Evolutionary game of investors’ opportunistic behaviour during the operational period in PPP projects

In public–private partnership (PPP) projects, during the operational period, private investors are prone to act opportunistically in pursuit of their own gain. Based on the perspectives of government’s administrative supervisory functions, this paper analyses the issue of strategic choice for opportunistic behaviour by the government and private investors during the operational period of projects using evolutionary game theory. The results show that there is not a single set of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) between the government and the investors. The end results of the evolutionary game are related to the initial states of the system. Conditions that would dissuade investors from adopting an opportunistic behaviour, and settings that would encourage government to supervise closely, are explored. Punishments set by the government, which would then lead to different ultimate choices made by these two parties, are also discussed. Finally, the paper proposes a few policy recommendations for government supervision on the basis of parametric analysis. The findings also serve as a reference for the decision-making process of the government and the investors.     

基于系统动力学的绿色公路建设激励机制博弈研究

针对绿色公路规模化发展程度不足、激励机制有待完善的问题，以政府方和绿色公路投资建设者为参与人构建两者间的演化博弈模型，分析绿色公路发展的内在机理。博弈模型表明当政府对绿色公路采取激励政策的概率较大时，投资建设者的稳定策略为建设绿色公路，当投资建设者建设绿色公路的概率较大时，政府方的稳定策略为采取激励政策。在此基础上利用系统动力学原理对博弈过程进行仿真分析，研究政府和投资者协同推进绿色公路的路径。仿真结果表明，促进绿色公路发展的关键是提高政企双方采取积极策略的初始概率，并降低影响演化结果的阈值。     

重大工程两类监理模式合谋防范研究

工程监理制是提高工程质量的关键路径。我国工程实践中形成了“大业主,小监理”和“小业主,大监理”两种模式,两类监理模式形成不同的委托代理关系和合谋情形。针对两类监理模式,基于演化博弈论构建合谋情形下的政府、业主、承包商和监理博弈模型,通过计算实验得到合谋主体最优合谋概率和政府最优监管概率,据此设计相应的合谋防范机制,即“大业主,小监理”模式下,政府引入第三方审查机构降低业主的道德风险;“小业主,大监理”模式下,政府通过构建监理市场声誉体系约束监理合谋行为。     

PPP 项目政府监管强度对社会资本履约绩效影响研究

为明确政府监管强度对社会资本履约绩效影响的作用机理,通过识别政府监管内容,构建了一个有调节的结构方程模型,考察不同PPP 项目类型下政府监管强度对于社会资本的履约绩效影响。研究发现:政府监管中的准入监管、价格监管、信息监管、合同监管的加强对于社会资本履约绩效的提升有显著作用。其中准入监管中,经营性并不能对该路径效果起到调节作用;价格监管路径的效果随着经营性水平的提高起到明显的正作用调节;信息监管路径随着经营性水平的提高,对路径起到的是削弱的作用;合同监管路径调节效应也是随着经营水平提高而对路径效果削弱。研究结果为政府今后实施PPP监管提供了理论支持,同时可为社会资本选择项目时衡量当地政府监管提供参考,更好地实现PPP 项目目标。     

博弈论视角下的 PPP 模式政府监管研究

PPP 模式在我国公共服务领域的应用日益广泛,越来越多的问题也随之暴露,其中较为突出的是政府监管问题。政府和私人部门的合作,本质上是二者之间博弈的结果。本文以博弈论的视角分别从宏观和微观两个层面利用 4 种博弈模型来分析 PPP 模式下私人部门与政府之间的博弈过程,发现政府监管问题的关键在于促进私人部门积极履约。由此结合我国 PPP模式下政府监管的不足给出如何加强政府监管的合理建议,旨在促进 PPP 模式在我国的发展     

Enhanced supervision strategies for effective reduction of building energy consumption--A case study of Ningbo

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the reasons for ever growing energy consumption in buildings and to give enhanced supervision strategies for reduction of building energy consumption compared to regular ones. A case study of Ningbo city was used to make a detail analysis. Several factors were determined as the reasons for ever growing building energy consumption including climate change, household electricity load increase, the growth of real estate, fast-growing household electrical appliances, high energy consumption in existing buildings, changes in industrial structure and the lack of enhanced government supervision. Then the discussion of suitable countermeasures shows that only enhanced supervision strategies are currently applicable. Finally, it is concluded that enhanced government supervision strategies, including the establishment of a strict control system for new built buildings through information integration and encryption, establishing an energy efficiency supervision system of large-scale public building and a carrot-and-stick approach with added expert checklist for the building application of renewable energy, showed great advantages in promoting building energy efficiency in Ningbo, compared with other cities. These supervision strategies are applicable in other cities as they are in the similar situations in the enforcement of building energy efficiency.     

