非对称信息下供应链库存系统Pareto 优化模型

运用委托代理理论,研究了非对称信息条件下,由单供应商单分销商组成的供应链 Pareto优化问题. 在假定分销商所面临的需求是与销售价格有关的随机变量,以及供,销双方关于分销商销售价格信息不对称这两个前提下,将供应商作为委托人,分销商作为代理人,给出了供应商为吸引销售商选择对自己最有利的销售价格而设计的最优激励合同,比较了在不同信息条件下供销双方的最优决策 .最后,给出了应用实例和灵敏度分析.

     

B2B电子市场下供应链期权合同协调模型与优化

研究B2B电子市场下双源渠道的供应链期权合同协调模型与优化问题.在需求不确定条件下,推导了传统供应链中分销商的最优批量定货量和最优期权购买量,以及供应商的最优生产量.建立了B2B电子市场下的供应链期权合同模型,结合长期合约的稳定性和现货采购的灵活性,讨论了分销商和供应商的最优决策.最后从渠道协调的角度,讨论了传统供应链和B2B电子市场下的期权合同能有效协调供应链的充分条件.     

基于Q学习的供应链分销系统最优订货策略研究

研究由一个制造商和多个分销商组成的分销系统的最优订货策略问题.在外部顾客需求不断变化的情况下,以不断提高分销系统双方合作绩效为目标,基于Q学习算法来确定每个分销商的最优订货批量.实例结果表明,在外部需求不断变化的条件下,该算法能简便地解决供应链企业分销系统合作中的最优订货批量问题.     

阻止信息收集的供应链契约

针对内生信息结构下供应链中阻止信息收集的问题,建立一个非线性规划模型.研究发现,存在一个作为给出不同契约参考点的信息收集成本阈值,进而给出了不同信息收集成本下阻止信息收集的契约,分析比较两种不同契约下供销双方的决策和收益,并且证明了当信息收集成本大于信息收集成本阈值时,供应商更愿意阻止信息收集.此时,供应商获得相对更好的收益,而销售商获得保留收益.最后给出的数值算例验证了主要结论.     

考虑供应商保鲜努力的生鲜电商销售模式选择

基于一个生鲜供应商和一个生鲜电商组成的供应链,考虑生鲜供应商的保鲜努力对产品新鲜度的影响,建立转售模式、代理模式和混合模式下的博弈模型,研究生鲜供应商提供保鲜努力下生鲜电商的最优销售模式选择,分析销售模式差异对保鲜努力水平和销售价格的影响.研究结果显示:当佣金率较高且消费者对产品新鲜度比较敏感时,生鲜电商的最优销售模式是混合模式;否则,生鲜电商的最优销售模式是转售模式,而生鲜供应商的利润和供应链总绩效始终在混合模式下最大.生鲜供应商在代理模式和混合模式下的保鲜努力水平始终相等,佣金率较低时,代理模式和混合模式下的保鲜努力水平高于转售模式下的保鲜努力水平.此外,代理模式和混合模式下的销售价格随佣金率的降低而提高,佣金率低于一定水平时,混合模式下转售渠道的销售价格最高.     

基于创新努力决策柔性的军品供应商培植激励研究

研究军事装备制造商对元器件供应商培植激励过程中供应商的协同创新努力决策柔性问题,首先通过对努力决策柔性的价值分析,给出了供应商进行创新努力的最优柔性决策规则;然后得到在考虑创新努力决策柔性的条件下供应商创新努力所需要的门周价格大于不考虑创新努力决策柔性时所需要的门阈价格,而且门阈价格随着波动率的增大(减小)而增大(减小);最后建立了供应商创新努力决策柔性条件下的制造商最优决策模型,给出了最优培植激励合约的设计规则.     

基于创新努力决策柔性的军品供应商培植激励研究

研究军事装备制造商对元器件供应商培植激励过程中供应商的协同创新努力决策柔性问题.首先通过对努力决策柔性的价值分析,给出了供应商进行创新努力的最优柔性决策规则;然后得到在考虑创新努力决策柔性的条件下供应商创新努力所需要的门阈价格大于不考虑创新努力决策柔性时所需要的门阈价格,而且门阈价格随着波动率的增大(减小)而增大(减小);最后建立了供应商创新努力决策柔性条件下的制造商最优决策模型,给出了最优培植激励合约的设计规则.

     

公平偏好下绿色供应链收益分享与绿色创新投入

将公平偏好理论应用到绿色供应链绿色创新投入问题的研究中,建立以F-S模型为基础的绿色制造商与供应商的收益模型,并分析在信息不对称条件下公平偏好对供应商绿色创新、收益分享比例、固定补贴以及制造商最优效用的影响.研究结果表明:在信息不对称条件下,公平偏好对供应商的最优绿色创新投入无影响,公平偏好不会影响绿色制造商提供的最优收益分享比例,而绿色制造商提供给供应商的补贴会受公平偏好影响,绿色制造商给供应商的固定补贴额是随着供应商公平偏好心理强度的增大而减小,而绿色制造商的最优效用会受到供应商公平偏好强度和自身公平偏好强度的共同影响.     

