政府视角下农田水利设施困境的静态博弈分析

农田水利设施困境表现为农田水利设施的老化失修、损坏严重及其建设资金严重不足、运行维护缺少经费。中央政府与地方政府之间的静态博弈分析显示:中央政府只有加大对地方政府的监督力度并提高监督效率,才能促使地方政府进行农田水利设施的配套资金投入。在目前财政体制下、在农田水利设施投资领域,中央政府很难对地方政府进行有效监督,这是导致农田水利设施困境的重要原因之一。农田水利设施解困的对策在于:改革和完善现行分税制财政体制以加强地方政府投资农田水利建设的财力基础;改革和完善相关法律制度以奠定中央政府对地方政府实施有效监督的制度基础;建立健全中央政府对地方政府农田水利设施投资的监督激励机制。     

水利水电工程设计及管理对投资控制的影响分析

投资控制与水利水电工程设计管理之间的关系非常紧密,正确处理经济与技术两者关系,使水利水电工程效益得到最大发挥。文章就水利水电工程设计和管理中投资控制的重要性进行了分析,并对建设过程中投资控制存在的问题进行了探讨,有针对性地提出了应对措施供参考。     

浅析水利水电工程概预算编制

水利水电工程是国民经济的重要基础设施,是建筑工程的重要组成部分。水利水电工程具有规模大、投资高、包括的建筑物及设备种类繁多、建设周期长、技术复杂及风险因素多等特点。概预算编制工作在水利水电工程基本建设中发挥着无可替代的重要作用,对控制工程投资规模、提高工程投资效益等有重要的意义,是影响水利水电工程造价的关键因素。但是,目前水利水电工程概预算编制工作还存在很多问题,不能对水利水电工程基本建设投资进行有效的监督和控制。因此,如何提高水利水电工程概预算编制质量逐渐成为水利水电工程各参建单位及相关部门关注的焦点。     

信息技术在水利水电工程造价管理中的应用

水利水电工程造价管理是指在水利水电工程建设的全过程中,全方位、多层次地运用经济、技术、法律等手段,对投资行为、工程价格进行预测、分析、计算、监督、管理、控制,达到以尽可能少的人力、物力和财力投入获取最大利益的一系列行为。文章分析了工程造价管理存在的问题,阐述了信息技术在水利水电工程造价管理中的应用。     

水利水电工程环境保护措施落实的保障机制

水利水电工程环境保护日益受到重视,但许多工程的环境保护投资在评估中被较大幅度核减,致使工程的环境保护措施无法完全落实。针对这一问题,本文主要从技术层面深入分析了环境保护投资估算的各个环节及存在的不足,初步提出了通过完善标准体系、加强人员培训,将过鱼与分层取水设施投资纳入环保投资,加强各部门之间的沟通等水利水电工程环境保护措施落实的资金保障机制。     

水利水电工程项目投资管理与造价控制

水利水电工程是国民经济发展必不可少的基础产业,其系统建设过程相当复杂,加之长期受计划经济体制的影响,使得水利水电工程建设投资难以掌控。结合我国水利水电工程投资管理和造价控制的现状,指出在投资管理和造价控制中存在的主要问题,从加强项目前期工作的深度,施工阶段中合理投资控制,以及提高管理水平等方面入手,阐述了有效控制水利水电工程造价的途径。     

水利水电工程造价中单价法预测的探讨

水利水电工程建设是我国经济基础建设之一,水利水电工程大多数技术复杂、规模大,工期长、投资巨大,有着极强的综合性和系统性。当前预测水利工程造价仍沿用了传统的单价法,虽然也做了一定的改进及完善,但是仍然存在一些问题,预测得出的结果经常与实际不符或者存在偏差。本文根据某水利水电工程实例,重点论述了当前单价法预测中的一些问题及改进措施,旨在为相关工程提供参考借鉴。     

水利水电工程管理过程中的质量管理研究

水利水电工程,是属于我国社会发展和经济发展的基础工程,水利水电工程的建设有利于促进我国社会的进步和经济的发展。随着水利水电工程建设项目越来越多,对于水利水电工程在管理中的要求也越来严格,但是目前水利水电工程在质量管理上还存在一些问题。文章通过对水利水电工程管理过程中出现的质量问题进行分析,并针对于问题,提供一些解决措施。     