考虑社会监督的建筑废弃物处置演化博弈分析

考虑到建筑废弃物违法处置具有明显的负外部性,基于多元协作治理机制,引入社会监督因素建立施工单位与监管部门建筑废弃物处置的演化博弈模型,分析不同社会监督水平对其行为策略的影响,并进行数值仿真。结果表明:社会监督不存在或水平较低时,系统不存在演化稳定策略;在监管部门缺少必要奖惩激励的情况下,可能出现治理失效的情况;社会监督水平的提高有利于抑制违法填埋行为,减少监管部门监管成本;当社会监管达到较高水平时,举报曝光的概率大于违法处理废弃物节省成本与风险成本的比值,施工单位群体会自发趋向于合规处理策略。据此,从公众参与和废弃物处置成本角度出发提出建议,为建筑废弃物治理提供参考。     

P2P借贷在房地产融资中的应用研究

互联网金融兴起的大背景下,P2P网络借贷为突破房地产业融资瓶颈提供了一种高效可行的选择。本文对比分析P2P借贷相较于传统融资方式所具备的优势;同时针对其在实践运用中的问题,借鉴国外经验,从风控模式、风控技术、风控体系、监管体系四个层面提出相应建议及运作思路,以保证投资者的资金安全。     

Analysis of the risk-sharing ratio in PPP projects based on government minimum revenue guarantees

Public-private partnership (PPP) projects have been widely applied in infrastructure construction. A suitable risk distribution strategy is crucial for promoting negotiations between the government and investors. The government usually provides guarantees to investors to distribute risk. However, an excessive guarantee increases the government's financial burden, whereas an insufficient guarantee reduces the confidence of the investors participating in the project. In a minimum revenue guarantee (MRG), the government subsidizes the investors the difference between the actual revenue and the government guarantee line if there is a loss. In PPP power plant and highway projects, investors' revenues come from two sources: government guarantees and the project company's self-sale. To support project companies and to optimize the projects' benefits, the government should set a reasonable benchmark for purchase amounts. Based on the traditional principal-agent model, this paper introduces the reciprocal preference theory to analyze the risk-sharing ratio most suitable for the government. Then, an optimal incentive mechanism is established to guarantee the project's income. The results indicate that by setting a different guarantee strategy for different participants, the government can utilize reciprocal preference to incentivize investors to exert more effort during a partnership and avoid moral hazard.     

公共项目公私伙伴关系监管体系与监管途径

讨论了公私合作模式(PPP)进行公共项目建设有利于解决建设资金紧张以及政府在投资管理上的低效问题,在分析PPP项目政府监管现状的基础上,提出健全监管体系,合理确定政府监督边界,科学选择监管途径,对PPP项目进行依法规制,以推进公共项目PPP模式的健康发展。     

深圳公益性房屋拆迁督导模式及其创新研究

以施工企业工程建设监理理论为基础,阐述了深圳市公益性房屋拆迁的督导模式演进及创新,剖析了该协督模式的特点、运作模式及作用。在借鉴政府投资项目代建制及工程建设监理模式的基础上,尝试提出能适应深圳乃至全国的新的城市公益性房屋拆迁督导管理模式。     

PPP模式下地下综合管廊入廊定价激励机制研究

地下综合管廊建设难以推广的主要原因在于前期需要巨大的建设投资和后期需要较高的运营成本。在分析PPP模式相关理论和地下综合管廊相关知识的基础上,提出了适合于我国地下综合管廊建设的PPP融资模式,即基于URM(使用者付费模式)的建设期补偿模式和运营期补偿模式,予以解决前期投资需求问题。继而选取了运营期补偿模式作为研究基础,运用委托-代理理论作为理论支撑,设计了一种激励相容的入廊定价机制,予以解决运营收费问题。该机制的实现,不但可以维护管线单位和消费大众的利益,还可以在满足投资方利润的基础上激励投资方真实申报成本,降低管廊运营成本,减轻政府财政负担。     