随机需求下提前期可控的生产-库存联合优化模型

考虑单供应商和单采购商的生产-库存联合优化问题.假设采购商面临正态需求,供应商的提前期可以控制,并基于此建立供应商与采购商联合期望总成本最小化模型.在所建立的模型中允许采购商缺货,且部分缺货可延期交付,部分缺货发生销售损失;同时考虑运输成本,并假设运输成本依赖于订货量和提前期.给出了求解最优生产批量、最优提前期、最优再订货点和订货量的算法,并通过数值算例进行了说明.     

大型客机初创期“主供”发展模式下的关系契约协调

研究我国大型客机研制初创期情景下的“主供”供应链协调.在供应商及主制造商交叉竞争的条件下,主制造商从寻求强势供应商建立合作关系入手,设计基于专有投资的关系契约,以线性分成合作关系带来的收益激励强势供应商与主制造商建立合作关系;分析不同契约状态时交叉竞争供应链的均衡决策,对关系契约的占优性、关系契约的演化等方面进行分析.研究得出,当关系契约能够自执行且满足强势供应商及弱主制造商的盈利预期时,供应商接受契约,双方合作关系达成;当强势供应商不接受关系契约,即无契约协调时,双方的最优交易量及供应价格完全由市场竞争决定.与完全竞争条件下相比,关系契约协调时供应商成本结构对其与不同主制造商最优交易量的影响呈相反趋势,且关系契约具有占优性,能够协调弱主制造商及相对强势供应商建立合作关系,并提升二者的盈利能力和竞争能力.     

Supply chain financing with advance selling under disruption

We study a financing problem in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one supplier and one buyer under supply disruption. The supplier could face a disruption at its end which could effectively reduce its yield in case of disruption, thereby resulting in supply yield uncertainty. The retailer can finance the supplier using advance selling that can help mitigate the impact of disruption. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, where the supplier as the leader announces the wholesale price and the retailer responds by deciding its optimal order quantity given stochastic demand and an exogenous fixed retail price. The supplier then commences production and a disruption can happen with a known probability. We assume that under disruption the quantity delivered is a fraction of the initial quantity ordered by the retailer. The retailer loses any unmet demand. We analyze three different scenarios of the Stackelberg game, namely no advance selling with disruption, advance selling without disruption, and advance selling with disruption. Our results indicate that advance selling can be used to mitigate the impact of supply disruption and at the same time could lead to an increase in the overall SC profit.     

Coordinated ordering decisions for products with short lifecycle and variable selling price

The supplier–buyer coordination is an important policy in the supply chain management. The buyer in the two-echelon inventory system with regular selling season has to face the uncertainty of customer demand, supplier’s delivery time and variable price change. At the same time, the supplier has to consider the inventory holding and delay cost. The objective of this study is to develop an integrated supply chain strategy for products with short lifecycle and variable selling price to entice cooperation. The strategy must provide a win–win situation for both the supplier and the buyer. A numerical case example, sensitivity analysis and compensation mechanism are given to illustrate the model.     

Optimal transfer,ordering and payment policies for joint supplier–buyer inventory model with price-sensitive trapezoidal demand and net credit

This study aims at formulating an integrated supplier–buyer inventory model when market demand is variable price-sensitive trapezoidal and the supplier offers a choice between discount in unit price and permissible delay period for settling the accounts due against the purchases made. This type of trade credit is termed as ‘net credit’. In this policy, if the buyer pays within offered time M₁, then the buyer is entitled for a cash discount; otherwise the full account must be settled by the time M₂; where M₂ > M₁ ? 0. The goal is to determine the optimal selling price, procurement quantity, number of transfers from the supplier to the buyer and payment time to maximise the joint profit per unit time. An algorithm is worked out to obtain the optimal solution. A numerical example is given to validate the proposed model. The managerial insights based on sensitivity analysis are deduced.     

Flexible versus committed and specific versus uniform: wholesale price contracting in a supply chain with downstream process innovation

If buyers are asymmetric in terms of their operating costs, researchers and managers broadly agree that the supplier can optimize her/his own profit by offering the more efficient buyer a higher price. In this paper, we develop a game theoretical model to investigate the interaction between one supplier and two asymmetric buyers within a supply chain. We formulate buyers' operating costs as a function of their process innovation levels, which implies that they can reduce the unit operating cost via investments in process innovation in the long run. Our research demonstrates that the uniform wholesale price (UWP) is always preferred over the buyer-specific wholesale price by the supplier because of the effect of innovation stimulation. The optimal timing of pricing is contingent on the level of market demand variance. If two buyers have the same ability to reduce their operating costs via process innovation, the UWP strategy forms a win-win situation to the supplier and two buyers. Our results provide the supplier with suggestions regarding when to adopt the UWP strategy and how to enhance downstream innovation performance within the supply chain.     

