博弈论模型在解决水资源冲突上的运用

水资源短缺和水质恶化是当今众多发展中国家所面临的两个严重问题。与这两个问题有关的水资源管理通常涉及众多的利益相关者。这些利益相关者因为不同的兴趣和利益常常发生冲突。在缺乏水市场和专有财产权利时, 冲突是不可避免的。博弈论是模仿和解决这类冲突的一种有效方法。以汉江流域水资源管理中所涉及的不同利益相关者的冲突为例，展示如何用非合作与合作博弈来模拟和解决水资源冲突。在本研究中，统计学和经济计量学的回归模型法用来构建博弈各方的效益函数，成本效益分析法来比较不同战略下的博弈结果。博弈模拟结果显示,非合作虽然可使某方赢利，但却使整体受损;相反，合作虽然可给某方带来损失，但是却给各方带来整体利益。所以，如果能够把合作所带来的部分净收益从赢利方转向损失方，以补足损失方的损失，博弈各方均能受益。此模拟方法及结果不仅可使水资源不同利益相关者受益，而且在水资源合理分配﹑水价制定﹑生态补偿等方面也可以为水资源管理部门提供决策支持。     

水资源利用与排污控制的非合作博弈方法

为在水环境保护优先的前提下保障水资源持续利用,通过分析水资源经济利用主体与水环境保护主体的目标冲突,建立水资源利用与排污控制的讨价还价博弈模型与主从博弈模型,提出水资源利用与排污控制互馈决策的协调方法,并对比分析均衡解与非劣解的内涵与关系.以洞庭湖四口河系地区为研究区域,结果表明:讨价还价博弈和主从博弈方法的均衡解均在...     

城镇供水企业效用优先的许可管制

利用纳什均衡及重复博弈的原理,讨论同一城市多家企业经营城市供水所引发的管网重复建设、资源浪费、无序价格竞争问题,研究管网正反馈因素对城市供水企业博弈结果的影响。阐明了当重复博弈实现合作均衡时,均衡分界点的动态变化趋势,并在减少重复建设等问题的前提下,给出了目前对发放经营许可证数量的政策建议。     

利益相关者的水资源配置博弈

水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。     

Water Resources Allocation Using Solution Concepts of Fuzzy Cooperative Games: Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core

In this paper, two new solution concepts for fuzzy cooperative games, namely Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core are developed. They aim for optimal allocation of available water resources and associated benefits to water users in a river basin. The results of these solution concepts are compared with the results of some traditional fuzzy and crisp games, namely Fuzzy Shapley Value, Crisp Shapley Value, Least Core, Weak Least Core and Normalized Nucleolus. It is shown that the proposed solution concepts are more efficient than the crisp games. Moreover, they do not have the limitation of Fuzzy Shapley Value in satisfying the group rationality criterion. This paper consists of two steps. In the first step, an optimization model is used for initial water allocation to stakeholders. In the second step, fuzzy coalitions are defined and participation rates of water users (players) in the fuzzy coalitions are optimized in order to reach a maximum net benefit. Then, the total net benefit is allocated to the players in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Least Core, Fuzzy Weak Least Core and some traditional fuzzy and crisp games. The effectiveness and applicability of the proposed methodology is examined using a numerical example and also applying it to the Karoon river basin in southern Iran.     

A Fuzzy Variable Least Core Game for Inter-basin Water Resources Allocation Under Uncertainty

In this paper, a new solution concept, called Fuzzy Variable Least Core (FVLC), is developed for fuzzy cooperative games. The FVLC is able to incorporate fuzzy input variables and result in fuzzy benefit shares of players participating in a coalition. This solution concept is used for water and benefit allocation to water users in inter-basin water transfer systems considering the uncertainties associated with their benefit coefficients. In the proposed water allocation methodology, an Integrated Stochastic Dynamic Programming (ISDP) model is developed to obtain the water rights of players and economic water allocation policies. In the next step, the total net fuzzy benefit of the system is reallocated to water users in an equitable and rational way using a FVLC-based model. In this model, a new algorithm is proposed for converting a multilateral cooperative game with fuzzy variables to some fuzzy bilateral cooperative games, which are solved using the FLVC solution concept. The applicability and efficiency of the proposed methodology is examined by applying it to a large scale inter-basin water transfer project in Iran.     

