考虑质量价值水平的复杂产品供应链质量成本优化方法

优化复杂产品供应链质量成本是提高供应链质量管控能力、降低供应链质量风险的重要方法.综合考虑产品质量水平和产品研制成本,提出复杂产品质量价值概念,并详细分析以供应商网络为基础的复杂产品质量价值形成机理.建立复杂产品质量价值GERT网络模型,实现复杂产品质量价值水平的量化计算,并以此为基础,通过识别网络中的关键供应商建立优化模型,提出考虑质量价值水平的复杂产品供应链质量成本优化方法.最后通过算例验证模型方法的科学性和有效性.     

一种基于马尔可夫博弈的能量均衡路由算法

针对无线传感器网络中耗能不均问题,引入马尔可夫博弈理论,构建了无线传感器网络的马尔可夫博弈模型.在能量均衡路由分析的基础上,给出了一种基于马尔可夫博弈的能量均衡路由算法,该算法从无线传感器网络整体耗能出发,兼顾节点之间的合作.定义了能量和信誉值的二元收益函数,给出了节点转发的状态转移概率,根据收益函数进行能量调节,求解出能量和收益之间的均衡系数——纳什均衡,实现了节点能量的均衡消耗,延长了网络的生命周期.使用PRISM概率仿真工具进行仿真,验证了该博弈模型存在纳什均衡点,同时表明该模型能促进节点之间合作,最大化无线传感器网络的生命周期.     

低碳供应链生产及交易决策机制

研究由两个产品制造商和上游碳配额供应商所组成的供应链系统的生产和交易决策问题.通过建立经济主体的主从博弈模型,得到它们之间互为反应函数的纳什均衡解,并在此基础上设定其为产品碳排放量和排放上限的函数.分析表明,产品碳排放量和政府排放上限对两制造商和碳配额供应商最优变量以及利润值的影响呈反向关系;在两制造商严格控制排放量和政府科学制定排放上限的前提下,两级主体可通过某种契约进一步提高各自的利润值.     

低碳供应链纵向合作减排的动态优化

基于微分博弈, 研究由一个供应商与一个制造商组成的低碳供应链中纵向合作减排的动态优化问题. 构建了以制造商占主导、供应商跟随的Stackelberg 微分博弈模型, 分别得到了制造商和供应商的最优反馈均衡策略及各自的利润最优值函数, 推导出产品碳排放量随时间变化的最优轨迹. 通过数值算例分析了制造商和供应商的长期合作减排策略对产品碳排放量的影响, 为供应链上下游企业开展长期减排合作提供了理论依据.

     

主制造商供应商协同合作最优定价决策博弈与混沌分析

基于主制造商供应商的协同合作模式和利益追求,建立了主制造商供应商的价格博弈模型,考虑主制造商供应商的合作共生关系,引入共生系数,研究利益分配下的供应链定价问题.应用复杂系统理论分析了系统的稳定性与混沌状态,通过数值模拟,发现了供应商的价格调整速度影响供应链系统的稳定,共生系数影响主制造商和供应商的利益.由此,供应链企业通过选择合适的控制系数,可使系统维持在稳定状态下,这一研究结果对复杂产品主制造商供应商的价格决策有很好的借鉴作用.     

供应商一级密封报价博弈模型研究

在一个复杂的供应链系统中,由于供应商之间信息保密,那么供应商之间将会出现不完全信息竞争博弈。基于一级密封拍卖方式与供应链中供应商的投标报价的相似性,利用一级密封拍卖模型对供应商的竞争报价进行了研究,建立了供应商报价博弈模型,得到供应商的最优报价策略,定量地解决了报价中的信息不完全的问题,为供应商的报价决策提供参考。     

基于Stackelberg博弈论的Multi—Homing负载均衡研究

阐述了Stackelberg博弈的基本理论和模型,并将其应用于多主接入网络的负栽均衡问题中,给出了一种基于Stackelberg博弈理论的多主接入网络带宽分配模型.考虑网络和用户之间的供需平衡,采用线性和非线性价格方案,给出了更加合理的带宽分配策略.仿真结果证明了算法是有效的,Stackelberg博弈模型能够合理有效地利用带宽资源,实现了负载均衡.     