加强水利水电开发的协调发展

如何实现四川水利水电协调发展？关键是要弄清现状（存在问题）,在此基础上,应加大开发水电的力度;解决好水利水电发展中的热点、难点问题;加强水利水电协调发展研究,进而实现四川真正意义上的水利水电协调发展。     

水利水电工程造价中单价法应用存在的问题及改进策略

水利水电工程具有推动社会经济和农业生产稳步发展的重要作用,是国民经济基础设施的重要组成部分,此类工程投资大、工期长、技术复杂且具有明显的系统性特征。在水利水电工程造价预测中,单价法的应用最为广泛,虽然该方法在以往的工作中得到了不断的优化和改进,但仍存在着一些不尽如人意的问题,不仅不利于项目投资的合理、有效控制,还容易引起不必要的纠纷。文章结合工程实例,对单价法预测中存在的问题进行分析,并以此为依据,就改进策略提出意见和建议。     

The Mekong Game: Achieving an All-win Situation

In recent years, there have been many quarrels among countries of the Mekong River Basin surrounding use of the water resources of that river. In particular, China’s behavior of constructing dams upstream has resulted in objections by many people in all countries downstream. Cooperative game theory has been applied to solving issues of building and utilizing dams on trans-border rivers. The central question is how to allocate the surplus benefits generated by the dams. This paper proposes to achieve an all-win situation in use of Mekong water resources through cooperation. A game named “The Mekong Game” was designed for those Ph.D. students and resource persons to play on the PROSPER.NET’s workshop in 2010. For a hypothetical case in Mekong Game, the Shapley Value Method’s results were given, which could be regarded as one of equitable results in theory, and the Mekong Game’s process and outcomes are introduced in this paper. Participants were divided into six groups representing the six involved “countries.” The process of meeting an agreement with an all-win idea was simulated through three round-table negotiations. For the hypothetical case, different set of results under different situations were compared and discussed, including no dam(s), dam(s) without cooperation, dam(s) with cooperation but without compensation and re-allocation, Shapley Value Method, and Mekong Game (bargaining and negotiation). The results reveal: although it is hard to get theoretical optimal aftermath considering other complicated factors than those can be calculated, the all-win situation is still possible through bargaining and negotiation processes, which should be much better than all-lose situation such as the current one.     

防洪基金博弈研究

应用博弈论对防洪基金机制进行了研究，防洪基金在中国是对中央政府防洪投入的一个重要补充，在对目前的防洪减灾投入体制阐述的基础上，我们建立了博弈模型，用来模拟中央政府和地方政府之间的相互影响和相互作用，此二被认为是防洪减灾的两大主要参与，然后，对上述博弈进行了全面的均衡分析，分不同情况讨论了博弈均衡的存在和均衡结果的性质，从而阐明了允许和支持防洪基金出现的条件，实证分析表明，我们的理论分析结果和我国防洪基金的实际情况是十分吻合的。     

Common pool water resources management considering a regulator interference: A game theory approach to derive managerial policies for Urmia lake,Iran

An increased need for water, combined with a scarcity of water resources, has resulted in serious challenges regarding water resource management. Those issues have always been a major concern of most research regarding the management and operation of water resources. Various qualitative and quantitative methods, Game Theory (GT) being an example, have been proposed for managing common pool water resources. This study adopts GT to address a case of common pool water resource management, including consideration of the interference of a regulator. Urmia lake in north‐western Iran was chosen as an illustration of a common source of water shared between two provinces acting as littoral stakeholders to the lake. Due to a non‐cooperative behaviour of the stakeholders, the lake is most likely to dry up. To change the game situation, a regulator was inserted into the game as a third player. The game among players is investigated in terms of two static and dynamic game methods. Two strategies are defined for each player. The equilibrium point will be achieved according to the strategies adopted by the players. For static games, a low‐level equilibrium under non‐cooperation conditions is obtained. Dynamic games among players are more likely to occur, rather than static games. The equilibrium of high‐level productivity will be obtained under cooperative conditions among the players.     

