信息不对称下多供应商与单零售商的退货策略

研究由多个提供互补组件的供应商和一个组装商组成的报童型供应链中,零售商将需求信息私有化时,供应商如何制定克服信息不对称的退货策略,使得零售商订货量和信息对称情况下供应链最优订货量相等。假设需求分高需求和低需求两种状态,供应商在需求状态未知的情况下给出针对不同需求状态的两个子契约,使得零售商按照实际需求状态而确定相应订货量。首先分析集权型供应链中整个供应链的最优订货量,再分析分权型供应链中零售商的订货决策,进一步分析信息不对称情况下供应商间的博弈及批发价和回收价契约参数的确定方法。通过算例,说明激励零售商按照真实需求状态选择子契约的合理性,供应商制定的退货策略可以克服信息不对称。     

供应商、运输商和购买商的供应链协调研究

随着第三方物流的不断发展,运输商在供应链中的地位日益显著.本文考虑信息完全共享和固定需求函数情况下,对供应商、运输商和购买商组成的供应链的协调问题进行研究.文中首先构建了独立决策模型,得到了供应链各成员的最优定价和最大利润;然后构建了集中化决策模型,证明了集中化决策时供应链总利润大于独立决策时总利润,并在此基础上给出供应链协调策略;最后用算例检验了相关结论.     

考虑服务质量差异和质量敏感的平台入侵研究

在渠道需求受服务质量差异和顾客质量敏感性影响的情况下,考虑平台商是否开辟自营渠道入侵供应商的网上直销渠道,建立平台基础决策模型和平台商入侵决策模型。运用逆向归纳法,得到不同情形下供应商和平台的最优决策和均衡利润,探究了质量敏感性和渠道竞争强度对决策和利润的影响。结果表明:缺乏质量的监管机制,顾客对质量重视度增加并不能激励供应商提升服务质量;随着平台入侵,渠道竞争加剧会增加供应链之间的内部损耗,降低供应链总利润;另外,非平台主导的供应链中,当平台入驻收费策略为内生变量时,入侵策略导致利润损失。     

两种信息条件下制造商基于质量的订购问题

研究了2种不同信息条件下制造商的订购问题,建立了在2种情况下制造商的订购量决策模型.以原材料的质量水平为供应商的决策变量,假设制造商的质量检验水平一定,转移支付和订购量为制造商的决策变量.当供应商隐匿原材料的质量水平时,制造商需要比信息公开时订购更多的量,并且在此情况下,整个供应链的收益要低于信息公开时的供应链收益.     

供应链质量监督问题及其决策

研究了供应链中制造商和购买商的质量监督问题，在Starbird s.提出的模型基础上改进并建立了制造商和购买商的质量成本模型，采用分析方法进行了优化，提出了供应链质量监督策略由制造商的目标质量、生产批量、购买商的最优质量奖励、质量征罚和抽样检验组成，并进行了质量监督决策仿真。结果表明，所建立的模型和提出的质量监督策略是可行的。     

信息不对称时发生突发事件供应链的协调

研究了供应商发生突发事件后,在集中供应链、不存在转移支付时的分散供应链、存在转移支付且零售商订单拖欠成本信息对称与信息不对称的分散供应链四种情况中,使用转移支付协调该供应链.将各种情况进行对比并说明,信息对称时,通过转移支付能够达到供应链的整体最优;信息不对称时,转移支付无法使得供应链达到整体最优.     

不对称信息条件下的供应链突变管理

主要分析了供应链发生中断后,供应商在与分销商信息不对称的背景下如何设计最优合同中各主要参数,以降低自己的期望损失,同时通过理论公式和数据模型分析了信息不对称对最优合同中各要素以及整个供应链系统的影响,并联系实际对不同情况下供应商的合理风险储备提出建议.     

R&D过程中供应商纵向知识溢出决策分析

建立一个供应链成员间知识溢出模型,对R&D过程中供应商纵向知识溢出的原因以及影响因素进行分析.发现供应商纵向知识溢出的决策与供应商和制造商获得的边际收益以及R&D质量对隐性知识投入和显性知识投入的弹性系数有关.供应商的边际收益相对于制造商的边际收益越高(低),供应商越有(没有)动力进行知识投入和溢出.当供应商的知识溢出大于零时,供应商的最优知识溢出与他对质量的影响正相关.     