基于信任的无线传感器网络时隙分配博弈分析

为了帮助无线传感器网络作出既有利于自身收益又能抑制恶意节点的决策,提出了一种信任激励的时隙分配博弈模型。根据收益矩阵对恶意节点和簇头之间的非零和博弈关系进行了认知和分解,指出了破坏行为可以抑制的原因是纳什均衡可以作为惩罚阻止节点偏离收益更高的策略组合。在此基础上建立了博弈模型,然后证明了无限重复博弈中的纳什回归策略成为子博弈完美均衡的充分必要条件。采用单轮纳什均衡惩罚合作性策略的偏离者,从而使恶意节点与簇头的无限重复博弈能够产生合作效应。仿真实验结果表明,根据该模型作出的决策可以增加网络收益并抑制恶意节点的破坏行为。     

基于博弈论的异构融合网络接入选择方法研究

各种异构接入网络的无缝融合是下一代网络的显著特征之一,不同网络技术接入形式的多样化使得多网络接口的用户终端可自主选择对用户最为有利的接入网络(或SP,Service Provider)获得互联网服务.文中给出一种面向用户可视化可操作的异种网络接入选择实现机制,该机制采用一种量化接入系统服务质量的统一评价模型及基于最优用户性价比的网络选择决策方法,同时依据不同接入网络之间的合作与非合作关系以及SP与用户之间的竞争关系,引入博弈论方法建立网络价格策略的两种博弈模型,通过求解模型的纳什均衡价格及共谋价格,确定网络优化定价机制.仿真结果比较了异构网络融合环境下的各接入网络在非合作和合作博弈模式中的优化定价机制及获得的收益特性,并比较了不同博弈场景下用户选择接入网络的性价比.     

考虑市场因素的电力系统供需互动混合博弈强化学习算法

为对电力市场环境下电力系统供需互动问题更精确地建模,使其更好地与未来电力市场环境下需求侧负荷聚合商之间多变的关系和复杂的通信拓扑结构相匹配,本文将电力系统供需互动的Stackelberg博弈与复杂网络上反映需求侧负荷聚合商互动的演化博弈相结合,搭建考虑市场因素的电力系统供需互动混合博弈模型.并提出混合博弈强化学习算法求解相应的非凸非连续优化问题,该算法以Q学习为载体,通过引入博弈论和图论的思想,把分块协同和演化博弈的方法相结合,充分地利用博弈者之间互动博弈关系所形成的知识矩阵信息,高质量地求解考虑复杂网络上多智能体系统的非凸优化问题.基于复杂网络理论搭建的四类3机-6负荷系统和南方某一线城市电网的仿真结果表明:混合博弈强化学习算法的寻优性能比大多数集中式的智能算法好,且在不同网络下均可以保证较好的寻优结果,具有很强的适应性和稳定性.     

基于碳配额政策的两级低碳供应链博弈与优化

通过构建供应商和制造商两级低碳供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,得到博弈均衡解和收益共享契约参数,比较分散决策、集中决策和收益共享契约下实现低碳供应链的经济效应,并通过算例分析了是否合作减排以及合作减排对供应链成员产量、碳减排量、利润的影响和收益共享契约参数对供应链成员利润的影响,为供应链上下游企业开展碳减排合作提供了理论依据和政策建议.     

Manufacturing lot-sizing under MRP II environment: An improved analytical model & heuristic procedure

Under single-level lot-sizing problem, well known Wagner-Whitin algorithm based on Dynamic Programming (DP) provides optimal order schedule. Order schedule does not work properly under Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II), where it is considered multi-level capacitated problem and requirements of subcomponents are depend on the parent product. In this paper, we formulate a multi-level capacitated optimization model and develop a relatively efficient heuristic working under MRP II environment which considers work center capacities and interrelationship between levels in lot-sizing computation.     

复杂产品供应链质量控制方案递阶决策模型

提出一类供应链质量控制方案递阶决策模型,辅助复杂产品主制造商更好地推广和落实质量控制方案,以实现供应链整体质量的最优改善.首先搭建了一类新型的供应链质量屋分析平台,并将其表征为多目标规划模型,确定最优方案组合;然后,基于复杂产品供应链多层级结构设计质量屋网络,以控制资源为纽带构建多级多目标递阶决策模型,实现了质量控制方案的继承和衔接;最后,针对某型号商用飞机供应链开展案例研究,验证了所提出模型和方法的可行性和有效性.     

供应商能力有约束的混合型多属性决策方法

研究了一种混合型多属性决策方法,用于多资源模型的供应商选择问题,并将供应商选择过程分为2个阶段.首先用熵系数模型确定评价指标的客观权重,利用逼近理想解排序法模型排定方案优劣次序;然后建立多目标规划模型确定采购数量在入选供应商之间的分配;最后给出了一个算例,算例结果表明该方法可行且有效.     

工程系统进度优化的协同决策方法

为解决多个承包商间的项目合作伙伴选择问题, 采用多目标规划构建工程系统进度优化的协同决策模型. 以合作博弈理论为基础, 运用主要目标法设计一种基于期望收益约束选择的模型求解方法. 算例结果表明, 所提出的方法可以在保障参与协同的承包商收益需求前提下实现工程系统进度最优, 所获得的协同方案更容易为各方接受.