An Ultimatum Game Theory Based Approach for Basin Scale Water Allocation Conflict Resolution

Increasing water consumption via competitive demands has resulted in serious water conflicts and the subsequent environmental crisis in the Gavkhouni Watershed with the Gavkhouni swamp in the most downstream located in the central part of Iran. In this research, a two-player ultimatum game theory approach is adopted to not only address the water conflicts with the purpose of environmental reclamation of the drying swamp, but also to ensure economic satisfaction for the upstream landowners and farmers. The Ministry of Energy (MoE) and its subsidiary regional water authority represent the responsible organizations for providing water while the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) is the primary body in charge of water consumption in the watershed. MoE and MoA are considered as two players in the game, whereas MoE has more power than MoA in terms of allocating water. Five strategies are studied namely: 1 and 2) decreasing water allocation to irrigated agriculture as much as the annual shortage of the Gavkhouni swamp with and without compensation to MoA (D-L), 3 and 4) decreasing water allocation to irrigated agriculture twice as much the annual shortage of the swamp with and without compensation for MoA (D-2 L) and 5) giving up Gavkhouni swamp’s reclamation plan (D). Moreover, three scenarios regarding the relations between environmental and agricultural utilities are designated. According to the results, D-2 L with paying compensation to MoA is chosen as the best alternative in scenario 1 when the environmental utility was assumed to be greater than the agricultural utility. Ultimatum Game Theory has no final solution for scenarios 2 and 3 where the environmental utility is considered to be equal and smaller than agricultural utility. The swamp’s annual environmental water shortage as 324 million cubic meters is supplied by application of both strategies D-L and D-2 L. Ultimatum Games are efficient in assessment of water conflicts to resolve them through careful and planned negotiations.     

博弈论模型在解决水资源冲突上的运用

水资源短缺和水质恶化是当今众多发展中国家所面临的两个严重问题。与这两个问题有关的水资源管理通常涉及众多的利益相关者。这些利益相关者因为不同的兴趣和利益常常发生冲突。在缺乏水市场和专有财产权利时, 冲突是不可避免的。博弈论是模仿和解决这类冲突的一种有效方法。以汉江流域水资源管理中所涉及的不同利益相关者的冲突为例，展示如何用非合作与合作博弈来模拟和解决水资源冲突。在本研究中，统计学和经济计量学的回归模型法用来构建博弈各方的效益函数，成本效益分析法来比较不同战略下的博弈结果。博弈模拟结果显示,非合作虽然可使某方赢利，但却使整体受损;相反，合作虽然可给某方带来损失，但是却给各方带来整体利益。所以，如果能够把合作所带来的部分净收益从赢利方转向损失方，以补足损失方的损失，博弈各方均能受益。此模拟方法及结果不仅可使水资源不同利益相关者受益，而且在水资源合理分配﹑水价制定﹑生态补偿等方面也可以为水资源管理部门提供决策支持。     

The Financing of Hydropower,Irrigation and Water Supply Infrastructure in Developing Countries

A companion paper in the previous issue of this journal (Briscoe, 1999) describes the changing face of infrastructure financing in developing countries. This paper deals with the financing of major infrastructure in the water-related sectors-hydropower, water supply and sanitation, irrigation, and overall water resources management (including the environment). The overall level of investment in water-related infrastructure in developing countries is estimated to be of the order of $65 billion annually, with the respective shares about $15 billion for hydro, $25 billion for water and sanitation and $25 billion for irrigation and drainage. About 90% of this investment comes from domestic sources, primarily from the public sector. Water-related infrastructure accounts for a large chunk-about 15%-of all government spending. This heavy dependence on the public sector means that the global 'winds of change' in the respective roles of government and the private sector have major implications for the financing and structure of the water economy. The paper describes how each of the 'sub-sectors' is adapting to these winds of change. First, in recent years competition and private sector provision have emerged as the characteristicsof the new electricity industry. This change poses a fundamental challenge to hydro which, to a much greater degree than thermal, has risks (hydrological, geological, social and environmental) which are better assumed by the public than the private sector. The future of private hydro, and thus of hydro itself, depends heavily on the ability of the public sector to both share risks with the private sector, and to provide predictable social and environmental rules of the game. Second, the urban water supply sector is in the early stages of equally profound change. In recent years there has been a dramatic shift towards the private sector, in developed and developing countries alike. An outline of the future shape of a competitive urban water sector is emerging: it is one in which a growing number of private companies will compete with revitalized (and often corporatized) public utilities. Capital will, increasingly, come from the private capital markets, with the critical government role being that of light, transparent benchmarking and regulation. Third, the adaptation to the winds of change is least advanced in the public irrigation sector, which has long been characterized by public financing and 'rent seeking' by bureaucracies, politicians and private beneficiaries. It is only in recent years, and only in a few countries, that the irrigation sector has modernized. In these cases irrigation has become like any other utility, in which accountable, autonomous agencies provide users with the services the users want. In many instances, farmers have become responsible for the costs of operating and maintaining their systems; in some instances they are responsible for meeting the full costs of replacement, rehabilitation and new investments. Where these changes have taken place, there have not only been sharp swings in the relative proportion of private and public spending, but there have been dramatic improvements in the efficiency of investment and operation and, in most cases, major positive environmental impacts.     