Towards integrated catchment management: increasing the dialogue between scientists,policy‐makers and stakeholders

The aim of the Hydrology for the Environment, Life and Policy (HELP) project is to strengthen the role and inputs of the scientific community in the integrated catchment management process. Water resources management in the 21st century requires a radical reorientation and an effective dialogue between decision‐makers, stakeholders and the scientific water community. This paper offers a skeleton worldview as a starting point for that dialogue by bringing together key issues as identified by water resource experts from different disciplines. Experiences from all over the world demonstrate the need for multistakeholder advocacy and the importance of compromise‐building mechanisms. Water law defines the rules of the game and provides a necessary framework for policy and its execution. However, there must be adequate social acceptance and active compliance, otherwise the formal rules and administrative regulation will not be perceived as legitimate and ultimately could prove ineffective. The challenge now is to create management systems where the formal decision‐makers interact with relevant members of the scientific community, users and other stakeholders for a coordinated approach that successfully orchestrates water uses towards internal compatibility. Integrated water resources management is essential for securing a proper overview of all the activities that depend on the same resource—the precipitation over the basin—and which are internally linked by the mobility of water from the water divide to the river mouth.     

Contribution to decision‐making on establishing the maximum water level for Lake Vegoritida

The water level in Lake Vegoritida, Greece, has undergone great changes over the past decades attributable to severe water abstraction directly from the lake and its catchment, which affected not only the conditions of the natural environment, but also social and economic conditions. The water level of the lake is currently rising, with discussion of an agreeable decision about the desired maximum lake water level becoming a source of conflict among the lake stakeholders. The present study provides a framework for a participatory management plan, with the perspective of engaging all levels of lake stakeholders in the process of deciding and establishing the maximum lake water level. Kolb's learning cycle is used as a methodological vehicle in the proposed process of participatory decision‐making. Its contribution to decision‐making includes (a) identification of lake stakeholders and the issues arising from a potential establishment of a maximum lake water level; and (b) three suggested water level scenarios to facilitate a future constructive discussion directed to establishing a maximum water level in Lake Vegoritida.     

Water Resources Allocation in Transboundary River Basins Based on a Game Model Considering Inflow Forecasting Errors

Dynamic transboundary water resources allocation based on inflow prediction results is an important task for water resources management in river basins. This paper takes the watershed management agency as the leader and the associated area as the follower, and proposes a two-level asymmetric Nash-Harsanyi Leader-Follower game model considering inflow forecasting errors. In the proposed model, the Monte Carlo method is used to analyze the uncertainty of various stakeholder allocation results and the response regularity to the total water resource uncertainty. The quantitative relationship between the allocation results of stakeholders and the mean and standard deviation of total water resource uncertainty is subsequently established. The Huaihe River basin in China is selected as a case study. The results show the following: (1) the water allocated to the watershed management agency and three provinces has a normal distribution when the inflow forecasting error obeys the normal distribution; (2) the sum of the mean of the water allocated to stakeholders equals the mean of the forecast water resource and the sum of the standard deviations of the water allocated to stakeholders equals the standard deviation of the forecast water resource; (3) the mean and standard deviation of the allocation results have a good linear relationship with the mean and standard deviation of forecast water resource; (4) the distribution parameters of the stakeholder allocation results can be directly derived from the distribution parameters of the forecast information, thus aiding the stakeholders in making decisions and improving the practical value of the method.

     

Using Game Theory to Assign Groundwater Pumping Schedules

This paper deals with optimization of extracting groundwater by a number of users (stakeholders) from a common aquifer. The aim is to reduce their pumping cost and the respective energy consumption, taking into account the schedule preferences of the users (e.g. pumping during the day instead of during the night). Moreover, it is postulated that alternate pumping reduces pumping cost. To facilitate the participation of stakeholders in achieving the best alternate pumping schedule, the problem is formulated as an anti-coordination game. Using vertices to represent the players (users) and weighted edges to represent their interactions we have created an algorithm that can be used to get players’ payoffs. Then, assuming that the players are allowed to improve their payoffs by playing consecutive moves, we use our algorithm to find the Nash equilibria of the game. However, not all games converge to the same Nash equilibria, as changing the sequence of the players can result in different solutions. Therefore, we use Genetic Algorithms to find the sequence of the players that minimizes the overall pumping cost or the energy consumption, using the least possible game rounds. The algorithm proposed can be used by researchers and authorities to promote cooperation between well users, leading to financial and environmental benefit.