     

Learning machiavellian strategies for manipulation in Stackelberg security games

This paper suggests a new approach for repeated Stackelberg security games (SSGs) based on manipulation. Manipulation is a strategy interpreted by the Machiavellianism social behavior theory, which consists on three main concepts: view, tactics, and immorality. The world is conceptualized by manipulators and manipulated (view). Players employ Machiavelli’s tactics and Machiavellian intelligence in order to manipulate attacker/defender situations. The immorality plays a fundamental role in these games, defenders are able to not be attached to a conventional moral in order to achieve their goals. We consider a security game model involving manipulating defenders and manipulated attackers engaged cooperatively in a Nash game and at the same time restricted by a Stackelberg game. The resulting game is non-cooperative bargaining game. The cooperation is represented by the Nash bargaining solution. We propose an analytical formula for solving the manipulation game, which arises as the maximum of the quotient of two Nash products. The role of the players in the Stackelberg security game are determined by the weights of the players for the Nash bargaining approach. We consider only a subgame perfect equilibrium where the solution of the manipulation game is a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE). We employ a reinforcement learning (RL) approach for the implementation of the immorality. A numerical example related to developing a strategic schedule for the efficient use of resources for patrolling in a smart city is handled using a class of homogeneous, ergodic, controllable, and finite Markov chains for showing the usefulness of the method for security resource allocation.

     

基于贝叶斯序贯博弈模型的智能电网信息物理安全分析

智能电网是利用信息技术优化从供应者到消费者的电力传输和配电网络.作为一种信息物理系统（Cyber-physical system，CPS），智能电网由物理设备和负责数据计算与通信的网络组成.智能电网的诸多安全问题会出现在通信网络和物理设备这两个层面，例如注入坏数据和收集客户隐私信息的网络攻击，攻击电网物理设备的物理攻击等.本文主要研究了智能电网的系统管理员（防护者）如何确定攻击者类型，从而选择最优防护策略的问题.提出了一种贝叶斯序贯博弈模型以确定攻击者的类型，根据序贯博弈树得到博弈双方的均衡策略.首先，对类型不确定的攻击者和防护者构建静态贝叶斯博弈模型，通过海萨尼转换将不完全信息博弈转换成完全信息博弈，得到贝叶斯纳什均衡解，进而确定攻击者的类型.其次，考虑攻击者和防护者之间的序贯博弈模型，它能够有效地帮助防护者进行决策分析.通过逆向归纳法分别对两种类型的攻击者和防护者之间的博弈树进行分析，得到博弈树的均衡路径，进而得到攻击者的最优攻击策略和防护者的最优防护策略.分析表明，贝叶斯序贯博弈模型能够使防护者确定攻击者的类型，并且选择最优防护策略，从而为涉及智能电网信息安全的相关研究提供参考.     

Competition between High Speed Rail and Conventional Transport Modes: Market Entry Game Analysis on Indian Corridors

This paper investigates the competition between HSR and the incumbent with vertical service differentiation for Indian corridors. As Indian government plans to invest in this new technology, strategic decisions pertaining to type of corridor, speed of HSR, HSR technology, given the competition scenario on that corridor becomes vital. The strategic interactions between the operators are modelled as a three staged game between the entrant and the incumbent considering the competition over fare and frequency to maximize different objective functions i.e. Profit and Social Welfare. Speed of HSR is taken as a strategic variable in the game with two levels of high speed, {Low-H, High-H}. This model is applied on two corridors of India of different length i.e. Bangalore-Delhi (competition with airlines with length of corridor being 2400 km) and Bangalore-Mysore (competition with bus with length of corridor being 150 km). Revealed and stated preference surveys are conducted for the passengers traveling on these corridors and a discrete choice model was estimated for both the corridors. These models were used to determine the modal share in the new hypothetical scenario which were in turn used in defining objective functions such as profits and social welfare. Various game scenarios characterized by sunk and variable cost of the modes are formulated and equilibrium for all demand levels is computed for both the corridors for these different objective functions. Results demonstrates variation in Nash equilibrium for different game scenarios and hence indicates the importance of incorporating speed as a strategic variable. Changing the objective function to social welfare maximization results in different equilibrium solution for Bangalore-Delhi corridor. Thus, impact of different combinations of demand, cost structures and objective functions are explored on the market equilibrium thereby providing interesting insights in this area.

     

Computation of Multi-facility Location Nash Equilibria on a Network Under Quantity Competition

We deal with the location-quantity problem for competing firms when they locate multiple facilities and offer the same type of product. Competition is performed under delivered quantities that are sent from the facilities to the customers. This problem is reduced to a location game when the competing firms deliver the Cournot equilibrium quantities. While existence conditions for a Nash equilibrium of the location game have been discussed in many contributions in the literature, computing an equilibrium on a network when multiple facilities are to be located by each firm is a problem not previously addressed. We propose an integer linear programming formulation to fill this gap. The formulation solves the profit maximization problem for a firm, assuming that the other firms have fixed their facility locations. This allows us to compute location Nash equilibria by the best response procedure. A study with data of Spanish municipalities under different scenarios is presented and conclusions are drawn from a sensitivity analysis.