不对称竞争条件下的集团转移定价决策

分析了不对称竞争条件下企业集团的转移定价决策问题.得出存在上游竞争的条件下,转移价格大于边际成本;存在下游竞争的条件下,转移价格的大小取决于各下游企业最终产品的相互替代程度.     

基于Cournot-Bertrand 混合竞争的企业集团转移定价决策

研究多部门企业集团在最终产品市场面临Cournot-Bertrand 混合竞争时的转移定价决策问题. 由动态博弈的逆向归纳求解方法可知, 均衡转移定价策略将随着最终产品之间的关系而有所差异. 当竞争对手仅生产最终产品时, 最优转移价格高于边际成本, 且采用价格-产量竞争优于产量-价格竞争; 当竞争对手为垂直一体化企业时, 采用产量-价格竞争的最优转移价格高于边际成本, 采用价格-产量竞争则低于边际成本, 而且采用产量-价格竞争优于价格-产量竞争.

     

基于Bertrand博弈的共享单车定价与投放联合策略研究

基于共享单车租赁所具有的随机性特点,构建随机环境下共享单车企业在寡头市场中关于租赁定价与投放数量联合决策的二维Bertrand博弈模型,研究差异定价与协同定价两种情形下共享单车企业的最优策略组合,分析市场潜在需求量和用车区域覆盖难度系数对企业策略以及经营利润产生的影响.研究表明:在差异定价情形下,当用车需求具有概率性特点时,共享单车企业之间的博弈存在唯一的纳什均衡解,且低价企业对市场价格的影响力升高有利于竞争双方利润增加;在协同定价情形下,共享单车市场的平均租赁价格较低,且随市场潜在需求量的增大而增大,但与差异定价情形相比增速较小;协同定价有利于维持共享单车企业在市场规模较小时的盈利,差异定价有利于抑制共享单车企业在市场规模扩大时的过度投放.     

信息产品的定价策略

传统的经济学理论认为,在完全竞争的市场上,企业产品的价格等于其边际成本,市场达到帕累托有效率;而在垄断竞争的情况下,企业采取成本加成定价法,市场价格等于边际成本加成,而加成量取决于消费者对商品的需求弹性。通常,企业在定价过程中要考虑的因素有产品的成本结构、市场结构以及消费者对产品的需求和使用的行为模式等。     

再制造率随机的闭环供应链产品差别定价策略

考虑闭环供应链的差别定价问题, 制造商回收废旧产品, 并生产新产品和再制造产品, 再制造率随机. 采用Stackelberg 博弈方法, 研究集中决策和分散决策下相应产品的最优定价, 给出供应链各成员的最优利润. 结果表明:若制造商对产品延迟定价, 则集中决策下回收价格高于分散决策, 而销售价格均低于分散决策; 当零售商的保守利润不低于一定值时, 集中决策下总利润不低于分散决策, 制造商可以采用改进的两部定价契约协调供应链.

     

沉淀成本、市场结构与企业战略博弈分析

新古典一般均衡理论体系在完全的产品和要素市场完全竞争条件下,是一个没有沉淀成本的经济模型,然而在市场不完全的条件下,由于沉淀成本的存在,不仅导致要素市场失灵,而且还造成企业阊成本不对称和竞争优势,进而造成企业间战略博弈,为企业家寻求超额利润奠定了客观基础。因此,我们运用沉淀成本概念,借助于不完全产品市场结构来研究企业闻的战略博弈,将完全竞争条件下企业无沉淀成本的价格接受者被动理性转变为寡头市场结构条件下的主动战略理性,为企业闻战略博弈提供了一种研究方法,同时也为企业战略管理提供了指导原则,即在于加强沉淀成本管理和风险管理。     

基于垂直产品差异化的垄断企业虚假质量策略研究

在产品差异化市场中,由于产品质量信息存在不对称,消费者经常通过价格来判断产品的质量,这为企业使用虚假质量提供了机会.基于垂直产品差异化,构建垄断市场质量差异化的产品定价模型,研究产品质量信息不对称时,垄断企业是否有动机采取虚假质量.若存在该动机,则分析垄断企业质量策略选择及其影响因素.研究表明,垄断企业对高、低两种质量产品均存在使用虚假质量的动机,具体采用何种质量策略,则取决于高、低质量产品的质量差异度,成本差异度以及企业对高、低质量产品使用的虚假度.     

