信息不对称条件下寡头集团转移定价决策分析

研究信息不对称条件下存在中间产品外部市场的寡头集团转移定价决策问题.在不完全竞争中间产品外部市场条件下,当集团之间信息不对称时,对中间产品内外部实行单一定价,转移价格将大于中间产品的边际成本;对中间产品内外部实行差别定价时,转移价格则等于中间产品的边际成本.通过对两种策略的比较可知,寡头集团实行差别定价还是单一定价,取决于中间产品外部市场和最终产品市场的需求价格弹性.     

基于Cournot-Bertrand 混合竞争的企业集团转移定价决策

研究多部门企业集团在最终产品市场面临Cournot-Bertrand 混合竞争时的转移定价决策问题. 由动态博弈的逆向归纳求解方法可知, 均衡转移定价策略将随着最终产品之间的关系而有所差异. 当竞争对手仅生产最终产品时, 最优转移价格高于边际成本, 且采用价格-产量竞争优于产量-价格竞争; 当竞争对手为垂直一体化企业时, 采用产量-价格竞争的最优转移价格高于边际成本, 采用价格-产量竞争则低于边际成本, 而且采用产量-价格竞争优于价格-产量竞争.

     

非合作条件下基于责任延伸制的电子废弃物回收主体利益博弈研究

针对由两个制造商、两个回收商、当地政府和消费者构成的物流系统,研究了非合作条件下电子废弃物回收主体的利益博弈.在责任延伸制前提下,以回收商为斯坦伯格主导者,分别构建了非合作条件下的垄断回收模型和竞争回收模型,并采用逆推法求解了模型的纳什均衡条件.最后进行灵敏度分析,探讨了产品替代率和回收率对两种模式下产品销售价格和回收费用的影响.结果表明,对于回收商,垄断回收模式下的平均回收费用总比竞争回收模式高,且回收商需根据临界值选择回收模式;对于制造商,垄断回收模式下设定的价格总比竞争回收模式高,且制造商总是偏好竞争回收模式.研究结果可为决策者对回收模式的选择提供理论依据.     

竞争视角下考虑技术创新的逆向供应链微分博弈

针对由再制造商、线上线下竞争回收商和消费者组成的逆向供应链,考虑技术创新研究竞争背景下逆向供应链的微分博弈问题.利用伊藤过程刻画再制造技术先进度的随机演化过程,基于成员的利润结构,构建逆向供应链的随机微分博弈模型.运用贝尔曼连续型动态规划理论,求解动态和稳定均衡状态下成员的反馈策略,揭示再制造技术先进度的动态随机演化特征.最后结合算例,分析两种均衡状态下,回收商的竞争程度和消费者对直接回收价格的敏感系数对各成员均衡策略以及利润的影响.研究表明:提高再制造技术先进度可降低直接回收价格和转移回收价格;由于随机干扰因素的影响,再制造技术先进度始终围绕其期望上下波动,最终稳定于一个稳态值;回收商的竞争有利于激励再制造商投入更多的技术创新努力以提高再制造技术先进度,进而提高电子废弃物的整体可再制造率,但会降低回收商的单位获利,并且过度的竞争不利于电子废弃物的回收.     

零售商价格竞争下的最优决策与收益共享契约

研究由一个制造商与两个竞争零售商组成的两级供应链系统的最优决策及契约协调问题,其中每个零售商面临的需求是价格敏感和随机的.当随机需求分布具有递增失败率(IFR)时,竞争的零售商存在唯一最优的定价和订购决策,并给出了最优决策的解析表达式,证明了收益共享契约能使两个竞争零售商加盟的供应链达到协调及契约成立的条件.最后通过理论推导和数值分析给出了需求价格弹性系数对最优决策及协调的影响.     

沉淀成本、市场结构与企业战略博弈分析

新古典一般均衡理论体系在完全的产品和要素市场完全竞争条件下,是一个没有沉淀成本的经济模型,然而在市场不完全的条件下,由于沉淀成本的存在,不仅导致要素市场失灵,而且还造成企业阊成本不对称和竞争优势,进而造成企业间战略博弈,为企业家寻求超额利润奠定了客观基础。因此,我们运用沉淀成本概念,借助于不完全产品市场结构来研究企业闻的战略博弈,将完全竞争条件下企业无沉淀成本的价格接受者被动理性转变为寡头市场结构条件下的主动战略理性,为企业闻战略博弈提供了一种研究方法,同时也为企业战略管理提供了指导原则,即在于加强沉淀成本管理和风险管理。     

多TCP协议多链路端拥塞控制特性研究

当多链路端网络模型中包含有多种TCP协议的数据源端时,不同源端根据不同的反馈信号调整发送速率,无法保证网络平衡点的存在性和唯一性及带宽分配的公平性.针对不同源响应不同反馈价格机制,引入价格映射函数,建立了具有不同价格映射函数的对偶优化模型.证明了在适当假设下该模型平衡点是存在的.提出并证明了保证网络平衡点唯一性的价格映射函数设计条件.同时在期望带宽分配公平性的平衡点下给出了网络允许的最大往返延迟时间.     

考虑公平目标的网约车服务价格管制策略

考虑网约车服务与出租车服务的竞争市场中,按照服务感知体验高低将网约车服务分为两类,如专车服务属于高服务感知体验的网约车服务,顺风车服务可视为低服务感知体验的网约车服务.研究网约车服务与出租车服务共存情况下实现公平这一目标的价格管制策略制定,并比较无竞争市场、竞争市场无管制与竞争市场管制3种情景下社会福利的变化.研究结果表明:网约车服务体验高于出租车服务体验时,价格管制提高了网约车服务价格,两种服务竞争提高了社会福利,但价格管制的实施相对降低了社会福利;网约车服务体验低于出租车服务体验但二者较为接近且出租车服务价格处于较低水平时,无需监管即可实现管制目标,此时竞争市场中有无管制2种情景下的社会福利变化与网约车服务感知体验以及出租车服务的价格有关.     