消防监督检查创新模式研究

对消防监督检查的创新模式进行探索,对消防监督检查的三种工作模式进行对比研究,包括以政府为全核心的监督检查执法模式;由政府购买第三方服务辅助监督检查,政府执法的半社会化模式,以及以第三方为监督检查核心,政府执法的社会化 模式。进一步提出了“两查两评一公示两应用”模型。结合上海市奉贤区消防监督检查试点工作成果加以分析,对消防监督检查改革发展提供借鉴意义。     

政府担保PPP 项目复合期权价值评估

在公私合营项目（PPP）中,政府往往通过提供担保的形式为投资方分担风险从而增强其投资信心。以PPP 模式的大型基础设施项目建设为背景,在项目风险分担以及实物期权理论的基础上,对政府向投资方做出的最低收益担保以及政府参与投资方超额收益分享的期权价值进行了估算。通过数值分析说明了政府提供最低收益担保可以降低投资方将来收益不确定性,且依据风险承担应与所得收益相当原则,政府分担了风险就有权分享超额收益,这一期权价值的获得可有效降低政府的财政压力。     

基于建构扎根理论的中国EPC工程质量监管机制研究

基于政府工程质量监管视角,通过实地调研和深度访谈,采用建构扎根理论方法对访谈资料进行实质性编码,探究EPC工程质量监管机制的核心构成要素及运行机理。在此基础上,结合案例项目资料,综合实证扎根主义方法的优点,融合解释主义理念和批判主义思维,阐述目前的工程质量监管机制“是什么”,剖析目前的EPC工程质量监管机制“为什么”不能脱胎于传统的工程质量监管机制,进而构建与中国EPC工程情境相适应的质量监管机制。此外,借鉴案例项目经验和相关文献研究,从政府监管、行业治理和项目内部管理三个层面提出建议和对策。研究结果不仅弥补了现阶段在EPC工程质量监管机制研究方面的不足,为EPC工程质量监管提供借鉴和参考,而且对中国EPC模式的健康发展具有较重要的实践意义。     

Promoting the sustainable development of infrastructure projects through responsible innovation: An evolutionary game analysis

Responsible innovation in infrastructure projects can promote the sustainable development of infrastructure projects where the strategies of the stakeholders involved have a significant impact on this process. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, focal enterprises, and the public to simulate and analyze their behavioral strategies and the sensitivity to relevant influencing factors at different phases of infrastructure projects. The results demonstrate that the government acts as a leader in the initial phase, and gradually evolves into the role of guardian in the intermediate and operational phases. Lower supervision costs, heavier penalties, and public participation can promote responsible innovation by focal enterprises and responsible supervision by the government, while higher incentive subsidies will generate the focal enterprises' behavior of “defrauding subsidy.” A three-dimensional framework for responsible innovation in infrastructure projects is developed based on the research results, covering the project life cycle, stakeholders, and responsibility and benefits, which embody the coupling mechanism of infrastructure projects’ responsible innovation.     

基于委托代理理论的BT模式激励问题研究

BT模式逐步成为政府解决非经营性基础设施建设资金紧缺的一种新的尝试,但在项目建设过程中,政府和投资人之间不可避免地会出现"逆向选择"与"道德风险"问题。在BT项目中引入激励机制,通过建立政府给予投资人的最优激励报酬模型,分析影响最优激励系数变化的各种因素,并以此为基础提出激励报酬模型在以BT模式建设工程项目过程中应用的建议,有助于解决政府和投资人之间的委托代理问题并实现政府与投资人之间利益最大化的均衡。     

我国民营资本参与医院PPP 的PEST-SWOT 分析

随着新医改的深入实施,国家鼓励和引导民营资本举办医疗机构,形成多元化办医格局。PPP（Public Private Partnership）是民营资本参与医改的重要路径之一,具有独特的优势。为了识别民营资本参与医院PPP 的发展前景,采用 PEST-SWOT 模型进行分析论证,利用PEST 分析民营资本参与医院PPP 的宏观环境,识别民营资本的外部因素即面临的机会威胁,通过与国有企业的比较,识别民营资本及企业的内部因素即自身的优势和劣势,并根据不同的组合提出了相应的发展战略和应对措施,从而为民营资本的投资决策提供参考依据。     

资源补偿项目（RCP）融资模式特许权要点设计——以某湿地公园项目为例

以解决某市湿地公园项目融资问题为主题,引入资源补偿项目（Resource Compensate Project,RCP）融资模式,结合项目实际情况,定量分析住宅用地资源的补偿量,并就特许权协议设计了十二条关键条款。全文思路、方法和特许权协议条款建议可供RCP融资模式应用借鉴。