考虑风险规避的闭环供应链差别定价协调模型

针对再制造成本不确定条件下考虑制造商风险规避特性的新产品与再制造产品差别定价协调问题, 采用均值—方差方法衡量该问题的最优定价决策。在分散化决策下, 采用Stackelberg博弈理论研究价格差敏感系数和制造商风险规避度对闭环供应链定价策略的影响, 然后以集中化决策作为研究基准, 指出分散化决策存在双重边际效应。为消除利益损失, 提出一种收益共享一风险共担契约来协调闭环供应链, 研究表明, 该协调契约能有效实现风险规避下闭环供应链的协调。最后运用数值分析方法对无协调和有协调时的闭环供应链定价策略进行比较研究, 并进一步探讨价格差敏感系数和制造商风险规避度对闭环供应链定价策略以及协调性能的影响。     

产品质量信息不对称时基于信号博弈的期权预售策略

预售期到达的策略消费者与制造商之间产品质量信息不对称,制造商可以通过不同的预售策略和预售价格设置,影响消费者对产品质量的判断和购买时机的选择.基于信号传递博弈理论,构建产品质量信息对称和不对称时的博弈模型,给出质量信息不对称时制造商实现分离均衡和混同均衡的边界条件.结果表明:制造商产能较大时,期权预售本身可以作为高产品质量制造商的信号传递工具;消费者判断产品质量为高质量的先验概率足够大时,高产品质量制造商倾向于实现混同均衡隐藏质量信息,反之倾向于实现分离均衡,通过较高的行权价格传递质量信息.最后进一步探讨预售期时长对消费者等待成本的影响,结果表明等待成本相对较低时上述结论依然成立.     

具有网络外部效应的三度价格歧视研究

通过建立两厂商和两子市场的两阶段博弈模型,分析具有网络外部效应的寡头竞争市场厂商实施三度歧视定价的产出、价格和社会福利问题,研究结果表明:厂商通过歧视定价提高了强市场的价格,相应降低了弱市场的价格,虽然总产出没有改变,但却减少了社会总福利.     

Two-Way Interconnection with Partial Consumer Participation

This paper incorporates partial consumer participation in a model of competition between telecommunications networks with two-way interconnection. It is shown, in contrast to the results of similar models with full participation, that the firms' equilibrium profits depend on the level of a reciprocal access charge under two-part retail pricing. Under some simplifying assumptions, it is shown that firms prefer the access charge be set equal to the marginal cost of termination, which coincides with the social optimum. Without these additional assumptions the model is analytically complex and simulation results are presented that suggest firms prefer the access charge to be less than marginal cost, while the socially optimal access charge may be above or below cost depending on the differentiation of the firms.     

Competitive Pricing Strategies for Software and SaaS Products

We study the pricing strategies for a software firm and an entrant software-as-a-service (SaaS) firm in two customer markets: the market composed of the incumbent’s past customers and the market of new customers. We build a game theoretical model to investigate how user costs and the quality differential between products affect firms’ pricing in different customer markets. Our findings show that it is not always optimal for the software firm to price discriminate between its old users and the new customers. The entrant firm would be better off acquiring only the new customers when the SaaS quality is sufficiently low.     

Joint optimization of pricing and planning decisions in divergent supply chain

In divergent supply chains, such as in the oil industry, processing raw materials results in an outflow of multiple products. Final products are stored at international depots, from where they are ready to be shipped to the markets. Even if one company controls the entire chain, when production and sales organizations are decoupled, a relevant problem is to determine the internal prices of products at depots for achieving coordination. We propose an optimization model involving pricing and production decisions, and several constraints commonly used in divergent chains. In our approach, the producer incorporates the sellers’ behavior by expressing demand as a function of the internal price. As a result, our model serves as a coordination mechanism in trying to get an overall coordinated integrated solution in a decoupled reality. Numerical examples in single and multiple periods problems show the advantages of our approach over cost‐based methods.     