需求依赖于价格情境下基于Copula-CVaR 的报童决策

探讨价格不确定下,需求-价格相关性与风险态度对决策行为的影响.建立随机需求与随机价格相关情境下基于Copula-CVaR的报童决策模型,Copula函数描述相关性,条件风险价值(CVaR)反映风险态度,证明了模型解的存在性和惟一性.蒙特卡罗模拟发现,需求与价格的相关性与风险态度对决策的交互作用使决策行为发生规律性变化,决策者对价格波动有一定容忍度,需求与价格相关性趋于不相关与完全负相关时市场趋于同质性.     

考虑参照价格效应的双渠道供应链协调机制设计

考虑参照价格效应对双渠道供应链运作的影响,构建制造商和实体店间的Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨参照价格效应影响实体店销售价格和网店直销价格的机理,并在此基础上设计一个改善供应链运作的协调机制.研究结果表明:与集中决策模式相比,分散决策模式下的供应链整体利润水平会降低;参照价格效应的存在能够缓解渠道间价格的竞争程度,提升供应链的运作效率;合理设计的两部定价契约能够作为协调双渠道供应链的有效机制.     

Coordination and price competition in a duopoly common retailer supply chain

This paper analyzes the coordination and competition issues in a two-stage supply-chain distribution system where two vendors compete to sell differentiated products through a common retailer in the same market. The demand of a product not only depends on its own price, but also on the price of the other. Mathematical models have been developed to analyze the coordination issues under three different contexts: (i) price competition without channel coordination; (ii) price competition with channel coordination; and (iii) global coordination. It has been shown that under certain conditions, price competition through the dynamic process of price adjustment reaches the Nash–Bertrand equilibrium. Conditions have been derived for the Nash–Bertrand equilibrium to be dynamically stable. Further, it has been shown that duopoly competition can make consumers better-off or worse-off depending on the degree of product differentiation and the type of the product; while coordination enhances overall supply-chain profitability. The model is illustrated with suitable numerical examples.     

A hybrid of monopoly and perfect competition model for hi-tech products

For Hi-tech products, the demand rate, the component cost as well as the selling price usually decline significantly with time. In the case of perfect competition, shortages usually result in lost sales; while in a monopoly, shortages will be completely backordered. However, neither perfect competition nor monopoly exists. Therefore, there is a need to develop a replenishment model considering a hybrid of perfect competition and monopoly when the cost, price and demand are decreasing simultaneously. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis are carried out to illustrate this model. The results show that a higher decline-rate in the component cost leads to a smaller service level and a larger replenishment interval. When the component cost decline rate increases and the selling price decline rate decreases simultaneously, the replenishment interval decreases. In perfect competition it is better to have a high service level, while for the case with monopoly, keeping a low service level is better due to complete backordering.     

弹性效用价格竞争博弈的纯策略寡占均衡

讨论了具有弹性效用的并行路径网络的多个服务提供商之间的价格竞争博弈问题。如果每个拥有链路的服务提供商的目的是设定使自己利润最大化的价格,而用户依据Wardrop原理选择自己的传输流量和传输路径。当每个用户的效用函数为凹函数且其一阶导数也是凹函数,网络链路的延迟函数为线性函数时,则证明了这种多个服务提供商之间的价格竞争博弈存在纯策略寡占均衡。     

链与链基于价格竞争和规模不经济的纵向控制结构选择

考察价格竞争和规模不经济因素对链与链纵向控制结构选择的影响,并从制造商的绩效角度和供应链系统的绩效角度识别了纵向控制结构的动态演变过程及最终均衡结构,得到当价格竞争强度相对较弱且严重依赖于规模不经济效应时,不管是从制造商角度还是供应链系统角度,一体化结构为占优均衡结构;当价格竞争惨烈但又严重依赖于规模不经济效应时,分散化结构为供应链系统的占优均衡结构.     

Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions

This paper analyzes reserve price efficiency in auctions, which is defined as the relative value of the expected revenue increase induced by the optimal reserve price. We give a formal definition of competition (competitive pressure) in auctions and prove that reserve price efficiency is a decreasing function of competition level. And finally, some examples of auction properties affecting monotonically competition level are provided.     

An Agent-Based Economy Model of Real-Time Secondary Market for the Cognitive Radio Networks

The evolution of the cognitive radio network theory often presents economics-based methods and free market principles in the administration of network functioning. We present here, an application of the agent-based model in the case of an economy consisting of five primary users and secondary users (SUs) uniformly distributed in the linear region. We show that the price-based demand evolution and price competition play a significant role only in an “economizable” network loading band, while in both the low-loading and the over-loading state, the market rules fail. On the contrary, in the economizable loading state, the price competition, demand sensitivity and specific SUs’ locations work well, underpinning the known economic rules.     

The Effectiveness of Low Price Matching in Mitigating the Competitive Pressure of Low Friction Electronic Markets

The conventional wisdom is that Internet commerce substantially reduces the transaction costs for comparison shopping, which in turn intensifies price competition. However, the technology of the Internet marketplace offers retailers tools with the potential to blunt some of this competition. This paper explores the competitive impact of an electronic low price matching policy when firms can track customer search behavior. Using controlled laboratory techniques, we find that through the use of low price matching sellers are able to dampen some of the intense competition spawned when a large proportion of consumers comparison shop.