     

我国节水灌溉利益相关者关系分析

节水灌溉是一项涉及国家、地方、部门、个人之间利益全面调整的综合系统工程,也是一个涉及政府、主管部门、水管单位、用水户等多个利益主体的复杂多重博弈过程。运用马克思主义历史唯物观,分析了我国节水灌溉过程中机构、团体或个人之间的利益关系,从多元动态博弈的视角对节水灌溉利益相关者的博弈行为与博弈结果进行分析,论证了只有充分考虑各利益相关者的利益诉求,引导、激励和规范节水灌溉行为,用水户实施节水灌溉行为,政府、主管部门、水管单位和用水户才能同时获得最大收益,达到不同利益者共赢多赢的目的。     

Degradation of Lake Ziway,Ethiopia: A study of the environmental perceptions of school students

Lake Ziway in Ethiopia is a freshwater lake supporting multitude uses, including irrigation, fishing, water supply and recreation. However, the lake is being degraded primarily because of various land‐ and water‐use activities in its watershed. Recognizing these human impacts on the lake's water quality and quantity, the perceptions of school students were surveyed under the belief that the future of the lake is largely dependent on this younger generation. The goal of this study was to better understand how students actually recognize the extent to which various human activities impact the water quantity and quality of Lake Ziway. As major stakeholders in their communities, the perceptions of school students from four high schools regarding the changes to the lake over time were investigated. Students were contacted by purposive sampling, based on criteria of student academic performances, and their proximity to the lake. Their perceptions were studied on the basis of an interview survey. The majority of students indicated that high levels of human activities, especially water abstractions and water pollution, were the main lake impacts. Students believe there is a lack of sustainable utilization and protection of the lake. They suggested coordinated activities among all lake stakeholders in the participation and decision‐making process to properly manage the lake. Provision of awareness to both local administrations and local communities, concern for establishing an appropriate regulatory body and allocating a sufficient budget, and strict controls on flower farm practices in the lakeshore, also was considered to be of high priority as a means of conserving the sustainability of the lake. The result derived from this survey has important implications for facilitating improved school curricula, and for federal, regional and district level water resource management authorities, in setting priorities and developing policies for the sustainability of Lake Ziway.     

Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts

In game theory, potential resolutions to a conflict are found through stability analysis, based on stability definitions having precise mathematical structures. A stability definition reflects a decision maker’s behavior in a conflict or game, predicts how the game is played, and suggests the resolutions or equilibria of the dispute. Various stability definitions, reflecting different types of people with different levels of foresight, risk attitude, and knowledge of opponents’ preferences, have been proposed for resolving games. This paper reviews and illustrates six stability definitions, applicable to finite strategy strategic non-cooperative water resources games, including Nash Stability, General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), Sequential Stability (SEQ), Limited-Move Stability, and Non-Myopic Stability. The introduced stability definitions are applied to an interesting and highly informative range of generic water resources games to show how analytical results vary based on the applied stability definitions. The paper suggests that game theoretic models can better simulate real conflicts if the applied stability definitions better reflect characteristics of the players. When there is a lack of information about the types of decision makers, the employment of a range of stability definitions might improve the strategic results and provide useful insights into the basic framework of the conflict and its resolution.     

Enhancing institutional dynamics for multiple uses of water amidst climate‐related risks: The case of Lake Buhi,Philippines

This study examined the current governance system for Lake Buhi, Philippines. It describes stakeholder patterns of decision‐making, their roles in the decision‐making process based on their legal mandates, the manner of interactions, the sources of conflict and how these various issues are currently resolved. Stakeholders represent diverse interests, including irrigation, hydropower generation, fishery management and navigation. This study uses data generated from ten key informant interviews of the different stakeholders, information from five round table discussions, and secondary data and reports of various agencies. The results indicate that Lake Buhi and its watershed present classic man‐in‐nature governance challenges. The interplay of internal and external uncertainties regarding multiple uses results in a complex system that is difficult to effectively manage. Climate‐related hazards aggravate the pressures from activities within the lake watershed, complicating water allocation issues. The institutional arrangements that have emerged to address these challenges, however, appear to be fraught with overlaps, fragmentation and a lack of communication. It is thought these deficiencies could be addressed by establishing a lake basin council with representation from all the involved organizations, as well as any stakeholder groups not represented by organizations. The system of governance over the lake must address issues concerning water uses and access to the resource. The capacity of the organizations to participate in such an arrangement is weak, however, and capacity building is needed. The availability and sharing of data and information among stakeholders are also weak and must be strengthened if the work of the lake basin council is to be based on the best available information.     

Optimal Inter-Basin Water Allocation Using Crisp and Fuzzy Shapley Games

In recent years, uneven distribution of available water resources as well as increasing water demands and overexploiting the water resources have brought severe need for transferring water from basins having sufficient water to basins facing water shortages. Therefore, optimal allocation of shared water resources in water transfer projects, considering the utilities of different stakeholders, physical limitations of the system and socioeconomic criteria is an important task. In this paper, a new methodology based on crisp and fuzzy Shapley games is developed for optimal allocation of inter-basin water resources. In the proposed methodology, initial water allocations are obtained using an optimization model considering an equity criterion. In the second step, the stakeholders form crisp coalitions to increase the total net benefit of the system as well as their own benefits and a crisp Shapley Value game is used to reallocate the benefits produced in the crisp coalitions. Lastly, to provide maximum total net benefit, fuzzy coalitions are constituted and the participation rates of water users to fuzzy coalitions are optimized. Then, the total net benefit is reallocated to water users in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Shapley Value game. The effectiveness of this method is examined by applying it to a large scale case study of water transfer from the Karoon river basin in southern Iran to the Rafsanjan plain in central Iran.     