需求和成本同时发生偏差时供应链协调研究

研究一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链,分别在一体化供应链、分散化供应链发生突发事件的情况下,使用收益共享合约协调该供应链。研究发现,收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链的协调;当突发事件导致价格敏感系数和供应商的生产成本同时与其预测值发生偏差时,原有的协调被打破,改进的收益共享合约可协调价格敏感系数和成本偏差的分权供应链。     

一种多阶段供应商选择的混合整数规划模型

在建立供应链合作伙伴关系中,供应商的选择是供应链管理的一项重要内容.在现有文献的基础上对供应商的选择模型进行了改进,建立了集成单阶段与多阶段供应商选择的混合整数规划模型:既可以选择单阶段供应商,也可选择多阶段供应商即供应商的供应商的供应商等等.在模型中考虑了每个潜在供应商的能力约束,以供应商在产品价格、质量、配送水平等三个方面引起总的客户不满意度最小化作为选优的依据.     

Contract negotiation and risk preferences in dual-channel supply chain coordination

This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member’s risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process.     

Trust-embedded coordination in supply chain information sharing

This paper studies supply chain coordination with trust-embedded cost-sharing contract. In a two-tier supply chain, a retailer (she) and a supplier (he) make their private demand forecasting individually. The retailer places soft-orders, which are costless, non-verifiable and cancellable before shipping, to the supplier. After that, the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information to update his demand evaluation and prepare his capacity. How much the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information is specified by trust, which is a kind of psychological feeling and affected by multiple factors. When the supplier does not fully trust the retailer, he tends to prepare a conservative capacity to avoid over-production. To coordinate the supply chain, a two-stage coordination process is proposed. At the first stage, the supplier and retailer negotiate a cost-sharing rule to bind soft-orders. At the second stage, the retailer places a soft-order and decides whether or not to bind it referring to the cost-sharing rule. After that, the supplier determines his optimal production capacity. We show that the retailer and supplier value trust differently in the experimental studies. We also find that there is a threshold of negotiation power for the supply chain partners which means the supplier’s/retailer’s expected profit drops down if his/her negotiation power exceeds certain thresholds. The experimental studies also show that the proposed the two-stage coordination is effective.     

Supplier credit guarantee loan in supply chain with financial constraint and bargaining

This paper adopts a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework on financial decision. In a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier sells products through a financial constraint retailer. If needed, the retailer gets a short-term financing from a bank by supplier credit guarantee loan (CGL). Through applying the Nash bargaining framework, we formulate two-level game models, i.e. Retailer-Supply System negotiation and Supplier-Bank negotiation. In this paper, we study and discuss the equilibrium order quantity which is affected by initial working capital and interest rate, the retailer-supply system negotiation and upstream wholesale price effects for supply chain performance, the supplier-bank negotiation and interest rate decisions with different capital markets. The results show: (i) there exists loan size limit for financial constraint retailer under CGL. (ii) The upstream wholesale price increase will weaken retailer’s bargaining position, and the supply system may gain or lose depending on the bargaining power. (iii) There exists unique equilibrium sharing ratio in supply system, which means CGL can achieve risk sharing. (iv) Within a supply system, the upstream wholesale price advantage will weaken bank’s profit, whereas supplier may gain or lose depending on his bargaining power.     

存货影响销售量的两阶段供应链的VMI协调

研究在VMI环境下存货影响销售量的单供应商、单零售商的两阶段供应链的协调问题。建立了集中决策下的供应链模型,求出了整体供应链的利润函数;在分散决策下,采用收益共享契约对供应链进行协调,按Stackelberg博弈方式进行建模分析,发现收益共享契约无法协调供应链,即在利益分配上,与供应商相比,零售商获得了更多的供应链收益,而且分散式系统的收益始终低于集中决策下的水平;采用Nash协商对VMI供应链进行协调,完成了供应商和零售商收益的帕累托改进,不仅实现供应链的协调,而且达到了集中决策下的水平,最后通过算例进行了验证。     

弹性需求条件下供应链协作的批发价格机制研究

研究了一类由供应商与分销商组成的两级供应链在弹性需求下的协作机制设计问题.分析了供应商与分销商未进行任何协作时整个供应链的收益情况.在此基础上,对供应商与分销商进行协作时最优订货量与整个供应链的收益进行了分析.研究结果表明双方协作可以提高整个供应链系统的收益,但并不能保证合作各方的收益均会增加.为此,提出了一种基于不对称Nash协商模型的批发价格契约机制来协调合作双方的收益,并进行了数据模拟与综合分析.     

