购数量随供应商生产能力减少而减少,且当低技术需求低于一定临界值时,制造商选择高技术;2)当中等较短缺时,供应商仍为双渠道策略,不同于充足情况的是供应商先满足制造商的订购数量,再将剩余的生产能力用于自有生产,供应受限降低制造商的订购数量和利润;3)短缺时,当制造商的销售价格大于供应商的销售价格时,供应商采用只供应制造商策略,当满足低技术需求小于临界值时,制造商则采用高技术策略,反之,当供应商的销售价格大于制造商的销售价格时,供应商采用垄断策略,制造商只能选择低技术策略.最后,通过案例分析验证模型的有效性,所得结论对供应受限和需求不确定下供应商和制造商的运营实践具有较好的参考价值.     

产品质量信息不对称时基于信号博弈的期权预售策略

预售期到达的策略消费者与制造商之间产品质量信息不对称,制造商可以通过不同的预售策略和预售价格设置,影响消费者对产品质量的判断和购买时机的选择.基于信号传递博弈理论,构建产品质量信息对称和不对称时的博弈模型,给出质量信息不对称时制造商实现分离均衡和混同均衡的边界条件.结果表明:制造商产能较大时,期权预售本身可以作为高产品质量制造商的信号传递工具;消费者判断产品质量为高质量的先验概率足够大时,高产品质量制造商倾向于实现混同均衡隐藏质量信息,反之倾向于实现分离均衡,通过较高的行权价格传递质量信息.最后进一步探讨预售期时长对消费者等待成本的影响,结果表明等待成本相对较低时上述结论依然成立.     

Marketplace or reselling: the pricing decisions and face value of the coupons under the Cap-and-Trade regulation

This paper considers a manufacturer selling his products with the marketplace or the reselling mode under the cap-and-trade regulation. Coupons are allocated when selling the products. We explore the optimal decisions, the selection and the coordination with the two modes. First, we analytically find that the increase of the cap and platform power (commission rate) increases (decreases) the total production quantity and the optimal production quantity for coupon-sensitive consumers, and interestingly find that it reduces (increases) the production quantity for coupon-insensitive consumers when the sensitivity of the coupons is high. Furthermore, the optimal profit of the manufacturer first increases and then decreases with the cap when the emission intensity is low, and it increases with the cap when the emission intensity is high. Second, the marketplace mode creates more (less) profits for the manufacturer if the order-fulfillment cost is low (high). Whether the marketplace mode or the reselling mode will generate more carbon emission depends on the commission rate and the platform power. Finally, the marketplace mode is not capable of coordinating the manufacturer and the platform at all times, while the reselling mode can coordinate the two firms after considering a coupon-sharing contract under considerable platform power, and they can achieve Pareto improvement with a two-part tariff contract under the generalized Nash bargaining framework.     

Optimal distribution channel strategy for new and remanufactured products

The market for remanufactured products is large and growing rapidly, accelerated by the widespread popularity of internet sales and online auctions. Whereas extant remanufacturing research focuses primarily on such operations management issues in collecting of end-of-life products, remanufacturing technologies, production planning, and inventory control, we consider an operations-marketing interaction issue by identifying the optimal channel structures for marketing new and remanufactured products. Specifically, based on observations from current practice, we consider three channel strategies a dominant manufacturer can adopt: (1) marketing both new and remanufactured products through an independent retailer; (2) marketing the remanufactured products through the independent retailer, while controlling the new product sales by using its own online channel; (3) marketing the remanufactured products through the manufacturer-owned online channel, while selling new products through the independent retailer. Our results show that the manufacturer prefers to differentiate new and remanufactured products by opening a direct online channel, no matter how the system parameters change. However, which type of products (new or remanufactured) the manufacturer should sell through the online channel depends on the cost saving from remanufacturing, the customer’s acceptance of remanufactured products and the online inconvenience cost. Furthermore, this paper shows that, compared with channel strategy I where the manufacturer sells both new and remanufactured products through an independent retailer, this dual channel strategy benefits the end consumers, but might do harm to the retailer and the total supply chain in some situations.     

基于云平台的共享制造模式定价策略

在共享制造背景下,设备制造商可以通过两种方式向消费者提供服务:直接出售生产型设备给消费者,通过云平台提供制造服务:在购买模式下,讨论消费者的决策行为以及设备制造商的最优定价策略;在服务模式下,采用逆向归纳法分别求解基于商业性云平台(最大化自身收益)和基于公益性云平台(最大化社会总效益)的多阶段动态博弈问题.通过比较两种模式下设备制造商的利润,给出其选择不同商业模式的条件.同时,研究云平台普及率对消费者效用和设备制造商利润的影响,以及两种不同商业模式的环境效益.对于公益性云平台,设计返利机制协调供应链效率.研究表明,当云平台将收益全部返利给消费者时,社会总效益最大.从充分利用社会资源、提高社会经济和环境效益的角度进行分析,为供应链各参与方提供决策参考.     

Downstream horizontal integration and multiunit dealership

In this paper, a game theoretical model featuring a manufacturer and two dealers has been proposed to investigate the belief that horizontal integration in an established network and granting of regional multiunit dealership in a growing network improve the manufacturer's profit. Some of the main results are as follows: (1) the manufacturer and dealers are mutually better off when integration and multiunit dealership lead to an increase in consumer demand through higher prices and better investments in services and national advertising, (2) downstream integration and multiunit dealership harm the manufacturer's profit when the integrated dealer aims to free‐ride the manufacturer's brand or local service has no impact on consumer demand, (3) under certain conditions, both the manufacturer and dealers prefer downstream competition to integration regardless of whether it increases or reduces retail prices. Finally, mechanisms to implement horizontally integrated strategies in an established dealer network made of multiple single‐unit dealers such as the use of resale price maintenance (RPM), exclusive territory agreement, and dealer cuts are discussed.     

The bright side of third-party marketplaces in retailing

A prevalent practice for retailers is to provide a marketplace for third-party sellers (3P sellers) to sell products directly to consumers, charging the sellers a commission fee. This study investigates the downstream retailer's optimal strategy to introduce a 3P seller who sells a substitutable product. We develop a game-theoretic model, through which our first result shows that the retailer introduces a 3P seller only when the marginal costs of the products are in a medium range. Second, the retailer's strategy of introducing a 3P seller may benefit the manufacturer, even though the introduction creates downstream competition that may reduce the sales of the manufacturer's product. This happens because the strategy of introducing a 3P seller can mitigate the double marginalization between the manufacturer and retailer. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that introducing a 3P seller always results in a “win–lose” outcome for the retailer and manufacturer, we derive evidence that introducing a 3P seller can lead to a “win-win” outcome for the retailer and manufacturer and thus improve the channel performance. Lastly, we find that the retailer's 3P seller introduction strategy can also improve the consumer surplus because this strategy increases competition.