S水利水电建设的几个博弈问题研究

在简单介绍博弈论的基础上,采用经典的囚徒困境、智猪博弈、斗鸡博弈和讨价还价等博弈模型,对我国水利水电建设中存在的博弈进行了模拟。博弈分析表明：以中央政府为主的传统投资机制难以实现资源最优配置;江河流域上、下游地方政府之间在水利水电工程建设协调问题上存在困难,需要中央政府的干预;水利水电建设项目的竞争和投资分摊问题,不仅关系到各参与人自身的经济理性和经济利益,而且是各参与人相互影响和相互作用的结果。     

PPP模式下准经营性水利工程收益分配研究

准经营性水利工程建设投资较大,政府和社会资本合作(PPP)模式能够有效缓解政府财政压力。PPP模式在准经营性水利工程应用过程中,政府部门和社会资本方的合作关系以及运作模式,特别是各利益主体之间的利益分配问题,是PPP模式成功实施的前提条件和关键因素。基于合作博弈理论,结合准经营性水利工程特点,以政府、社会资本方、特许经营单位3个核心利益相关者为分配对象,构建出PPP模式下准经营性水利工程动态利益分配模型。经实例验证,运用该模型得到的PPP模式下准经营性水利工程的收益分配结果更加合理,能充分调动利益相关方的积极性。     

Tonle Sap Lake,Cambodia: A perspective on its transborder hydrological and resources governance

Tonle Sap Lake is the largest freshwater lake in South East Asia, being situated at the heart of the Mekong River Basin. Governance of the lake over the recent past has been weak and overly complex, and the basin governance structure has changed over time in terms of its fisheries management framework. The governance framework initially focused on the commercial exploitation of fish resources, but has more recently switched to a community‐based fisheries management, biodiversity conservation and open access model. This study discusses how the water flows occurring between the Mekong River and Tonle Sap Lake complicate the governance of the lake, and particularly its fisheries, biodiversity, land and water management activities. The establishment of the Tonle Sap Authority (TSA) in 2007 sought to address the governance challenges facing the lake. The current study concludes, however, that the TSA alone is not sufficient and that global, regional and national stakeholders must make an effort to ensure the water flows between the lake and the Mekong River are themselves considered a core governance issue for the Tonle Sap.     

Organizational Problems of Water Distribution in Khorezm,Uzbekistan

Abstract

The paper addresses problems of water resource management on the district and provincial level in the Khorezm province, Uzbekistan. The district water organizations are responsible for equitable water distribution to the agricultural users. These organizations do not have the necessary logistical capacities to manage the water resources nor to control water utilization at the local level. Over-extraction and the lack of control are leading to common pool resource problems at the district level. Furthermore, the concept of administrational management of water resources at the district level, instead of hydrological management increases the problems of equitable water distribution on the provincial, national, and international level.     

Regional cooperation and benefit sharing for sustainable water resources management in the Lower Mekong Basin

Benefit sharing is a concept associated with regional cooperation for sustainable water resources management. To this end, the present study analyses how implementation of this concept may contribute to economic growth and the promotion of sustainable livelihoods in the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB). It focuses on the balance between economic and human development, national interests, and the procedures used to manage water resources in the basin. It was found that: (a) Benefits obtained from the Mekong River are not equally shared between riparian countries because of inadequate regional cooperation, with economic and social development in the LMB being uneven, with Thailand and Vietnam achieving better human development, poverty reduction and food security outcomes than Laos and Cambodia; (b) Lack of shared national interests, or a common development agenda, has resulted in unsustainable water resource management outcomes; and (c) Procedures for water resources management agreed by the four LMB countries are well‐aligned with the conceptual framework for benefit sharing defined by Sadoff and Grey (2002, Water Policy, 4, 389), although while these procedures have the potential to facilitate a more cooperative agenda for equitable sharing of social, economic and environmental benefits from the water resources of the Mekong River, implementation of the 1995 Mekong Agreement currently remains controversial. The five procedures for water resource management developed by the Mekong River Commission have not resulted in satisfactory outcomes, due in part to the institution lacking regulatory authority.