基于博弈理论的农村基础设施建设分析

在我国农村基础设施落后的现状下,吸引社会资本进入农村基础设施项目的建设已经成为解决投资不足的一个重要方面。如何有效地激励社会中的企业投资建设,是政府部门急需解决的一个问题。本文依据博弈论的概念和方法,通过建立政府和项目公司之间的博弈模型,分析政府和公司的最优战略问题,对农村基础设施建设项目中政府政策优惠和企业投资进行了...     

Water Costs Allocation in Complex Systems Using a Cooperative Game Theory Approach

The management of complex water resource systems that address water service recovery costs and consider adequate contributions and priorities require methods that integrate technical, economic, environmental, social and legal aspects into a comprehensive framework. In Europe, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 2000/60/EC recommends that the pricing politics in a river basin take into account the cost recovery and the economic sustainability of the water use. However, the current cost allocation methods do not consider the user’s willingness to pay and often do not permit a total cost recovery. Thus, a new approach is required that includes these requirements when defining water rates. This article presents a methodology to allocate water service costs in a water resource system among different users that attempts to fulfil the WFD requirements. The methodology is based on Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) techniques and on the definition of the related characteristic function using a mathematical optimisation approach. The CGT provides the instruments that are necessary to analyse situations that require a cost-sharing rule. The CGT approach can define efficient and fair solutions that provide the appropriate incentives among the parties involved. Therefore, the water system cost allocation has been valued as a game in which it is necessary to determine the right payoff for each player that is, in this case, a water user. To apply the CGT principles in a water resources system, the characteristic function needs to be defined and evaluated using an adequate modelling approach; in this study, it is evaluated using the optimisation model WARGI. (Sechi and Zuddas 2000). The so-called “core” represents the game-solution set. It represents the area of the admissible cost allocation values from which the boundaries on the cost values for each player can be supplied. Within the core lie all of the allocations that satisfy the principles of equity, fairness, justice, efficiency and that guarantee cost recovery. The core of a cooperative game can represent a useful instrument to define the water cost rates. Furthermore, it can be used as a valid support in water resource management to achieve the economic analysis required by the WFD. The methodology was applied to a multi-reservoir and multi-demand water system in Sardinia, Italy.     

水资源优化配置的冲突问题博弈分析

力求通过建立完全信息动态博弈模型求解水资源冲突分析问题．博弈模型主要针对一条河流上、下游为了分享水资源，从各自要求出发，提出的解决方案与流域管理机构进行协调之间的用水冲突问题，力求通过流域管理机构的水资源费率和宏观调控的水权交易价格，求解水资源可持续发展情况下的市场均衡模型．以此达到有水资源费率和水权交易两种调控手段的情况下各决策者追求自身利益的结果．     

Water Diversion from the Great Lakes: Is a Cooperative Approach Possible?

The concern about other states diverting water from the Great Lakes has prompted the Great Lakes States and provinces to adopt institutional arrangements that have effectively blocked any new diversions.Since the current arrangements do not allow diversions, important opportunities may be lost in the future. This article considers the possibility of 'economically desirable diversions' and how the gains should be allocated among the states and provinces to foster cooperation. The study shows that in most cases, new institutional arrangements will be needed before agreements can be reached. Game theory is used to determine how coalitions may be formed to reach cooperative agreements for diversions. Five different lake diversion games are tried involving Lake Ontario, Lake Superior, Lake Erie, Lake Michigan-Huron, and finally, all the lakes together. Diversions from Lake Ontario may offer the best opportunity for cooperation since there are no interlake effects.