基于讨价还价博弈的ATO供应链零部件生产及补货策略

通过建立ATO供应链中最终产品制造商与其两个供应商间的讨价还价合作模型,研究了ATO供应链的零部件生产补货策略和相应的利润分配策略,并探讨了供应链中各合作主体议价能力对最优解的影响。研究发现,ATO供应链应随着最终产品销售价格的提高而增加零部件产量,随最终产品组装成本或零部件生产成本的提高而减少零部件产量;随着最终产品制造商对其中一个供应商议价能力的增强,该供应商零部件的转移价格及其利润会降低,而另外一个供应商的零部件转移价格和利润会提高;若最终产品制造商比另外一个供应商的议价能力强,其期望利润会得到提高,反之,则会降低。     

A model for performance monitoring of suppliers

The purchasing function is central to the strategic operations of effective supply chain management. This centrality is mainly due to the significant impact of material costs on profits, increased investments in inter-organizational advanced manufacturing and information technologies, and a growing emphasis on the just-in-time operations philosophy. The critical business processes of the purchasing function include supplier selection, negotiation of supply contracts, monitoring supplier performance, and acting as an interface between an organization and its suppliers. Within these core processes of purchasing, this paper narrows its scope to focus upon the supplier performance evaluation and monitoring process, which assists in maintaining effective customer-supplier linkages. While price has been traditionally considered as the single most important factor in evaluating suppliers, it has been agreed upon that value performance emphasis needs to include other important factors such as quality, delivery and flexibility. Given this evolving business competitiveness environment, the contribution of this research is threefold. First, it applies a new multi-criteria evaluation model for supplier performance evaluation by considering various performance criteria. Second, a proposed application extension of this model serves as a monitoring and control mechanism for the performance of suppliers, thus supporting continuous process improvement to achieve efficient customer-supplier relationships. Third, the paper presents this technique as a new methodological extension to data envelopment analysis research by improving the discriminatory power of an existing variable returns to scale model. The model and its application are demonstrated through a previously published illustrative case example.     

Optimal process mean and quality improvement in a supply chain model with two-part trade credit based on Taguchi loss function

The two-part trade credit policy is developed to accelerate cash inflow that can avoid bad debt risk in the earlier economic order quantity (EOQ) models allowing only one period of time for delay in payment. Taguchi loss function has proved to be a more realistic function for fitting the actual quality loss cost in economic product quantity (EPQ) model. To minimise quality loss, optimal process mean setting shifts process mean to balance the cost outside the specification limits, quality improvement applies investment to reduce process variation. Supply chain integration has been proved that it can be used to minimise the entire cost more effectively than independent EOQ or EPQ models. This paper improves the earlier studies by incorporating the above research topics that have not been simultaneously discussed before, develops a supply chain model based on the Taguchi loss function, which combines the trade strategy from the retailer’s perspective and the quality adjustments from the supplier’s perspective to maximise total supply chain profit. We find that the trade credit terms definitely affect suppliers and retailers’ optimal decisions, and numerical examples can provide decision references for supply chain managers to set a trade credit policy and control quality.     

不同契约下考虑公平偏好的供应商创新投入研究

针对一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链,研究供应商公平偏好对其创新投入的影响。引入公平偏好理论,运用Stackelberg博弈,建立批发价格契约、研发成本分担契约和收益共享契约3种契约下的供应链决策模型,对比分析不同契约下公平偏好系数对供应链均衡信息的影响。研究表明,研发成本分担契约下的供应商创新水平、供应链中成员效用及供应链整体效用总高于其他2种契约;收益共享契约下的供应商创新水平和供应链整体效用高于批发价格契约;批发价格契约和收益共享契约下的制造商效用和供应商效用的大小与供应商公平偏好系数以及收益共享契约下的供应商保留效用的大小有关。     

Integrated model for supplier selection and negotiation in a make-to-order environment

The paper deals with the development of an integrated supplier selection and negotiation process for multiple parts/materials procurement. The main objective is to integrate decisions in the internal supply chain of a make-to-order manufacturer. Two main decisions during the negotiation process are considered: (1) the manufacturing planning decision responsible for determining the production schedule and fabrication lot size and (2) the supplier selection decision concerning which suppliers are selected for company business and the order volume allocated to each selected supplier. The model is designed to support the negotiation process by generating a set of effective alternatives in each negotiation period. Its structure is multi-objective and non-linear. The combination of the interactive weighted Tchebycheff method and Benders decomposition method is applied to generate a set of effective alternatives to support the decision-maker in each negotiation period.