GIS-Based Analysis of Marginal Price Variation with an Application in the Identification of Candidate Ethanol Conversion Plant Locations

Facility location decisions require large investments of capital and represent long-term commitments for businesses. For firms that are highly dependent on access to raw materials, plant location has a major impact on direct material costs and, hence, on total product costs, pricing, and profitability. In the procurement of bulky, low-value raw materials, the cost of transportation represents a large portion of the final delivered cost. Depending on the commodity, the price paid is often a function of the maximum delivered cost (marginal price) of attaining a target quantity at a particular location. Such costs differ considerably from one candidate location to another if there is significant spatial variation in the quantities of the raw materials and the costs to produce them. In addition, the quality of a transportation network can play a role in the relative marginal prices among candidate locations. An adequate assessment of marginal price is essential for identifying promising areas for plant location. In this paper, we describe a methodology for generating marginal price surfaces when the number of potential supply points and the number of candidate plant locations are both very large. We present a GIS-based application of the methodology for the identification of promising locations for switchgrass-to-ethanol conversion plants.     

Competitive pricing with dynamic asymmetric price effects

We model the temporal pricing strategies for two firms with asymmetric costs and differing market power (i.e. big‐box retailer versus smaller local merchant). A firm's demand is a function of its price, a reference price and its competitor's price. Price effects may be asymmetric, i.e. consumers respond differently if they perceive a good to be over‐priced versus under‐priced. We derive analytical results for optimal prices. We show through a series of numerical examples under what settings firms choose various pricing strategies as well as profit implications for firms with differing costs.     

Dynamic pricing and channel efficiency in the presence of the cost learning effect

This paper investigates the impacts of the supply‐side cost learning effect on dynamic pricing strategies and the channel efficiency in a decentralized supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The unit production cost incurred by the manufacturer declines as the cumulative output increases. With the manufacturer being the price leader, the interactions between the two channel members are modeled as a Stackelberg differential game, where the two channel members dynamically set the wholesale and retail prices over time to optimize their respective profits. We find that while the cost learning effect is beneficial to both channel members in terms of long‐term profitability, such an effect is detrimental to the channel inefficiency caused by price double marginalization. In a setting where the manufacturer sells through competing retailers, we show that the channel efficiency can be improved with the emergence of horizontal competition. Our result also indicates that the channel efficiency with a feedback pricing equilibrium is higher than that with an open‐loop equilibrium.     

价格影响需求的易变质产品动态定价模型

在产品销售价格影响需求的条件下,利用最优控制理论建立了易变质产品的动态定价模型,目标是最大化产品销售周期内总的销售利润。利用Pontryagin 最大值原理得到了产品销售价格的最优性条件。通过对模型的理论分析得出如果产品销售价格介于单位产品购买费用和产品销售价格上限之间,且产品库存在销售周期结束之前始终为正时,销售周期内各时刻的产品最优销售价格一定大于与相应时刻变质率和产品单位库存成本有关的一个下界,销售周期内各时刻的产品最优库存水平一定小于与相应时刻变质率和产品单位库存成本有关的一个上界。     

The effect of firm number on equilibrium product positioning and pricing: a marketing–production perspective

We examine how product design and pricing are affected when the number of firms in the market increases by considering marketing and production variables. We employ a model that adopts marketing notions such as market shares and ideal points to dictate the attraction of the product to consumers. The model also incorporates production costs where the cost of the product increases linearly with increasing product attribute levels. The modeling framework facilitates the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices and product positions. The number of firms in the market is exogenously defined. When the number of firms in the market increases, firms lower their prices and design their product with features closer to the market's ideal point. This results in lower profits.