Optimal pricing contracts and level of information asymmetry in a supply chain

This study considers a stylized supply chain model consisting of a dominant supplier and a buyer, in which the latter possesses superior knowledge of his private cost information. The supplier's imperfect knowledge about the buyer's cost is denoted by a subjective distribution. By assuming that the distribution is uniform, we first derive the explicit expressions of the optimal equilibrium outcomes of two contract formats offered by the supplier, the simple price‐only contract and sophisticated menu of contracts, respectively. Based on the optimal results, we continue to investigate how the supplier's expected profit varies with the level of information asymmetry, which is measured by the variance of the supplier's subjective distribution. Our findings indicate that the supplier's expected profits initially decrease and then increase as the supplier's knowledge of the buyer's cost becomes increasingly uncertain. That is, if the supplier could choose the level of information asymmetry, she would prefer a symmetric case (with the variance being zero) or a totally asymmetric case (with the variance being as high as possible). Numerical experiments demonstrate that our result still holds when we take into account such distributions as a truncated gamma and normal, and a fixed support of the distribution function instead of a moving support.     

信息不对称的收益共享寄售系统协调

考虑了不对称信息下两级供应链中收益共享寄售系统的协调．首先,供应商向零售商谎报其生产成本：零售商根据供应商报告的生产成本,决定零售商的收益分配比例;最后,供应商决定零售价格和生产数量,并且保持产品的所有权．利用解析的方法得出一些理论结果：1）系统存在唯一的均衡解;2）系统效率只与需求价格弹性系数有关,随需求价格弹性系数递减,系统效率不低于73．6％;3）生产成本信息不对称使系统效率和系统灵活性下降;4）从长远来看,系统能够消除生产成本信息不对称带来的影响．     

Combined optimal price and optimal inventory replenishment policies when a sale results in increase in demand

When a supplier reduces the price of a product temporarily a buyer might place a large order and offer a sale on these units to its customers. In most cases a price discount results in an increase in demand. In this paper we relax the constant demand assumption made in most studies of inventory systems with price changes. We analyze the options available to a buyer and develop profit functions for different combinations of sales period and replenishment time and present optimal ordering policies. The paper also presents a procedure to include any relationship between price and demand to determine the combined optimal price and optimal order quantity.     

非对称需求信息下两阶段供应链协调

针对由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链，其成员之间的市场需求信息不对称问题，建立了非对称信息下批发价与订货量的stackelberg博弈模型，给出了零售商和供应商分别拥有需求信息下的博弈均衡．效值实例分析了非对称信息对价格和订货量及利润的影响，同时给出了信息不对称下的供应链协调机制。     

Extending electronic sourcing theory: An exploratory study of electronic reverse auction outcomes

Existing electronic sourcing theory has predominantly focused on the impact of electronic reverse auctions on price savings and has proposed various factors influencing this outcome. Such price savings have been widely claimed to come at the expense of the buyer–supplier relationship. Only a few research studies, however, have investigated the impact of electronic reverse auctions on the buyer–supplier relationship. Based on an extensive literature review and multiple case study research, we extend electronic sourcing theory by developing a conceptual model that considers a broader set of outcomes, posits organizational and project antecedents that a buying firm can manipulate to impact those outcomes, and introduces supplier-related factors that moderate the antecedent–outcome relationships. In contrast to prior research, our model shows that buying organizations consider a broad set of financial, operational, as well as strategic e-sourcing outcomes, and that, under certain conditions, the traditional trade-off in electronic reverse auctions between price savings and the buyer–supplier relationship does not hold.     

Optimal apparel supplier selection with forecast updates under carbon emission taxation scheme

Carbon emission tax is an important measure for sustainable supply chain management. This paper studies an optimal supplier selection problem in the fashion apparel supply chain in the presence of carbon emission tax. We consider the scenario in which there are multiple suppliers in the market. In the basic model, each supplier offers a supply lead time and a wholesale pricing contract to the fashion retail buyer. For the fashion retail buyer, the supplier which offers a shorter lead time allows it to postpone the ordering decision with updated and better forecast, and also a smaller carbon tax. However, the wholesale price is usually larger. We propose a two-phase optimal supplier selection scheme in which phase one filters the inferior suppliers and phase two helps to select the best supplier among the set of non-inferior suppliers by multi-stage stochastic dynamic programming. The impacts brought by different formats of carbon emission tax are explored. Finally, we examine an extended model in which there is a local supplier who offers a buyback contract and accepts product returns. Insights from the analysis are discussed.